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Controlling Small Wars

A Strategy for the 1970s

ALLEN LANE THE PENGUIN PRESS

First published in the United States in 1969 by
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York

First published in Great Britain in 1970 by
Allen Lane The Penguin Press
Vigo Street, London W1

ISBN 0 7139 0127 6

Printed in Great Britain by
Fletcher & Son Ltd, Norwich
Set in Monotype Times New Roman

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Preface

This work is the outgrowth of a series of research studies conducted by the Arms Control Project of the MIT Center for International Studies on the problems of arms and security in the developing regions of the world. The war in Vietnam gave special point to our research. More generally, as the 1960s yield to the 1970s, Americans with concern for the future cannot help but be sobered by examination of the multitude of small wars the world over in which the United States has either been playing a part, or believed lay within the ambit of its concern as a great power with extensive – but ill-defined – responsibilities. Our own approach to this broad range of issues has been primarily as scholars. But as concerned citizens we have the strong conviction that the recent past teaches crucially important lessons about the future, which the United States will ignore at its peril.

In our research we were fortunate to have the willing and indeed indispensable collaboration of a number of associates. In the historical-analytical case studies that we devised, the better to comprehend the dynamic history of conflicts, we are indebted to the following individuals: Mrs Jane K. Holland, who drafted virtually the entire first part of Chapter 5 on the Soviet–Iranian conflict; Miss Priscilla A. Clapp, who did the same with Chapter 6 on the Bay of Pigs, and Mr R. Lucas Fischer, who prepared the bulk of the first part of Chapter 8 on the Indonesian war of independence. Conflict in the Middle East was initially researched by Mr Philip Raup, Miss Clapp, and Mrs Irirangi C. Bloomfield, who also helped with the general editing.

A very special debt of gratitude is owed to our closest collaborator throughout the entire research, Colonel Laurence J. Legere, USA (Retd). Colonel Legere contributed much to the present work and in addition served as a source of advice and judgement without which we would have been the poorer.

We also benefited at all stages of the research from the imaginative and sympathetic collaboration of Dr Richard E. Barringer and Mr John H. Hoagland, as well as from the helpful assistance of Miss Janet Fraser and Mr Robert K. Ramers.

This book is based in part on research prepared under a contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgements expressed herein are those of the authors and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other department or agency of the United States government.

At the same time, we would be derelict in not paying tribute to two public servants of high competence – Lieutenant-General John J. Davis, USA, and Mr Edmund S. Finegold, whose wise, understanding, and encouraging sponsorship of our research could serve as a model for government–university relations.

Cambridge, Mass. LPB
April 1969 ACL

Introduction

Since the 1940s United States policy, when faced with a foreign conflict in which Communism seemed involved or serious instability threatened, has reacted with a certain consistency. Toward such local conflicts – and there have been many – the guiding assumption has been that someone, whether collective security agencies such as the United Nations or if necessary this country alone, must be prepared to intervene to repel aggression, restore order, or both. Vietnam is only the latest example. The US attitude has been that of a strong and responsible power which regretted its irresponsible isolationism during the rise of Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese militarism. It has also been that of a rich *status-quo* power with world-wide interests which felt itself threatened by violent and convulsive changes virtually anywhere in the world. And it has been that of the leading proponent of universal collective security and international organization. We expected the newly created world order to function and, when it could not, we created new organizations on a regional scale; when these could not cope, it became natural for us to consider unilateral intervention.

On occasion since the end of World War II, the peace of the world has probably been saved by the willingness of the United States to act in this unilateral fashion. For the 1970s, however, this nation may need a rather different approach.

It is not that the fundamental problems will be radically different. As the world moves into the 1970s, aggressive international behaviour will remain, as before, a virulent danger to world peace. It will still be true that unless someone discourages such behaviour

it will tend to flourish. And some Communists, however home-grown, will remain committed to political means that profoundly violate the central traditions of Western ethics and democratic life.

But some other things *have* altered. Today we surely know that social change in developing societies, though it often looks like instability, may in the long run be the only sure road to stability. Also we have observed that contemporary revolution is as often as not non-Communist, however frequently Communists may seek to manipulate it. And we have noticed that Communist intervention can frequently be as much of a headache for them as our own variety can be for us. Furthermore, Communism itself has become a congeries of feuding powers. And in this epoch of thermonuclear arsenals, strategic delivery systems, and sophisticated nuclear warheads, the possible price of direct great-power military involvement in local conflict has gone steadily up. Perhaps most to the point, the United States of America is long overdue in refurbishing its own social order, a task deserving the highest priority in both resources and attention.

For all of these reasons the 1970s call for an alternative strategy to unilateral military intervention. Intervention may still be found necessary when vital interests are threatened. But the peace – and US national interests – may be better served at most times by a purposeful strategy of *conflict control*. The prime aim of this strategy would be neither to win nor to guide local conflicts; it would be to prevent, contain, or terminate them. It would seek, in short, to make them less threatening to regional and world peace by applying American brains, energy, and resources to the minimizing of violence by deliberate purposeful policies.

We do not allege that the United States government has been unmindful of the growing incidence of internal conflict and conflict among smaller powers. It has been trying hard to educate itself about insurgency situations, good and bad, Communist and other. It has at times sought to damp down small wars between nations. But faced with both types of prevalent local conflicts – internal insurgencies and inter-state wars in regions that are

developing – the United States has given the impression it lacked coherent policy doctrines, did not always know what kinds of policies would best serve its interests, and had failed to anticipate conflicts intelligently.

Two policy failures have been in evidence. One is failure to take advantage of such patterns and uniformities as may exist among local conflicts. The other is failure to anticipate and prevent embryonic conflicts. The United States has appeared to lurch with pained surprise from crisis to crisis; the central preoccupation of American decision-makers has often been keeping up with unanticipated squabbles abroad. Perhaps because they never have caught up, and there has never been time or energy for analysis, the notion persists that such conflicts are random and individually unique phenomena calling typically for traditional diplomatic and military treatment – and that only if they become sufficiently menacing.

Failure to anticipate and prevent is a great handicap in coping with internal conflict – revolutions, civil wars, and guerilla uprisings. Even more to the point, the United States has been looking at these internal struggles primarily from the standpoint of producing an outcome favourable to itself, although even when 'our' side 'wins' it is by no means clear that the ultimate outcome will truly favour U S interests, let alone the larger common interest in regional and world peace. To date, the dominant questions have been how to deny the area in question to those nations hostile to the United States and how best to apply friendly resources and power to produce an outcome favourable to the United States.

It seems both relevant and timely to ask an additional question. If, instead of 'winning', one's objective were *to bring a given conflict under control with the prime aim of avoiding or minimizing violence*, what would have to be done?

It is another matter whether one wants to carry out such a policy. There may well be local conflicts that the United States is legitimately more interested in winning than in controlling. On occasion the United States might choose even to foment a local conflict rather than accept the moral or strategic consequences of

keeping the conflict suppressed (although the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961 and the Suez conflict of 1956 illustrate both the great political costs and the agonizing practical difficulties of wars – particularly 'limited wars' – generated by democracies). Other values than minimizing violence or keeping down the potential risk of intensification may frequently be preferred. The overarching goal may legitimately be victory for one side, the serving of justice, the defeat of Communism, the downfall of oppressors, the ousting of colonial rulers, etc. There will continue to be times when these latter ends are, by any but doctrinaire pacifist standards, more to be valued than the exclusive end of avoiding or minimizing violence. But might it not be well to develop a set of prescriptions for those times when minimizing violence *is* – or *should be* – the determinant of policy? We are profoundly convinced it would.

Part One

1

The Age of Local Conflict

For two decades the world has lived in the shadow of a nuclear war. The driving ambitions of first the Soviet Union and then Communist China, as well as the determined opposition of the West, gave such a war every reason for happening. But only a madman could regard a general thermonuclear exchange as a rational means of gaining political ends. Because of this fearsome realization, local quarrels and disorders far from the capitals of the great powers have become in a sense substitutes for general war. Small wars do get fought in this era. In case after case they have posed at least potential threats of intensification to wider areas and of use of more destructive weapons.

Two consequences follow. Now that fear of intensification has generally inhibited the intervention of super-powers, local conflicts have been more free to take place. And today the most powerful nations on earth have found themselves entangled with small-scale conflicts to a degree that is unique in political history. Post-World War II conflicts of the local variety thus pose a problem of growing magnitude for the super-powers. They have also acutely complicated the process of modernization for developing nations in the regions outside Europe. So far, over 95 per cent of the little wars of our age have taken place in the great southern, under-developed half of the world.

Some of these local conflicts resemble the traditional type of warfare between states. But over half have been internal insurrections, insurgencies, civil wars, and guerrilla-type conflicts. All have been 'limited', most in the sense of taking place within the frontiers of a single state. Even the largest-scale, such as Korea

and Vietnam, have been tied to restricted objectives. Along with the general decline in international wars for conquest and colonization has come an increase in the proportion of wars for psychologically coercive purposes. Furthermore, formal declarations of war are almost completely out of fashion. Therefore, if we define 'conflicts' as disputes in or between nations that involve the threat or use of significant violence, some fifty-four have taken place since 1945.

The forces that generate local conflicts show no sign of diminishing. To the extent that the incidence of local conflict is a function of economic, social, and political change, one can confidently predict a steepening of the curve as the change processes accelerate. A familiar historic process of geo-political consolidation is taking place; this process includes conflict. In the case of the East:

> Insurgency really springs out of the fact that Asia is entering, shall we say, the nineteenth century. Stronger central governments imbued with nationalist concepts have arisen since World War II. They are in the process of extending their authority to areas hitherto only claimed on maps. . . . It's like the rise of national European powers in the nineteenth century. It's always the hill people who are last to be brought under control.[1]

The same description may be applied equally to parts of Africa where independent governments face the problem of maintaining internal security against a variety of domestic dissidents.

The sundering of the nineteenth-century colonial map into fragments of independent political life has produced a multitude of states without settled boundaries, viable economies, or adequately trained personnel. Add to these instabilities the population and technological explosions, as well as the spread of mass communications preaching a message of human rights and individual freedom, and all the ingredients exist for revolutionary change.

Whatever the colour of a given revolution, conflict arises from

1. Statement by a Chinese-born diplomat in Bangkok, cited in Harrison E. Salisbury, 'Unrest in the Hills Besets South Asia', *The New York Times*, 26 June 1966.

the very nature of revolutionary change. Danton's apothegm that 'revolution devours its children' has proved no less true of a Nkrumah or Sukarno than of a Trotsky, Zinoviev, Peng Teng-hua, or Liu Shao-ch'i. Future victims are not hard to discern.

In the southern half of Africa there are several potentially explosive colonial situations. Despite surface calm the continued domination of a black population by a white minority puts a slow but sputtering fuse on the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, as well as on South West Africa, where the United Nations has declared its competence to lead the inhabitants to independence but has yet to solve the problem of wresting control from the South African government. Racial conflagration could develop in South Africa or Rhodesia and perhaps in the Congo or any other place where white settlers or mercenaries continue to defy aspirations of a black majority. Continued white-minority domination has created a widespread commitment to violence by Africans inside and outside these areas.

Future conflicts *between* states should not be written off either. The absence of clearly demarcated boundaries in Africa looms as another source of local conflict – between Algeria and Morocco, Morocco and Mauretania, Ethiopia and Somalia, and some other areas where the issue is not yet acute. Nor is this problem confined to Africa. There are border disputes in the Arab world, such as between Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the recently created South Yemen. In the Himalayan foothills India has yet to solve border differences with China that have already had at least one violent phase.

Rivalries for leadership in the Arab world seem to be sharpening. An ideological void has followed the rejection of colonial and tribal political concepts; a legitimate basis for authority is often lacking, and what one faction claims, another may challenge until force becomes the final arbiter. Only where one leader can claim leadership through the charisma of his person, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, has there been internal stability, however fragile. Stability may materialize in south and south-east Asia as an accompaniment of efforts to organize the nations on

a regional basis. But the hardy perennial trouble spots of Kashmir, Palestine, and Cyprus are chronic Middle Eastern conflicts that remain dangerously unresolved.

It is the rivalries between the super-powers that make local conflicts matter so much to those not directly involved. Changes, however, are taking place in these rivalries. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have seemed to be undergoing a shift toward improved understanding and recognition of limited common interests. Moscow's role as peace-maker in the Indian–Pakistani fighting in 1965 contrasted with two decades of dogmatic Soviet support in and out of the United Nations for the Indian side. Likewise, despite its drive for influence and control in the Middle East, Soviet diplomacy strongly favoured an end to fighting when the guns finally spoke there in 1956 and in 1967.

Nevertheless, continuing international dangers inhere even in *controlled* Soviet trouble-making around the world. In developing regions the Sino–Soviet split may now generate conflicts by competition for the allegiance of local radical movements; such intra-Communist conflicts may be exacerbated by rivalry with leftist *non*-Communist revolutionary groups in Latin America and elsewhere. Chinese nuclear diplomacy will doubtless endow some such issues in the future with an apocalyptic note of terror. Alongside all this may of course be increasing collisions within Moscow's eastern European empire.

All local conflicts are now potentially subject to the use of nuclear weapons. It takes little effort to imagine what may happen when fanatical local leaders possess crude nuclear weapons and perhaps a willingness to use them. Unfortunately the instabilities that lie behind local conflicts will be little affected by great-power arms control and disarmament agreements, with the notable exception of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

For the developing regions, then, the pre-conditions for continued conflict exist in abundance. Nothing seems safer than the prediction that the decade of the 1970s, because it will be one of revolution, modernization, and change, will be one of local conflict. The ingredients are likely to exist in the foreseeable future

as they do now, for local conflicts to flourish, to draw in the great powers, and to intensify.

*

In the face of these prospects it is our thesis that a more purposeful effort is required – as a matter of high urgency and concern – to prevent, contain, and terminate such conflicts with a minimum of violence and with the least chance of their intensifying or spreading. It is our further conviction, based on a fine-grained analysis of small wars in the post-war period, that much can be learned from recent history for present and future application. We believe that significant elements of a *strategy of conflict control* can now be derived and be set alongside past strategies of 'win' that all too often involved belatedly, politically costly, and sometimes bloody unilateral military intervention.

Lest our assertions seem pretentious let it be admitted at once that, even if a purposeful conflict-control policy is to be studied and adopted for maximum use, in few other areas of foreign policy are there more formidable difficulties and obstacles. Even in terms of available information on which to base a new look at local-conflict control, one starts from a surprisingly thin base of organized knowledge; for a generation substantial American intellectual energy has been devoted to understanding and calculating the prospect of general war between the super-powers. We now know a great deal about the theory of super-power wars, happily still in the realm of theory.

As a mutual desire to avoid thermonuclear war created a built-in strategy of caution in Moscow, Washington, and probably Peking as well, strategic theory lowered its gaze to the subject of limited war, in the sense of less than general nuclear clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe and elsewhere. Virtually all the limited-war literature deals with this rather than with all-out nuclear exchange between the super-powers. Henry A. Kissinger, in his pioneering work on nuclear warfare, established the characteristics of such a conflict: specific rather than unlimited objectives and the intention of affecting rather than crushing the will of one's opponent. Thomas C. Schelling

illuminated the bargaining utility of unused force. Both writers emphasized the fact of not using all of one's power and thus not fighting a general war on the model of World Wars I and II (and presumably, III). This genre of analysis is of great value. The control of what we here call 'local conflict' can benefit from the ideas of deliberate restraints, symbolic communications, and tacit bargaining that are now a part of super-power relations. But specific new policies are now needed to cope with the cat-and-dog fights that often take place far from the heart of Soviet or US military power.

Even the definition of 'limited' becomes blurred when removed from the familiar super-power lexicon, which is why we will call such lower-level conflicts 'local'. In many of them (although less so, for example, in the Korean and Vietnam wars) the discrepancy between the potential power of the belligerents and the actual force exerted by one or more of them is much less than in skirmishes or proxy wars among the super-powers. The relative limitation of local wars has not generally been brought about by deliberate self-denial, typical of current super-power policy. What has kept them limited, and sometimes kept them local, has not always been lack of physical capabilities, but instead consideration of the nature and value of war aims, possible costs of the war, and prospects of achieving aims at a particular level of effort – a consideration that is by no means always affected by capabilities.

Just because local conflicts have tended to remain confined and rather low-level from a super-power standpoint, it does not follow that either the passions involved, the intensity of commitment, or the ideological component were necessarily less. Some conflicts are of a low order of intensity even by local standards. But sometimes this was only because they lacked the capacity to be intercontinental rather than because they were purposefully modest in their aims.

There is thus a range of points of view from which one can consider conflict as limited. What looks to Washington like a brushfire may from the standpoint of the combatants appear total.

To those who were involved unlimited annihilation may have seemed an accurate description for an Alamo, a Little Big Horn, a Carthage – or an Asian village that was levelled, its crops destroyed, and most of its population killed. That such conflict stands low on the scale of thermonuclear casualties is irrelevant to the local perspective.

By the same token the seeming inability of non-great-power countries to carry their struggles to the point of exhaustion or annihilation does not necessarily carry with it a willingness on their part to reach any kind of settlement, other than perhaps an armed truce (as examples: Palestine, Cyprus, and Kashmir). The Nasserite Arabs, the black-majority-ruled African states (*vis-à-vis* South Africa and the white Rhodesian régime), and Communist North Vietnam, even if deprived of sophisticated means, in theory could with will and organization conduct war without end. Rome, as Robert Osgood has pointed out, did not need nuclear bombs to annihilate Carthage. The most intractable conflicts are often the most local of all – especially those that occur within the boundaries of a new state (or newly divided state) in which the issue is control over the machinery of internal rule; by virtue of the potency and universality of internal instability in developing regions this type of conflict may range very high in intensity and commitment. For this reason the temptations to *external* involvement on ideological grounds may be extensive, as they were in the Spanish civil war, the Greek insurgency of the late 1940s, the Vietnam war, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, the 1960 Congo collapse, and the Nigerian civil war 1966–70. In such cases one danger of intensification is a possible spread of war to the general neighbourhood. Another danger is that the involved outside powers will wind up fighting each other. The indivisibility of security in the world of the last third of the twentieth century has come to imply a built-in potential for what is commonly called 'escalation' in its attempts at peace-keeping and peace-making. The aim should be to make security *divisible*.

It should be clear that, whatever great powers may decide, by no means all local conflicts are equally controllable, ranging as

they do from, say, a potential Asian nuclear war to guerrilla warfare in one province of a Latin American country. Moreover, for control-policy purposes super-powers must also consider the difference between what has been an inadvertent stumbling into an unwanted local war and the local conflict that has been planned, initiated, and will be persisted in until death or victory.

China, for example, claims to see itself in a continuing worldwide conflict in which stimulated 'wars of national liberation' are to be viewed as battles in a prolonged revolutionary war of global sweep. On a somewhat lower order, Nasser's Egypt holds aims that at times have appeared to embrace all of the African continent. Fidel Castro acts as if he has unlimited aims with regard to the whole of Latin America. Sukarno at one stage had ambitions which extended to wherever the Malay race was found in south-east Asia; Kwame Nkrumah's ambitions at one stage apparently embraced a mystical notion of pan-Africa. Certainly some African states would, if they could, draw all Europe and North America into a war to the end against white-ruled governments in such places as Rhodesia and South Africa. Even discounting the occasional tendency of local leaders rhetorically to invoke World War III and threaten thermonuclear exchanges and all the other apocalyptic extravagances they evidently wish they had available, indigenous self-restraint cannot always be counted on to keep local conflicts either local or limited.

Thus there are many hindrances to a conflict-control approach. But, as we propose to show, there are also some potential levers or handles available to the would-be conflict controller that are not always remembered, used, or used well or intelligently. A closer look at the detailed life-cycles of post-war local conflicts reveals that, far from being totally unique and unsusceptible to any general rules, they conform surprisingly to common patterns of structure and have common factors at work at different points along their lifelines (factors identifiable as either promoting or limiting violence). Thus some elements exist for a positive approach that, within the limits of realism, may hold promise for influencing events which frequently seem unavoidable.

2

An Anatomy of Conflict

To move toward greater understanding of a strategy for controlling future conflicts one must be more systematic and precise about lessons drawn from past experience than is possible by relying solely on memory and general impressions. Using *traditional* methods a great deal can be learned about a particular conflict, even about a number of conflicts, but without moving toward a better understanding of the phenomenon of conflict itself – its structure, its mechanism, the pressures that drive it – or how those pressures can be controlled. What is therefore required is a device to enable us to observe the *internal dynamics* of conflicts. For this we need a concept of the anatomy and bone structure of conflict.

Essential to unearthing such an anatomy is recognition that conflict is a dynamic process, not a single, unchanging state of affairs. People tend to refer to the 'Kashmir conflict', for example, as a convenient shorthand for the whole history of Indian–Pakistani quarrels over this piece of beautiful but tortured territory. Within the Kashmir conflict – and all others – there have been many different stages or phases, some characterized by bellicose language, some characterized by sabre rattling, some characterized by bloody war. If we wish to learn more about conflict with the central purpose of developing a catalogue of conflict-control measures, it is essential that such stages or phases be studied separately.

We start, then, with a basic concept of conflict as a sequence of *phases*. Within each phase exist *factors* – conditions, perceptions, or events – which generate pressures. Some of these

pressures tend toward increased violence and some tend away from violence. Their relative strength during the phase determines whether or not the conflict worsens. Within each phase the factors interact in such a way as to push the conflict ultimately across a series of *thresholds* toward or away from violence. The transition across thresholds is a function of the combined interaction of the factors of the previous phase.

Conflict originally arises out of a substantive *dispute*, which may be over territory, borders, legitimacy, ideology, power, race, or whatever. This quarrel or dispute over an issue is at first not necessarily perceived in military terms by either party. It is waged at the polls, in the courts, in the press, through UN exchanges or other diplomatic media, economically, politically – anything but militarily. But if one or more parties makes it military – introduces a *military option* – a threshold has then been crossed to a second phase, in which hostilities are potentially likely or at least reasonably expectable; a *conflict* has been generated, starting when the dispute comes to be regarded in military terms by one or both parties.


This condition which we define as 'conflict' can come about when one side acquires military *matériel* – for example when a disaffected group in a given society acquires arms and thus equips itself with the option of pressing its demands by force. Or the military option can be introduced when one or both sides – in a situation, say, of an inter-state conflict where both parties from the outset have standing military establishments – decide that the force they possess is specifically relevant to their dispute. The introduction of a military option does not mean that hostilities have actually occurred, just that they are likely or possible. The conflict is still in a *pre-hostilities* stage.

If *hostilities* break out, intended or accidental, a third phase is entered. *Intensification* (usually, but imprecisely, called 'escalation') may take place during this phase. That is, the hostilities may spread to wider geographic areas; new parties may become engaged; small-scale skirmishes may burgeon into pitched battles; or a war begun with small arms may develop into one in which

the panoply of weapons in the adversaries' inventories is hurled against opposing forces and perhaps civilian and economic targets as well.

If hostilities are *terminated* another threshold is crossed to a fourth phase, in which the conflict may well continue, but without fighting necessarily being resumed. The conflict remains if at least one party continues to view the quarrel in potentially military terms. The conflict ceases when the dispute is no longer perceived significantly in military terms, real or potential. A fifth phase may then be entered, in which the military option is discarded but the issues in dispute remain unresolved; in which case it can be said that the conflict is ended, but not the dispute. If the parties manage to resolve the issues, or if they just cease to care, the dispute is *settled.*

The resulting continuum can thus be assigned these general phases:



For convenience, these various phases can be numbered. Phase I is the dispute stage, where a divisive issue exists but has not yet been cast by either disputant in terms to which military power becomes importantly relevant. Phase II is the pre-hostilities phase, where no shooting takes place but war begins to appear likely: a military build-up starts, or an arms race develops, or military forces are deployed with serious intent to use them at some point. In general the conflict is now perceived more in military than non-military terms. Phase III – the hostilities phase – is when the disputants have crossed the threshold to actual fighting. Phase IV – the cessation of hostilities phase – is an armed truce, so to speak, but with no end to the conflict, let alone a settlement of the underlying dispute. Phase V is a phase beyond conflict, where the situation is no longer perceived in military terms but the dispute persists. Finally, there is another stage beyond, a final

stage where the underlying dispute and, *a fortiori*, the conflict are settled. This stage is *settlement* (S).

The notion of thresholds separating different phases of conflict needs some explanation. One might think that thresholds are the really crucial points to study and understand; these moments of execution, as it were, might appear the centrally important ones, particularly since decisions leading to the succeeding phases can be changed right up to a threshold. For example, the decision to attack is reversible until the attack is actually launched. By this reasoning one might think we should concentrate here on thresholds of transition, rather than on phases, as sources of identifiable points of possible policy leverage in our quest for conflict control.


Exact moments of transition from one threshold to another are often difficult to identify precisely. In addition, as we have said, they misleadingly suggest that if one is looking for policy handles the important moment of change is when an event becomes visible – when hostilities break out, an arms deal is publicly consummated, negotiations succeed, etc. But the moment of conception may be really more significant than the transitional moment of birth; it is at the former that events are, so to speak, foreordained. The point is that violence-producing factors and those tending away from violent outcomes in fact have their interactions *during* phases rather than exactly at moments of transition. At a threshold they have accumulated to a point where the change visibly takes place. In short, thresholds are merely convenient points of demarcation at which to separate phases; the event of transition is itself a product of forces that have been at work throughout the phase.

Several intriguing hypotheses about the nature and course of local conflicts are implicit in the picture we have drawn so far:

(1) Local conflicts have a general, common structure rather than being always unique and random phenomena.

(2) All conflicts go through a preliminary dispute phase (Phase I) and one or more of three basic conflict phases.

(3) In each phase identifiable factors generate pressures that tend to push the conflict across a threshold of transition into an-



other phase; these factors are countered by other factors that can be regarded as tending toward the prevention of that transition – or toward settlement.[1]

With these three hypotheses in mind we can now propose that change in the relationship among factors will alter the likelihood of a conflict undergoing transition from one phase to another. This last hypothesis is at the very centre of the quest for a strategy of conflict control. We assert that:

(4) *The course of local conflicts can be significantly altered by policy measures aimed at reinforcing violence-minimizing factors and offsetting violence-generating factors, as appropriate for the phase in question.*

In short this kind of four-part analysis can suggest specific policy measures that may tend to control conflicts. Once said, this kind of analysis and logic may appear obvious. But it seems not

1. This inter-relationship of the dynamic process of conflict and the operative pressure factors may be represented in the form of a matrix, as shown in Appendix A.

to have been obvious in an age that must increasingly feel itself the victim of forces beyond its control.

An important insight emerges from the above fourfold line of reasoning. Just as conflict is a dynamic process and not a single state of affairs, so also conflict control cannot be a single policy objective. Control is composed of *several* related but distinct objectives which differ from phase to phase. One control objective is common to every phase: to settle the underlying dispute. But, failing that, there are additional objectives to work towards. Initially the objective is to keep a dispute (Phase I) non-military. Once a military option has been introduced (Phase II) the objective is to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and to contain (i.e., restrict the scope/scale of) potential hostilities. If hostilities break out (Phase III) the objective is to contain (i.e., moderate) them or terminate them. Once open hostilities are terminated (Phase IV) it is necessary to prevent their resumption and, once more, to restrict the scale of a potential resumption. If the disputants are pacified to a point where there is no longer any intention by either to seek a military solution (Phase V), the objective is to keep it that way.[2] Many of these objectives are pursued every day by responsible governments and by international organizations, and they will come as no surprise. What is perhaps surprising is that they can be brought into a coherent theory. Can it be put to use?

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The analytic representation of conflict and policies of conflict control described in the preceding pages is based on pure deduction. Like many models it is an abstract, generalized, even idealized picture – in this case of a common and all too pervasive phenomenon – and will rarely be followed in exact detail by any real-life conflict. Some cases of conflict fortunately never cross the threshold of outbreak of hostilities. Others stay for a mercifully brief time in the hostilities phase and then are either pacified while moving through Phase IV, where the conflict is still sharp

2. A comprehensive model of the structure of local conflict, including the definitions of and inter-relations among phases, factors, and conflict-control policy objectives, appears in Appendix B.

but not openly violent, perhaps go through Phase V, where there is no longer any intention to resolve the dispute by military means, and on to S. Some may even go directly from the battlefield to settlement if results of battle are decisive enough, although what happened to Carthage hardly qualifies as a satisfactory avoidance of Phases IV and V. Another, less Punic example would be the end of a resistance movement in occupied territory when occupation forces surrender or withdraw. A depressing number of conflicts linger in the hostilities phase, moving through sub-phases representing intensification of hostilities (escalation), or perhaps resting in a tenuous, cease-fire peace (Phase IV) until – with renewed wind and limb – hostilities resume. There is, furthermore, no time limit on any single phase. The US–Soviet Cold War is an example of a decades-long Phase II conflict, hopefully always to stay pre-hostilities. In 1947 the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan remained in Phase II only a matter of days before plunging into open hostilities.

The conflict structure we have described is not, of course, the only possible one; other devices may be chosen for dissecting the course of conflict. Mao Tse-tung's three stages of guerrilla warfare, for example, are in a crude sense analogous to our Phases II and III, although his emphasis is on the degree to which terrorism becomes organized into ever larger military formations. Another scale[3] involves four stages: an initial conspiratorial phase (our Phase II); a violent stage (our Phase III); a revolutionary stage; and lastly, a final victory stage, which presumably

3. A. J. Thomas, Jr, Ann V. Thomas, and Oscar A. Salas: *The International Law of Indirect Aggression and Subversion*, report prepared for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under contract no. ACDA/GC–41, 30 June 1966. A related attempt to refine stages or sub-processes of insurgencies, civil wars, and nationalist movements lists ten: initial alienation; organization of revolutionary organizations; mass revolutionary appeals; revolutionary coalition and movement-building; non-violent revolutionary politics; the outbreak of revolutionary violence; rule of the moderates; accession of the extremists; reigns of terror; Thermidor. David C. Schwartz: *A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior* (University of Pennsylvania, Document 6–28–66–86), pp. 9–10.

corresponds either to our Phase V, if the issue remains, or our S, if it has disappeared.

There are, in short, a variety of possible pictures of the general conflict process. Their utility depends on the kinds of questions they are best suited to illustrate. Those just mentioned apply most directly to internal insurgency situations. Since our interest is in *both* internal and inter-state conflict and our goal is to make more coherent a purposeful conflict-control policy, we elected to construct a model that seemed applicable to a wider range of types of conflict and appeared to hold most promise of illuminating the real policy problem of conflict control.

*

Before showing what policy-relevant lessons may be learned by using our model, some further preliminary questions need to be posed. How far back toward the roots of conflict need one go to develop a comprehensive catalogue of conflict-control measures? And what is the relative importance for conflict-control purposes of the several phases?

The answer depends on one's particular angle of vision. The historian usually wishes to comprehend as much as he can of the total sequence of events, tracking them through until their eventual termination. The philosopher is generally concerned with first causes – the innate and often concealed bases for later actions. The peace-maker focuses most often on the later stages of the conflict, bent on seeing how the belligerent parties may be moved toward settlement. And the senior American policy-maker typically starts to focus seriously on a local conflict only when it reaches a stage of volatility sufficient to warrant assigning it a priority among a range of other threatening disturbances.

Furthermore, in order to develop a coherent strategy of conflict control, one needs to learn as much as possible about the larger process within which international or internal political differences move across thresholds toward and away from war. Such an effort requires, of course, an explicit understanding of all the pressures and factors generating conflict.

A model only does part of the job of identifying causal elements. Because a complex phenomenon can be portrayed schematically does not mean that all operative elements can be identified or that the cause-effect relationships that link them can be clearly understood. It is important to understand enough of the cause-effect relationship only to be sure that a given policy activity will in fact reinforce or offset any given combination of factors. This might raise a larger question: can *historic* causes ever be identified, with real confidence, as the basis for later effects?

This question poses anew some of the vexing philosophic problems that are inherent in the search for causes of war. Apart from a few hardy souls in the peace-research field, few still research today in the fashion of, for example, Sidney Fay, in his monumental – and dubious – attempt to learn the true causes of World War I. The beginnings of a conflict stretch back into time, originating from causes that are only imperfectly knowable. Various situations, occurrences, and constellations of pressures can be identified along the route toward a conflict. Some of them are obviously causes. But it is equally true that a conflict may have exploded into hostilities because of some hitherto undetected situation – or because a new condition was suddenly introduced. Not all pressures along the time-space continuum are man-made, or visible at the time, or 'always there'. Some even represent gathered momentum, just as some barriers to intensification represent sheer inertia rather than purposeful policy.[4] Social scientists have been probing into conditions that seem to generate conflict *within* nations. But, with regard to inter-state conflict, the policy-maker and the student of policy will probably always have to content themselves with proximate causes, with no assurance that the basic forces generating conflict are fully revealed.

4. For evidence of the presence at critical choice points of non-rational factors of pressures, acceleration, and a sense of fatality, a classic example may be the World War I case. See especially Barbara W. Tuchman: *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan; 1962) and recent social-science experiments in simulating that event, notably Robert North's at Stanford, reported in Appendix B in Robert C. North *et al.*: *Content Analysis* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press; 1963).

A related intellectual hazard is believing that all conflicts are determined, in the sense that, given the appropriate ingredients, they will proceed in certain inevitable ways. Our thesis rests on the conviction that conflicts are *not* fatally irreversible. All in all, causality appears to be embodied in a combination of environmental situations, wilful intentions, and triggering events, all reaching critical mass at the point a conflict becomes acute. But within these boundaries some probable cause-effect relationships can be discerned.

One basis for this discernment is simple historical correlation. In one sense every significant correlation between a given set of circumstances and a given action may be interpreted as embodying either an explanation or a prediction about probable cause and effect. In our own conflict model, correlations can be made between transitions and the presence of factors in the pre-transition stage which in a limited, but important, sense imply cause and effect. With caveats similar to those of the historical correlator, some medical scientists, for example, implicate blood cholesterol in coronary-artery disease and tobacco in lung cancer. Likewise, the factors that are present during the identifiable phases of a conflict correlate with transitions in the course of a conflict. Only in this sense do they add up to a body of causation.

Ideally, then, *all* factors should be identified in order that all elements of probable causality may be translated into relevant conflict-control measures. The process of identification and correlation becomes increasingly difficult, however, the further one tracks a dispute back in time. More remote causes are embedded in factors that are increasingly difficult to discern.

What all this suggests is that there are actually *two* pre-conflict phases. One is the Phase I of our model, where a discernible dispute exists. The other is a *pre-dispute* phase – Phase Minus-One, so to speak – during which the preconditions for the dispute are maturing.

Is not that seedbed phase the one in which to concentrate for the application of measures to prevent conflict? Ideally, yes. But where? The UNESCO constitution asserts that 'wars begin in

the minds of men', and this is undeniable. Without much doubt there is a general built-in cause in the human proclivity for conflict, along the lines suggested by William James when he wrote that 'our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bones and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us.'[5] Clearly policy must be considered in a shorter and more manageable focus.

An important root cause of internal conflict is implied in the increasingly demonstrated correlation of insurgency with economic conditions (and Communist exploitation of those conditions to seize power). Persuasive statistics have been adduced to support the argument that, as one newspaper put it after Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's notable Montreal speech in May 1966 on this topic, 'Where the Poverty Is, Is Where the Insurgency Is'.[6] Direct connexions have also become increasingly evident between the incidence of conflict and the stresses of the modernization process. A general strategy aimed at minimizing conflict over a long future period quite correctly should focus on measures related to basic factors along the path to modernity. But, again, clearly only some of these factors lend themselves to purposeful current policy likely to control a given conflict.

If the pre-dispute Phase Minus-One stage is essentially un-

5. This view of man as susceptible, regardless of culture, to militarism has had a recent public revival at the hands of the ethologists, led by the celebrated Viennese Konrad Lorenz. See particularly Konrad Lorenz: *On Aggression* (New York: Harcourt, Brace; 1963); and Robert Ardrey: *African Genesis* (New York: Dell; 1963) and *The Territorial Imperative* (New York: Atheneum; 1966). For the view that violence is a 'chronic disease of society', see Kenneth Boulding: *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper & Row; 1962), p. 323.

6. *The New York Times*, 22 May 1966. In his Montreal speech McNamara pointed out that, since 1958, 87 per cent of the world's 'very poor' countries, 69 per cent of its 'poor' countries, and 48 per cent of its 'middle income' countries had suffered significant conflicts, whereas only one out of twenty-seven 'rich' countries had experienced 'major internal upheaval on its own territory'. Ibid., 19 May 1966. The Secretary was using 'rich', 'poor', etc., as defined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which he now heads).

manageable for our analytical purposes, the same can by no means be said of the second pre-conflict phase – the dispute phase – where a specific quarrel has started (Phase I). This phase is of vital importance for better understanding of how to prevent the transition from dispute to conflict, i.e., to Phase II. A few contemporary examples can make this point. Social justice in Cuba during the Batista years might have prevented guerrilla warfare developing in Cuba. Purposeful religious and ethnic collaboration – or separation – would perhaps have averted the strife on the Indian subcontinent and in Cyprus and Palestine. Preventive diplomacy remains the ideal of diplomacy itself.

Nevertheless it is not entirely realistic to ask diplomacy to focus even on Phase I rather than on Phase II. In principle massive diplomatic efforts ought to be employed for preventive diplomacy as early as possible in the life of a dispute. To be realistic, the world is fortunate when policy focuses on conflicts even in their Phase II stage, when hostilities have become more likely but have not yet actually broken out.

In fact the closer one is in time to the actual threshold of hostilities, the more pertinent are concrete policy measures bearing on the conflict itself – and the less relevant are the sorts of measures that might have prevented the conflict from arising in the first place. As the threshold of war gets closer, the policy measures need increasingly to focus on such tangible present realities as arms and external support, as well as on the various forms of diplomatic influence that can be applied to control the conflict.[7]

7. A striking 'laboratory' example of the diminishing relevance of first causes at points well along the conflict-control scale was suggested in a policy-type MIT political-military exercise. The US team sought to head off the hypothetical outbreak of violent revolution in a Middle Eastern country through activation of measures of economic reform and aid that had long been recognized as a means of getting at some of the root causes of strife in the area. But such measures turned out to be far too long-range in impact to affect management of the crisis and had no appreciable bearing on the violent events that unfolded to carry the situation across the threshold from Phase II to Phase III. Lincoln P. Bloomfield *et al.*: *Political Exercise II – The US and the USSR in Iran* (Cambridge: MIT Center for International Studies; December 1960).

What happens when we apply our abstract model of local conflict to real-life events?[8] Do the definitions and hypotheses that make it up still appear meaningful? Does it reveal patterns and consistencies? Or are individual conflicts so different that no useful generalizations can be made? Above all, can the process teach us anything about what ought to be done? In short, can these hypotheses about the way conflicts behave be combined with facts from local conflicts to move us closer to a set of policy prescriptions that might be helpful in getting through the predictably turbulent 1970s?

To assist in the search for answers to these questions, detailed studies were made of fourteen post-World War II local conflicts.[9] These fourteen conflicts were selected as a representative sample out of fifty-four cases.[10] The choice of them was based on the importance of their geographic locus, a desire to have some distribution among colonial, internal, and inter-state types, and the different degrees of successful control demonstrated among them. The first task was to examine the history of each conflict in detail in order to find the transitions or sharp changes that distinguished the different phases hypothesized in our abstract model. At what point was a military option introduced into a dispute, giving it a

8. A more detailed description of the analytic technique used in this study is contained in Chapter 4, and five examples of its application appear in Chapters 5 through 9.

9. Algerian–Moroccan conflict, 1962–3
Angola conflict, 1950–61
Arab–Israeli conflict, 1956–67 (see Chapter 9)
Bay of Pigs, 1960–61 (see Chapter 6)
Conflict on Cyprus, 1952–64
Greek insurgency, 1944–9 (see Chapter 7)
India–China border conflict, 1954–62
Indonesian war of independence, 1945–9 (see Chapter 8
Indonesian–Malaysian confrontation, 1963–5
Kashmir conflict, 1947–65
Malayan emergency, 1948–60
Somalian–Ethiopian–Kenyan conflict, 1960–64
Soviet–Iranian conflict, 1941–7 (see Chapter 5)
Suez (or British–French–Egyptian) conflict, 1956 (see Chapter 9)

10. The list of fifty-four cases is found in Appendix C.

new character of conflict? When, if at all, did hostilities break out? Were there distinct points at which the hostilities intensified or moderated? When did they cease? And so forth, through whatever pattern of transitions each particular conflict passed.

Once the phases had been isolated in each conflict, they were searched for factors that could be identified as bearing on the way the conflict developed, that is, on the transitions to new phases. These factors took the form, not of abstractions about conflict, but of economic, political, military, or social events, conditions, or perceptions that could reasonably be shown to have exerted pressures, in varying degree, on the future course of the conflict.

The detailed list of factors is long, as the case studies in this volume will illustrate. The following general categories of significant factors emerged from the fourteen cases; we feel they include many and perhaps most of the influential variables that may be found in an over-all hypothesis about the internal dynamics of local conflict:

(1) *Degree of commitment.* Included here are answers to the following kinds of questions: what proportion of available military force is engaged in the conflict? Is the conduct of hostilities limited – e.g., are the strategies being pursued more modest than either party is capable of pursuing? How wide-spread or restricted is the issue at stake; for example, does it involve only points on the border, or certain sections of the country, or is the issue one of national survival? Are the populations of the parties united behind their leaders in the conflict?

(2) *Autonomy of action.* This refers to factors that affect the degree to which the parties to local conflicts are subject to outside influences constraining their freedom of action. Factors concerning general dependence on external military or economic aid and political assistance, as well on as specific *matériel* support in conflict, are included here. Also found in this category of factors are the controversies that can arise among allies and coalitions as to how the conflict should be conducted.

(3) *Environment.* The physical nature of the locale can profoundly influence the way in which a conflict unfolds. The actions

of the parties themselves are influenced by the ease with which each of them can project its power and influence into the critical area. For this reason, geographic and weather factors are important, as are roads, railroads, airports, rivers, and harbours. Whether the country is flat and open or mountainous or jungle and whether borders are defined and controllable can also be significant. These factors also affect the accessibility of the area to those external powers – other states or international organizations – that might contemplate intervention.

(4) *Information.* The speed and accuracy with which information about developments within a conflict reaches the parties and interested outside powers can also have a major bearing on the conflict. And the channels of communications – how and from whom information is received – can help determine whether or not information is to be believed. Included here are factors, therefore, relating to reliable reports on immediate events as well as to long-range assessments of capabilities and intentions.

(5) *Time.* In many conflicts one can observe pressures that are generated by time: is there time to await clarification of events or are things moving so rapidly that action must be taken immediately if it is to be taken at all? Does the future appear to hold promise of an improvement or a deterioration in the relative balance of power between the parties? Are there specific anticipated events that may affect the prospects of one or both parties, such as an election, the arrival of arms, actions taken by international organizations, interventions by external powers? Such time factors have a bearing on the way in which parties to a local conflict behave and, hence, on the course the conflict takes.

(6) *Military relationship.* One obvious category of factors relates to the relative military power of the parties. And what the military balance between them is *believed* to be can be just as critical as what it actually is. Furthermore, what people think the future balance will be can help determine their decisions about *how vigorously* and *when* to take action. Included in this category are factors relating to the numbers in the armed forces, how much and what kinds of equipment they have, how well they are trained,

how rapidly they can be moved about to meet new challenges or capitalize on new opportunities, and how many threats they must be prepared to meet simultaneously. Related to all these issues are the kinds of strategy and tactics both sides are employing and whether the military doctrines of the parties are suitable to the challenges they face.

(7) *Internal cohesion.* The stability and unity of the people of a state are, of course, prime factors in internal conflicts. (By definition, it is the absence of such stability and unity that makes internal strife possible.) There are, as well, a number of ways in which the internal cohesion of states can influence the course of *inter-state* conflict. We have already mentioned that pressures from powerful groups in a divided nation can alter the freedom of action of its leaders. Equally, foreign adventures are a classic way in which weak leaders seek to unite their followers and distract them from problems at home. The degree of obvious internal cohesion also helps to determine each side's perceptions of the other's staying power and can reveal the possible existence of active or potential allies within the enemy camp.

(8) *Internal control.* The authority of central leadership over segments of its nominal following is often clearly absent in internal conflict. But there can be found within opposing camps of contestants, in both internal and inter-state conflicts, factors that reflect the degree of their strong, united leadership. Included in this category, therefore, is knowledge of the level of authority that can be exercised over local activists, including at times the military.

(9) *Ethnic relationships.* Both within each side to a local conflict and between them a variety of factors can at times be found that reflect basic racial, tribal, religious, or linguistic factors. Such factors can produce a volatile situation when the issues in the conflict tend to take shape along ethnic lines.

(10) *Ideology.* Ideologies may also affect the course of local conflict. Democracy, monarchism, Communism, socialism – all these can be banners behind which opposing forces rally, as well as factors conditioning their perceptions and expectations.

(11) *Past relationships.* Many of the issues in contention be-

tween local adversaries have had their genesis in the past history of their relations – issues such as disputed boundaries, irredentist claims, and other general historic animosities. At issue can be a long history. This category of factors therefore includes not only the memories that conflicting parties carry with them into their new quarrel but also the manner in which each will interpret or perceive the other's words, deeds, and intentions. Furthermore, actions which the parties have taken in earlier phases of the conflict can help condition their own, their supporters', and their adversaries' present outlooks and expectations. Men often learn from history, but sometimes they learn the wrong lessons.

(12) *Actions of international organizations.* Since the states of the world have provided themselves with instruments for keeping the peace, it is not surprising that a large number of factors found to be operating within conflicts involve these organizations in some way. Included in this category are not only the United Nations but also various regional security arrangements such as the Organization of American States, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity. Factors here relate to past actions the organizations have taken – the precise kinds of action, the speed and harmony with which they proceeded, the success they had – and to the parties' expectations about the role these bodies might play in the unfolding conflict.

(13) *Great-power interests, commitments, and actions.* This major cluster of factors encompasses the variety of impacts great powers can have – or have had – on the course of local conflicts. Each of the great powers has acquired obligations toward the developing countries or regions that colour the former's assessment of its stake in the outcomes of local quarrels and the latter's expectations about the role the great power will play. Ideological ties, formal treaty commitments, historic spheres of interest or responsibility, base rights, economic interests – all these can affect local conflicts. Whether local conflicts are sparked by competitive great-power interests or whether local adversaries themselves seek to draw in friendly great powers, the fact remains that time and again the great powers play critical roles in other people's quarrels.

Once again specific timing of action is equally important. Also of special importance is whether the great powers act in concert or in competition. Finally, the general state of relations among the great powers generally provides the broad setting within which local conflicts take place.

The above categories encompass all the factors we identified as exerting a force on the development of local conflicts. They are not, to be sure, exclusive categories. In the context of a specific conflict a particular significant event might have in it elements of several categories. For example, the imminent arrival of large quantities of Soviet arms in Cuba in 1961 represented competitive great-power involvement that appeared likely to strengthen Castro militarily to the point where no low-key exile invasion could succeed, and this in turn was used by those who argued for prompt US action while opportunity still existed. But although, historically, factors seldom fall neatly into single categories, the ones listed above underscore the very wide range of factors we found in local conflicts.

Another necessary caveat is that no factor or category of factors will always exert pressure in one direction only, that is, as a conflict-controlling pressure or a pressure worsening the conflict. When we ask what kind of pressure a given factor or category generated in a specific conflict in a particular phase, the answer must be complex in order to be accurate.

In the Soviet–Iranian conflict in the late 1940s, for example, the relative weakness of the Iranian central government was, during pre-hostilities (Phase II), a factor tending to encourage the Soviet Union and its Azerbaijani separatist cohorts to resort to force to wrest Azerbaijan from Iranian control. At a comparable stage in the Bay of Pigs crisis the apparent weakness of Castro's control – evidenced by the mass exodus from Cuba of his early supporters and by continued anti-Castro guerrilla activities in Cuba – led the United States to believe that a very low-level use of force (the exile invasion) could topple the government. Real or apparent weakness of the central government was, in both cases at this phase, a factor tending toward violence. However, once

hostilities had broken out in Iran, this weakness had a reverse effect: it permitted a rapid, relatively bloodless Azerbaijani-Soviet victory that quickly terminated hostilities (but was undesirable and subsequently reversed).

In Cuba the presumed weakness turned out to be an illusion, posing for the United States the agonizing dilemma of accepting the rapid defeat of its proxy or of committing its own forces and, thus, seriously intensifying the hostilities.

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Finally, in our study of the fourteen conflicts there remained the most demanding – and perhaps most controversial – task of all: *to identify all possible policy measures that might have had the effect of strengthening factors promoting control or the effect of countering or weakening factors tending to push the conflict toward violence.* The number of measures (or actions) to be identified was limited only by the imagination of the authors. Any action by any agent – the United Nations, the great powers, or the parties themselves – that could reasonably be expected to have the desired effect was included. The question we asked ourselves was not: what measures would have controlled this conflict? It was rather: what measures would have strengthened (or countered) this particular factor exerting this kind of pressure? We believe that to answer the second question helps to answer the first.

It is also important to keep in mind that we were, at this stage, trying to answer the above question when the policy objective *was* conflict control. Some of the measures that might have been taken to control conflict are politically ludicrous. For example, with regard to the weak central government factor, a measure aimed only at violence avoidance would have sought to strengthen the internal régimes of anti-Soviet Iran – and of pro-Soviet Cuba – the latter hardly an acceptable US policy objective.

In the real world all interested parties to conflicts in fact pursue a complex set of objectives in which conflict control is, at best, only one of the desired ends and, at worst, is actively opposed. Our objective in going through the exercise just described was

neither to replay history in the most realistic manner possible nor to second-guess policy-makers or castigate them for their lack of foresight and imagination (although at times the evidence is too persuasive to avoid such conclusions). It was rather to compile as large and imaginative a list as possible of policy measures that belong on an agenda of conflict control, and that might, above all, enable diplomacy to do better in those future conflicts *where the minimizing of violence is the prime objective being sought.* The list of conflict-control measures that emerged from this process includes some that would have been politically unacceptable in the real circumstances of the conflict in question or would have been impossible to achieve in time to be effective, even some that – because we deliberately looked at factors in isolation – were at times mutually inconsistent.

But from this approach to the fourteen actual conflicts emerged, first, a substantial list of the types of factors that have in fact been operating in contemporary local conflict, and second, a rich agenda of the types of policy measures and capabilities that belong in the armoury of those who would control such local conflicts in the future.

3

Lessons from Recent History

Let us now turn from how *we tried to learn from history about conflict control to* what *we learned. We shall look first at some general control-policy implications we saw in the fourteen conflicts and then at the implications derived from five selected cases.*

Some General Control-Policy Implications

The number of instances in our fourteen cases in which control measures of one kind or another might in a given situation have reinforced factors favouring a movement away from hostilities or might have offset factors favouring a movement toward hostilities exceeded 425. (If we had examined more cases, the number would obviously have been larger.) These instances were, in other words, theoretical *opportunities* to take purposeful policy action of some sort aimed at conflict control. Some were in fact taken at the time; most were not.

The bare total of theoretical opportunities for conflict-control measures may not tell very much. Nevertheless it is not uninteresting, since it shows how many measures emerged, through a systematic analytical process, as precisely matched to particular significant factors or pressures at particular phases in the lives of given conflicts. These were the tourniquets applicable at key pressure-points in the conflicts.

These *instances-opportunities* were distributed very unevenly

among the phases of conflict. Of the total, 149, or 36 per cent, occurred in the first, or pre-conflict, phase (Phase I). This has extraordinary implications; it suggests that *between one third and one half of all relevant violence-controlling policy activity may be applicable before a dispute has even turned into a conflict.*

This is not to say that all such measures as we have suggested could be taken today in comparable cases. What it does say is that there are a large number of measures to be taken that may go far to prevent a dispute from turning into a later war. Lamentably, statesmen and diplomats do not usually take notice of a potential conflict until it has been perceived by at least one party in primarily military terms and begins to frighten people.

Let us examine further these 425 instances of conflict-control opportunities. After a startlingly large concentration of them for the pre-conflict phase, the total number of suggested conflict-control measures declined through the phases of actual conflict (pre-hostilities, actual fighting, and the post-hostilities stages). Compared to 149 suggested instances in Phase I, a total of 94 were identified for Phase II, 83 for the first round of hostilities (Phase III), 75 for Phase IV, and 24 for Phase III_2 (resumed hostilities, when they occurred). The research method itself placed no special weight on any particular phase. But what happened was that the process of deriving conflict-control measures from factors yielded fewer and fewer steps that policy-makers might take to avert violence as conflict progressed along its path through actual bloodshed to termination. The range and variety of such measures declined as options began to close, attitudes hardened, and perceptions increasingly narrowed down to a preoccupation with the violent bands of the spectrum of political conduct. Even if guns are silenced, the task of moving toward a lasting solution is vastly more difficult than it is before they speak!

But what types of conflict-control measures are we talking about? By far the largest number (146, or 34 per cent of the total) were peace-making and peace-keeping diplomatic measures by international organizations, especially the use of the machinery

of the United Nations and/or such regional organizations as the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity. Measures in this category ranged from assisting local efforts to resettle or control refugees to active peace-keeping efforts in the form of border patrols, interposed forces, and the like. Under this heading were some measures involving the use of *available* international machinery and other measures calling for *improved* capabilities – standing peace-keeping forces, for example, able to be dispatched quickly to areas of trouble and equipped with such adjuncts as reconnaissance aircraft and other technical devices to make their presence most effective.

The next largest category of measures that can be conveniently grouped were those that states external to the issues in conflict – great powers, neighbouring states, and others – could have taken. These numbered eighty-five (20 per cent). One of the ironies that clearly emerged is that, while malevolent or maladroit meddling by outside powers is perhaps the most pervasive local-conflict-*promoting* factor, at the same time these same external powers emerge time and again as crucial potential sources of pressure for conflict-*control*. The measures included in this category ranged from such fundamentals as avoiding or composing the great-power conflicts that spawn and feed local tensions, to using such levers of influence as external powers may have to encourage local forces toward moderation and accommodation.

The third and fourth broad categories of measures – military forces and strategy, and internal political measures – were equal in number (sixty-two, or 14 per cent). The measures relating to military forces and strategy ranged from such specifics as improved command and control within the armed forces of the local contestants, to the adoption by the great powers of military strategies that both minimize the need for overseas bases and deter other great-power meddling that might instigate and encourage local dissidents. Internal political measures included those affecting the cohesiveness and stability of the government, civilian control of the military establishment, clarity of objectives, and rationality of decision making.

A fifth category of measures (twenty-nine, or 6·8 per cent) did not apply to some of the fourteen conflicts studied but lies so close to the central nature of conflict as to merit special attention. These measures related directly to the arms and other military *matériel* available or used in the conflicts. A nearly equal number of measures (twenty-six, or 6 per cent) could be grouped as economic and technical. Here were found such basic measures as general economic and technical assistance, as well as specific actions such as developing the technology in order to lessen great-power reliance on bases (e.g., by developing long-range airlift capabilities) and thereby reduce such vested interests in the outcomes of local quarrels.

A last category, measures relating to communication and information, yielded a small number of instances (sixteen, or 4 per cent). But the types of measures included under this heading were not unimportant. Better facilities for rapid and secure communication between adversaries might, in some instances, have avoided hasty responses based on misperception of intentions. More adequate intelligence as to the facts might, at other times, have prevented one side from plunging into a situation only to find that a much greater commitment of force was required in order to protect its initial modest commitment. And a more accurate long-term assessment of the capabilities of a quarrelsome neighbour could have helped alleviate the types of exaggerated and often unjustified fears that set off spiralling arms races.

The possibility of use of these several categories of conflict-control measures *across the phases of conflict*[1] may be meaningful at this point:

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1. It may be convenient to recapitulate that phase structure:

PHASE I	Dispute, pre-hostilities, pre-military
PHASE II	Pre-hostilities, but seen in military terms
PHASE III	Hostilities (resumed hostilities are designated III_2, III_3, etc.)
PHASE IV	Post-hostilities, but military option remains
PHASE V	Post-conflict, but dispute remains
S	Settlement of dispute

Type of Measure	*Ph.I*	*Ph.II*	*Ph.III*	*Ph.IV*	*Ph.III₂*
International-organization	53	33	25	31	4
External-political	33	17	15	16	4
Military and strategic	16	17	16	10	3
Internal-political	24	13	11	9	5
Arms and other *matériel*	6	8	5	5	5
Economic and technological	15	0	6	3	2
Communications and information	2	6	5	1	2

A relatively large incidence of international-organization measures – ways in which such institutions might have been used by the parties themselves or by external powers (including the great powers) – appeared to be appropriate and needed in the pre-conflict stage of dispute. Almost twice the number of measures were found to be relevant there as in the next preventive stage (conflict, but pre-hostilities) and considerably more than the number available and relevant *after* fighting broke out – which is precisely where most actual policy activity has unfortunately been focused.

The incidence of external-political measures was also greatest in the dispute phase and the next greatest in the second preventive phase (Phase II). Measures of military and strategic policy followed the same pattern. Here again the largest proportions of suggested measures emerged in Phases I and II and tended to centre around deterrence postures and policies. The same was true of economic and technological measures; that no such measures could have been appropriate in the simmering Phase II stage and very few in subsequent stages (save for those that merely repeated the desirability of substitutes for bases already covered under the military and strategic category) may reflect our lack of expertise or imagination; all that can be said is that they were not obvious to us. However, great-power and related political influence continued to be relevant during hostilities and after.

Much the same was true of internal-political measures: preventive activity, chiefly in the form of building sound socio-economic bases for effective political governance, outnumbered

later action by a significant margin. Save for out-and-out repression, which a strong government can apply any time (and a weak one can try to, usually expediting its own demise), the best time to carry on nation-building is clearly before the nation is engaged in a serious quarrel with another nation or has a genuine insurgency movement on its hands.

Arms and hardware measures (i.e. those most directly bearing on potential arms-control policy) appeared not surprisingly to have more applications early in the conflict process rather than later; by a small margin, specific opportunities for measures of arms control were more numerous in Phase II, when arms build-ups were under-way, than in any other phase.

The final conclusions we drew from our list of possible control measures were concerned with the distinction between interstate and internal conflicts. Of the total of 425 measures, 250 were for conflicts of the inter-state variety, 175 for those of the internal variety. These appear to be roughly comparable when adjusted for the slight difference between the number of internal and inter-state cases analysed.[2] But if the internal group is boiled down to pure subversion insurgencies, there would then be about twice as many measures suggested proportionately for inter-state conflicts as for internal. That striking differential might merely show a paucity of imagination. But it may equally show the difficulty of thinking up strategies to deal with internal insurgency-type situations – unfortunately not a new difficulty for the Western mind.

In the arms and hardware measures category, out of the total of 29 instances-opportunities, across all phases, 20 surfaced for inter-state conflicts and only 9 for internal. The numbers of military and strategic opportunities emphasized internal conflict control (26 for inter-state, 36 for internal), chiefly because of great-power involvement. Of possible international-organization measures, inter-state incidences outnumbered internal by well over two to one (104 to 42), a commentary on the limitations of the international juridical order when it comes to the mounting prob-

2. Eight of the fourteen conflicts studied came to be classified as inter-state, six as internal (some with significant external involvement).

lems of insurgency and internal defence. Externally sponsored political measures showed almost identical incidence (45 for inter-state and 40 for internal).

Economic and technological measures were three to two in favour of inter-state (16 to 10). This was doubtless a further reflection of our failure to be more imaginative about the possible relevance of these two types of non-political measures for internal conflicts. But it was also due to the fact that the best time to conceive and initiate economic development and modernization programmes is in Phase Minus-One, *before* forces of division and subversion can begin seriously to threaten the internal fabric of inchoate societies.

In the category of policy measures of an internal-political sort, not surprisingly somewhat more incidences emerged for internal conflicts than for inter-state (34 to 28). As for measures involving better communications and intelligence, these overwhelmingly (12 to 4) were deemed relevant to inter-state conflicts, where there are two sides usually willing to get in touch, rather than to internal ones, where passions for total victory run highest.

*

One of the most profound political ironies of our times is thrown into sharp relief when the theoretical opportunities for conflict control are compared with the opportunities actually seized in these same cases. And though our figures have no profound statistical value, it surely is no coincidence that the *number* of measures of all types actually taken in these cases was roughly *in inverse proportion* to those that, with the benefit of hindsight, might have been taken in pursuit of a purposeful conflict-control strategy: in the dispute phase, 9 measures were actually taken, out of 149 possible; in Phase II also, 9 out of a possible 94. Only when violence broke out in Phase III were there real signs of conflict-control activity – 31 measures out of 83 possible were taken; when hostilities ceased in Phase IV, interest began to flag – 14 measures were taken, out of 75 seen by us as possible; and where hostilities were resumed, 11 were taken, out of 25 identified

as relevant. Furthermore, when it came to shortcomings in preventive arms control, economic, diplomatic, and virtually every other conflict-controlling activity, there was no more than a modest difference between inter-state and internal cases.

As for *types* of control measures actually taken, by far the most numerous were in the realms of military and strategic action and UN cognizance (18 and 20 instances each). Not surprisingly, both peaked after hostilities actually broke out. Next was external-political action (16 instances), also focused heavily on the hostilities phases. As for internal-political action, 6 of 12 instances noted were acts of repression by the Portuguese authorities in Angola – policies that in the longer run seem certain to produce more severe conflict. Apart from these, the number of measures taken in the areas of economic aid, arms control, and improvement of communications is insignificant.

The fourteen cases were, as explained earlier, all conflicts, but not all became equally severe or intense. No significant relationship could be deduced between the number of measures actually taken and the inclination of the conflicts to intensify. But it should be emphasized again that most conflict-control effort was made *after* things became too volatile to ignore. In general, conflict-controlling policy activity pursued in the fourteen representative cases of local conflict was almost in inverse proportion to the chances of influencing events.

Part Two



catalogue of policy measures relevant to the control of such local conflicts in the future. The policy implications derived from the application of this technique to recent history have been recorded in Chapter 3; the posture they suggest the United States adopt will be set forth in Chapter 12. Our purpose here is to elaborate the ways in which we used the model of conflict sketched in Chapter 2 to lay the foundations for those policy implications.

We call the series of steps by which we proceeded from the study of past conflicts to an agenda of measures for controlling future conflicts the historic-analytical approach. These steps, in brief, were as follows: (a) to impose on real conflict data the phase structure postulated in our model of conflict; (b) to extract from each phase all identifiable factors deemed to have some relationship to that particular pattern; (c) to specify for each such factor a policy-relevant control measure; and (d) finally to extract from the specific statements of those measures the generalized lesson for future conflict control. This was a systematic way of using the realities and complexities of the real world to generate widely applicable policy insights; it is at many stages highly subjective, hence not scientific in the purest meaning of the word. The crucial test – which must be left to the reader – is whether the process has taught us anything useful about conflict and about its control.

Structuring the Data

As noted earlier, we began with a total of fifty-four conflicts in the developing world since the end of World War II, all of which had involved a serious threat of violence or actual violence. From these, fourteen were selected for more intense study. Since we were interested in ensuring that the sample cover as many different types of conflict as possible, we wanted to be sure that certain gross characteristics were adequately represented in the sample.

First of all we sought to select conflicts with wide geographic distribution. To have selected all the conflicts from one area –

conventional tactics on the part of the Dutch and unconventional (guerrilla) tactics on the part of the Indonesian nationalists.

(2) *The Indonesian–Malaysian confrontation, 1963–5*, also took place in south-east Asia. It was an inter-state conflict in which Indonesia employed largely unconventional warfare tactics. Britain, Australia, and New Zealand were also actively involved. In the course of long hostilities there was a marked intensification in the form of a geographic expansion of the conflict.

(3) *The Malayan emergency, 1948–60*, was the third south-east Asian conflict in our sample. There was significant external involvement in this internal conflict, and the guerrilla warfare lasted over ten years but at a very low level.

(4) *The Kashmir conflict, 1947–65*, took place in south Asia and was of the conventional inter-state type. In the first round of hostilities in the late 1940s fighting was hard to stop, whereas when fighting broke out again in 1965 it was quickly ended. In both instances the fighting intensified. The latter period of the conflict saw the Chinese become indirectly involved.

(5) *The India–China border conflict, 1954–62*, also in south Asia, was an inter-state conflict in which hostilities were fought by conventional tactics. While the fighting covered a fairly long period before it was ended, the hostilities did not intensify. This case was also interesting to us because it inter-acted with the Indian–Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. It was therefore possible to see in some detail the way in which one conflict affected the course of another.

(6) *The Bay of Pigs, 1960–61*, was the only Latin American conflict on which a detailed case-study was made. That conflict can be viewed either as an inter-state conflict between the United States and Cuba, in which the Cuban exiles were US pawns, or as an internal conflict among Cubans, which the United States exploited for its own ends. In either event, the US role was clearly that of conflict fomenter. The hostilities ended quickly, without intensifying.

(7) *The Algerian–Moroccan conflict, 1962–3*, was selected as a north African example. This inter-state border clash involved the

use of regular armed forces in hostilities that ended quickly and with no intensification.

(8) *The Somalian–Ethiopian–Kenyan conflict, 1960–64*, is one of the sub-Saharan African cases in our selection. Again it can be viewed as two internal conflicts – in Ethiopia and in Kenya between Somali-speaking minorities and the governments – that were exploited by an external power, Somalia, and led ultimately to armed clashes across inter-state boundaries between units of the regular armed forces. The internal aspects of the conflict were fought by unconventional guerrilla tactics, the inter-state aspects by conventional military tactics. The internal wars have proved hard to terminate, whereas the inter-state hostilities ended quickly. But both remained moderate.

(9) *The Angola conflict, 1950–61*, is a sub-Saharan colonial conflict that has broad racial implications as well. The hostilities that have broken out on several occasions between Portugal and black Angolan nationalists have been low-level guerrilla warfare in nature and have been terminated relatively quickly.

(10) *The Soviet–Iranian conflict, 1941–7*, was selected as one of the Middle Eastern cases in our sample. It, too, combined internal and inter-state features – an internal struggle between the central government and the Azerbaijani separatists that took place within the larger context of a Soviet–Iranian conflict. The hostilities that occurred involved conventional military tactics; they were low-level and very short-lived.

(11) *The Arab–Israeli conflict, 1956–67*, refers to the continuing Middle Eastern conflict that erupted into open inter-state warfare in 1948, in 1956, and again in 1967. We looked at the conflict beginning with the period leading up to the 1956 war and continuing through the 1967 war. In both cases hostilities ended quickly. In 1956 fighting intensified with the entry of additional states into the war (France and Britain); in 1967 the war spread geographically to include the Israeli–Jordan and Israeli–Syrian fronts as well as the Israeli–Egyptian front.

(12) *The Suez (or British–French–Egyptian) conflict. 1956*, was selected as a separate case for study but was analysed together

with the Arab–Israeli conflict just described, from which it grew and to which it contributed. The combined conflicts are analysed here (see Chapter 9) under the broader heading 'Conflict in the Middle East'. The hostilities of 1956 were common to both conflicts, but the courses of the two conflicts, both before and after that event, were markedly different.

(13) *The Greek insurgency, 1944–9*, took place on continental Europe. One of our major interests in this case was the uncanny resemblance it had to the war in Vietnam. For this reason we included it in our sample even though our main interest was not in European conflict. The conflict involved two hostilities phases, the first of them a short, urban guerrilla uprising, the second a long guerrilla war that saw the hostilities intensify on several occasions, ending with the guerrillas attempting a conventional military campaign.

(14) *The conflict on Cyprus, 1952–64*, took place, along with the Greek insurgency, in the eastern Mediterranean. The first part of the conflict was a colonial struggle to oust the British; then, once independence had been achieved, internal communal tensions on the island, which had been an important sub-theme during the earlier parts of the conflict, became the predominant theme in a new round of hostilities. The first hostilities (1952–60) were drawn out and intensified from urban terrorism to guerrilla warfare in the countryside; the second round of fighting (1960–64) began at a more intense level but did not further intensify and was quickly ended.

For each of these fourteen cases a chronological history was prepared and our conflict model was imposed on it. The phases of that model were outlined in Chapter 2 (see p. 29).

Our objective in examining this historical record was neither to develop new information nor to write exhaustive histories. It was rather to identify in each case the phase structure and the points of transition from one phase to another. To prepare our chronological histories we relied almost exclusively on secondary sources, though in the case of the Greek insurgency we used a single secondary source as a substitute for preparing our own narrative account.

For the other thirteen cases no single previous study proved sufficiently comprehensive for our needs. Most histories of these conflicts deal almost exclusively with their political and diplomatic aspects, to the virtual exclusion of the military side of their story.

On the whole it was possible to identify with considerable precision the points of transition that marked the entry of a conflict into a new phase. As might be expected, the most difficult transition to locate was that into Phase II (when a conflict was generated by the introduction of a military option). At times the beginning of Phase II was clearly visible, as when Soviet troops occupied northern Iran during World War II and placed Soviet military power in a position to influence directly the long-standing Soviet–Iranian dispute; in some cases there was widespread agreement on the actual date – such as when the United States in the Bay of Pigs conflict began to equip itself with a proxy military option in its dispute with Castro's Cuba; other transitions to Phase II were marked by the sudden capacity to use force that already existed – for example, when the Somali Republic became independent and thus acquired the capacity to employ force in its drive to unify the Somali-speaking peoples of the Horn of Africa. In most cases, however, the point of transition from dispute to conflict was more problematical. One could find a period of, say, several months, before which the dispute was clearly still in Phase I but after which it emerged as a Phase II conflict.

Transitions to later phases were more readily pin-pointed. Certainly hostilities were usually highly visible. Even here, however, there could be difficulty. It is a matter of judgement at what point in 1947 the mounting crescendo of violence in Kashmir by Pathan tribesmen and among Kashmiris should be said to have involved Indian–Pakistani hostilities. And how low a level did hostilities in a situation such as the Malayan emergency have to reach before one could have considered Phase III at an end?

In some cases it was possible to refine the process by dividing phases into sub-phases in which the conflict moved perceptibly toward a transition. The decision of the United States to recruit

and equip a force of exiled Cubans in order to have the option of using them against Castro marked the transition of the US–Cuban dispute to the pre-hostilities Phase II. The later decision to exercise that option, on the other hand, was a major step *within* Phase II toward the actual outbreak of hostilities, that is, when the forces landed on the beaches of the ill-famed Bay of Pigs.

Similarly, in the hostilities (Phase III) it was sometimes possible to identify intensifications and moderations of the hostilities – that is, points at which there were changes in the 'rules of the game' governing the conduct and limitations of hostilities. Illustrative here were the successive extensions of hostilities in Kashmir in 1965 from clashes within Indian-controlled portions of Kashmir between infiltrating irregulars and Indian forces, to clashes across the 1949 cease-fire line between Indian and Pakistani regulars, to invasions across the fixed international boundary between the two states.

Once the phases and sub-phases had been determined, each was searched for factors that appeared to have had an effect, however slight, on the course the conflict took. These factors were seen as events, perceptions, or conditions of an economic, political, diplomatic, or military nature.

Deriving Measures

It was not enough merely to identify a list of factors for each phase (or sub-phase) of each case. These factors had to be further grouped in terms of their relationship to a given control objective; it will be recalled that one insight we earlier derived from our model was that what 'controlling the conflict' means can differ from phase to phase. The phases and their appropriate control objectives can be stated as follows:

In PHASE I — To settle the dispute
To keep the dispute non-military

In PHASE II	To settle the dispute To prevent the outbreak of hostilities To restrict the scale/scope of potential hostilities
In PHASE III	To settle the dispute To terminate hostilities To moderate hostilities
In PHASE IV	To settle the dispute To prevent the resumption of hostilities To restrict the scale/scope of potential hostilities
In PHASE V	To settle the dispute To keep the dispute non-military

It was essential to our method of analysis that the factors not just be identified but also be defined in terms of supporting the accomplishment of a control objective or of making that goal more difficult to achieve.

This task in our analysis made clear one of the central problems of conflict control: the control objectives both within phases and among phases are not necessarily compatible. Furthermore, there is no consistent pattern of goals that are more or less likely to be compatible. Let us clarify these basic but complex assertions by a few illustrations. In Phase III of the Bay of Pigs conflict the invasion by the exile forces was quickly contained by Castro's forces. For the United States whatever pressures existed to continue the hostilities were also, in those circumstances, pressures to intensify the fighting by the direct commitment of US forces. In this case, therefore, the control objectives of terminating the hostilities and of keeping them moderate were compatible. Or, put more generally, the factors tending to moderate hostilities coincided with or complemented those tending toward termination. On the contrary, in the Greek insurgency and Malayan emergency, and perhaps latterly in Vietnam, the goal of speedy termination of hostilities tended to be antithetical to the goal of moderating them. In Malaya the Malayan and British authorities elected to keep their military response to the guerrilla challenge relatively low-level, and the guerrillas themselves were unable to intensify their operations. But, in part as a result, the war dragged

on for a decade. In Greece, on the other hand, both sides repeatedly intensified the hostilities – each in an effort to terminate the war by winning it.

Similar incompatibles are found within other phases. Within Phases II and IV, for example, the control objective of preventing the outbreak or resumption of hostilities may be at odds with the control objective of keeping future hostilities moderate if they nonetheless occur. This dilemma is particularly evident where arms levels are raised in Phases II and IV in an effort to secure peace by maintaining military balance or a deterrent posture.

Once all the factors that could be identified were classified in terms of their bearing – positive or negative – on a given control objective, it was possible to ask what types of policy activity might have served to reinforce conflict-controlling factors or to offset conflict-promoting factors. Here the only limit to the numbers and types of measure identified was our imagination.

It must be stressed that it was each separate factor that we were looking at, not the conflict as a whole. In other words our initial question was not, for example: what measures would have been required to control the Indonesian war of independence? The question was rather: if a lack of strong control authority over various para-military formations in Indonesia was pushing the conflict toward hostilities, what kinds of measures would have been relevant to offset that pressure? These measures might have included steps to strengthen the central government's position as well as steps to neutralize or counter the impact a lack of authority was having on the conflict.

There are cases in which the time perspective with which the problem of control is viewed can influence the control measures that suggest themselves. In a conflict such as that in Angola, for example, one set of measures (efficient and ruthless Portuguese suppression of Angolan nationalists) might have seemed effective for dealing with immediate threat, whereas a completely different set (accommodation to demands for liberalization and eventual independence) might have been far more appropriate to the longer-run goal of settling the dispute. The policy dilemma becomes even

more acute when the likelihood is recognized that this latter course might have itself been conflict promoting in the short run. We feel it is important to make this dilemma clear.

Because the only objective considered was conflict control, other policy nbjectives were ignored. The result of tagging each separate factor with a policy measure was that at times the measures were inconsistent when read in sequence. Rather than seeking to discuss control of the whole conflict, our focus was only on measures offsetting or reinforcing each specific factor.

We realize that the individual policy activities or measures identified by this method as relevant may have been quite unachievable in the actual context of the conflict or may have been achievable only within a time span that made them unlikely to have the desired effect quickly enough. But our over-all purpose was to develop insight into the potentials as well as the problems and dilemmas of controlling future local conflicts. While some of our specific measures may thus appear inapplicable or even bizarre in isolation, developing them in this manner was not wholly unrealistic. In reality, goals often do conflict, steps taken to achieve one objective often do have undesired side consequences, and things that might have been righted a generation ago often turn out to be generators of today's troubles.

In the five chapters that follow, illustrations are given of the application of this technique to five of our fourteen cases of recent local conflict. The conflict-control lessons derived from these five cases are contained in Chapter 10.

5

The Soviet–Iranian Conflict, 1941–7[1]

The Phases of Conflict

PHASE I
Background of the Conflict

During the century and a half preceding World War I, Iran was a battleground, virtually passive itself, on which the imperial struggles of the great powers were carried out. Russia and Britain were the constant factors: Russian policy had traditionally been to expand toward the Dardanelles, Turkey, and the Middle East; British policy had traditionally focused on Iran as a protective buffer for India and on the preservation of economic advantages gained in Iran during the struggle against Russian expansion.

Previous Soviet–Iranian Conflicts

In 1920 the Red Army regained control in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, three parts of Russia that had proclaimed their independence at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. Large numbers of refugees fled to Turkey and Iran, including many who left Soviet Azerbaijan to take refuge in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan.[2]

1. The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions to this chapter of Mrs Jane K. Holland and Miss Priscilla A. Clapp.

2. George Lenczowski: *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1949), p. 26. The author was with the Polish Legation in Iran from 1942 to 1945.



At the same time the Soviets gave significant military aid to several local rebel governments established in northern Iran – broadly speaking, in the same area that was to be involved in the 1941–7 Soviet–Iranian conflict. In May 1920 the Soviet fleet bombarded the Iranian port of Enzeli on the Caspian Sea as the Red

Army pursued remnants of the White Russian army under British protection there. A Soviet expeditionary force, composed of regular Red Army units, sailors from Kronstadt, Soviet Azerbaijani troops, and armed Persian oil workers from Baku, soon occupied most of the coastal Iranian province of Gilan. The Soviets alleged that this was a security measure undertaken by the independent Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, over whose actions and policies Moscow had no influence.[3] In 1921 the Soviet Republic of Gilan, with the support of Soviet advisers and troops, launched an unsuccessful attack on Tehran. Following the failure of this effort the Soviets withdrew aid from Gilan, and Iran easily regained control of that territory. After this period of semi-open conflict, Soviet–Iranian relations became relatively stabilized.

A treaty that was to play a role in the 1941–7 conflict was concluded between Iran and the Soviet Union in 1921, 'a genuine "leave-me-alone" treaty made by two very weak nations on the defensive who were both anxious to have time to recuperate.'[4] Each nation agreed to prohibit activity on its territory by groups that had designs on the other. A key provision stated that if a third party attempted armed intervention in Iran or sought to use Iranian territory as a base of operations against any of the Soviet republics and if the Iranian government were not able to deal with the situation, the Soviets would have the right to move their troops into the Iranian interior.[5]

The long history of the Russian threat to Iranian territorial integrity and of Iranian suspicion of Russia was fortified by the many differences between the two societies. The Moslem clergy and the devout in general in Iran were anti-Communist; the difficulties faced by Moslems inside the Soviet Union increased this feeling. During World War II the left-wing Tudeh ('masses') party gained considerable strength in Iran, appealing to some

3. ibid., pp. 52–3, 59.

4. Richard W. Van Wagenen, in consultation with T. Cuyler Young: *The Iranian Case 1946* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1952), p. 10.

5. ibid., pp. 10–11.

real grievances and supported by many liberal intellectuals. The Tudeh lost strength, however, as its connexion with the Soviet Union became clearer and as Soviet and Iranian national aims came into direct conflict.

Geographical and Physical Factors

The Iranian province of Azerbaijan, focus of the 1941–7 conflict, borders on the Soviet Union. Tabriz, the provincial capital, is only sixty miles from the Soviet Union. The border area is mountainous and difficult, but crossed by well-developed railways and paved roads built as lend-lease supply routes during World War II. Natural barriers between Azerbaijan and the rest of Iran do not offer serious obstacles to military movement, at least on a limited scale. The geography and terrain of the area thus offered no real advantages to either party in the conflict.

PHASE II
August 1941–August 1945

Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran in August 1941 to prevent its falling under pro-German control. The Soviets occupied the northern provinces (including Azerbaijan), and the British the larger southern and central regions, with a neutral zone including Tehran in the middle. In January 1942 the situation was formalized in a tripartite treaty between Britain, the Soviet Union, and Iran, in which Britain and the Soviet Union promised to withdraw their forces no later than six months after the end of all hostilities. It was also agreed that the occupying forces were to disturb as little as possible the internal affairs of Iran.[6]

Subsequently, US forces also entered Iran to help move lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union. The United States never formally became a party to the tripartite agreement but informally operated under its provisions. At the Tehran Big Three meeting in November 1943 the Soviet Union, the United States, and

6. *US Army Area Handbook for Iran* (Washington: Department of the Army; 1963), pp. 174–5.

Britain signed a Declaration on Iran which reaffirmed Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.[7]

Soviet Wartime Pressures

The exact time is not clear at which the Soviet Union began to perceive that its occupying military force would be useful in achieving its post-war objectives in Iran. While the occasion for the introduction of Soviet forces into Iran arose from broad requirements of World War II strategy, the Soviets quickly began to exert pressures directly and indirectly on internal Iranian politics. For example, the Tudeh, formed in January 1942 as a legal political party, had a hard core of Moscow-trained leaders. The party played a major role in Tehran politics as well as in the attempted communization of Azerbaijan.[8] The Soviet military presence thus provided a shield for the development of a Communist movement which the Soviets sought to use to influence and possibly eventually control the government of all Iran.

In October 1944 the Soviet Union made broad and vague demands for an oil concession in the five northern provinces of Iran. Iranian Premier Mohammad Saed Maragnej announced that no concessions would be granted to any foreign parties until after the war. The Soviets, however, were able to keep up sufficient pressure, through the Tudeh and a press campaign, so that Premier Saed finally had to resign. The Soviet demands were not dropped until the Iranian national assembly, the Majles, passed a law making it a crime for any government official to enter any negotiations with any foreign government or oil company.[9]

7. ibid., p. 176.

8. During the wartime period, Iranian political life reflected the lifting of restrictions on political activity. Politics became a crazy quilt of parties and interest groups, with a rapid turnover of governments. With the exception of the Tudeh, however, all political parties were in agreement on the objective of regaining complete control of all the territory of Iran and on the complete evacuation of Soviet troops.

9. Benjamin Shwadran: *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers* (2nd ed. rev.; New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press; 1959), pp. 65–7.

Iranian Reactions

During World War II the Iranians were concerned that the Soviets were using their position as an occupying power to pursue their long-term goals *vis-à-vis* Iran. The Iranians responded to Soviet pressure by utilizing the US military mission in an advisory capacity to reorganize and strengthen their army and gendarmerie. With this US aid the Iranian gendarmerie became an efficient force 'whose loyalty to the government often proved to be of decisive significance. . . . The calm and determined attitude of the gendarmerie at the time of the Azerbaijan crisis in 1945–1946 . . . prevented panic and riots in the capital at a most critical moment.'[10]

The Iranian army was generally loyal to the institution of the monarchy, although there was some infiltration by the Tudeh.[11] Iranian Chief of Staff General Hassan Arfa states that the army consisted of about 100,000 men (though this may be an exaggeration). There was some local production of small arms and ammunition (before the war, at least), and the Iranian forces had some modern offensive weaponry.

During the wartime occupation the over-all military balance in Iran between Iranian and Soviet forces was overwhelmingly in favour of the Soviets. Before 2 March 1946 there was reported to be in Iran a 'garrison force' of about three Soviet divisions – one infantry and two cavalry – with supporting armour.[12] The

10. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 304.

11. Hassan Arfa: *Under Five Shahs* (London: John Murray; 1964), p. 354. General Arfa, Iranian Chief of Staff until February 1946, claims to have uncovered a plot for a military rising in Tehran late in 1945, in which between fifty and one hundred subversive officers were involved; he also states that the defence of Tehran was complicated for him because of 'Communist secret agents, whose presence was suspected within the General Staff itself'. There was also some defection to the forces of the Azerbaijani army during the course of the conflict.

12. Robert Rossow, Jr: 'The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. X, no. 1 (winter 1946), p. 19. Rossow was US Consul in Tabriz, December 1945–July 1946, then chief of the political section of the US embassy in Tehran until January 1947.

Soviets had a barracks area in Tabriz and presumably facilities for maintenance of their military equipment. All this personnel and *matériel* was brought in openly as part of the wartime occupation.

British military posture in the Middle East, while weakened as a result of war exhaustion, was of a continuing nature. The British were still in India and Egypt and had bases in Aden, Kuwait, and Bahrein; they also had effective control of the Jordanian and Iraqi armies. Although the Iranians needed British support against the Soviets, they regarded it as something of a Trojan horse. Suspicion of British motives was widespread and it was feared that Britain and the Soviet Union would divide Iran between themselves.[13]

Iran's important relationship with the United States began during World War II as an outgrowth of the presence of the Persian Gulf Command forces in Iran. U S backing of Iran was not vigorous in the early days of the conflict, although the Iranian ambassador seems to have had no difficulty in being heard in Washington.[14]

The End of the War in Europe

With the end of the war in Europe, Iran made repeated and unsuccessful efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to cease interfering in internal Iranian politics and asked the British and the Soviets to withdraw altogether. In reply both the British and Soviets pointed out that they were not legally obliged to leave before the agreed deadline – six months after the end of hostilities. In the spring of 1945, however, the British did begin partial withdrawal and fruitlessly sought Soviet agreement for simultaneous action. The Soviets refused, but did agree to the early evacuation of the Tehran area. The Tehran evacuation began on 7 August 1945, but the Soviets replaced their uniformed troops with NKVD

13. Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi: *Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran* (New York: Whittier Books; 1954), p. xv.
14. ibid., pp. 270, 279 ff.

seized, re-established communications with Tehran, and, officially at least, restored authority to the local governor.

In October 1945 the Tudeh in Azerbaijan was renamed the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, with the intention of dissociating the national Tudeh party from any actions in Azerbaijan. On 23 October several new divisions of the Red Army entered Iran. Meanwhile the Soviet consul-general in Tabriz was masterminding preparation for the actual rebellion, in which the shortcomings of the abortive August coup would be overcome. He exercised his control through an apparatus of town commandants, military personnel obedient to the political rather than the military command. The rebels were covertly organized and a number of *muhajirs* (refugees) from Soviet Azerbaijan joined them. 'On November 15, 1945, the Soviets began the wholesale distribution of arms to the rebels and on the following day a carefully planned revolutionary operation was launched.'[19]

The central government sent a relief column north, but it was turned back without a fight by the Soviets on November 20.[20] The Iranian garrison in Tabriz was surrounded by the rebels and eventually surrendered without fighting; the commander of the garrison, who was sent back to Tehran, reported that 'the Iranian soldiers, numbering 900, had been surrounded by ten thousand Russian troops and by the Democrats armed with machine guns, who had occupied all the hills around the barracks.'[21] General fighting continued for several weeks, until on 12 December 1945, the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed in Tabriz.

The Soviets obstructed all movements of the Iranian army or gendarmerie against the rebels, protected all activities of the rebel forces by their own military presence, and intimidated the population by various means.[22] The Soviets also played on Kurdish nationalism and complicated the problem for the Iranians by sponsoring the Kurdish People's Republic of

19. Rossow, op. cit., p. 18. 20. ibid.
21. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 278.
22. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 288.

Mahabad.[23] The Republic of Mahabad was geographically contiguous to the Republic of Azerbaijan and entered an alliance with it, although there was continuous friction between the two rebel régimes.[24]

Altogether the Iranians directed twenty-four notes of protest to the Soviet embassy in Tehran between 2 May and 23 November 1945. The Soviet ambassador to Iran, however, absented himself from Tehran during the November uprising in Azerbaijan, and the Soviet chargé d'affaires professed complete ignorance of the rebellion.[25]

The question of evacuation of troops was discussed without effect at the London Big Four Foreign Ministers' meeting in September–October 1945. In November, after the rebellion had broken out, the Iranian ambassador in Washington brought the question to President Harry S. Truman's attention and publicly accused the Soviet Union of engineering the revolt in Azerbaijan.[26] The United States and Britain sent parallel notes to the Soviet Union proposing the withdrawal of all foreign troops by January 1946. In reply, the Soviet Union denied that it had interfered with the movement of Iranian troops already in Azerbaijan and claimed that the introduction of further Iranian troops would have increased rather than calmed disturbances in the province, thus necessitating the introduction of further Soviet troops.[27]

23. The People's Republic of Mahabad declared its independence of Tehran in December 1945 and was not reoccupied by the central government until a year later. The Soviets were said to have promised the Kurds planes, tanks, and heavy weapons and to have taken some fifty Kurds to Baku for military and political training; but all that materialized was Soviet pressure on reluctant Kurdish tribesmen to fight for the rebel republic.

24. Archie Roosevelt, Jr, 'The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. I, no. 3 (July 1947), pp. 247–69. Roosevelt was US Assistant Military Attaché in Tehran from March 1946 to February 1947.

25. Weaver, op. cit., p. 93.

26. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 270.

27. Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds.: *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1948), Vol. VIII (1 July 1945–31 December, 1946), pp. 851–3.

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27. Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds.: *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1948), Vol. VIII (1 July 1945–31 December, 1946), pp. 851–3.

PHASE IV_1
12 December 1945–10 December 1946

Except for minor and transitory episodes, hostilities did not break out again between Iranian and Soviet or Soviet-sponsored rebel forces for almost a year. This year can be divided into several distinct sub-phases.

Sub-Phase A: 12 December 1945–2 March 1946

This was a period of relatively little military activity, considerable diplomatic activity, and a general hardening of positions. The government of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan consolidated its control over the province, pursuing a dual policy of popular reforms (such as land redistribution and use of the Turkish language in the administration and in schools) and police-state terror methods of control. The new government was composed of men who were strongly linked to the Soviets or directly imported from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets made a serious effort to develop the Azerbaijani army. The Red Army uniform was used, the training of the new army was entrusted to Soviet officers, and the army cadres were heavily infiltrated by Soviet agents.[28] One observer describes the objective as

> a tough little Azerbaijani army, intended to provide a backbone for the mass of Communist irregulars who had pulled off the revolt. . . . The basic weapon was a sub-machine gun of Czech manufacture, and the Russians later added a number of light tanks and artillery. Several hundred officer candidates were taken to military bases in Soviet Azerbaijan . . . for intensive training in artillery, armor, aviation, and chemical warfare. Soviet officers and troops could be seen almost daily in the training grounds just beyond the Tabriz barracks area carrying out joint maneuvers with Azerbaijani forces and training them in the use of Soviet heavy artillery, rocket launchers, and heavy armor.[29]

28. Lenczowski, op. cit., 290; Fatemi, op. cit., p. 277.
29. Rossow, op. cit., p. 25.

In December 1945, at the Allied Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow, the US Secretary of State, James Byrnes, told Stalin that unless the Tehran Declaration on Iran were honoured, Iran would probably place its complaint before the United Nations and that, as a signatory of the Declaration, the United States would feel obliged to support Iran's right to be heard.

In response to this

> Stalin outlined what he termed the 'pertinent facts' in the matter. The Baku oil fields in the south of Russia lay close to the border and this created a special problem. These fields had to be safeguarded against any possible hostile action by Iran against the Soviet Union, and no confidence could be placed in the Iranian Government. Saboteurs might be sent to the Baku oil fields to set them on fire, he continued. Since the Soviet Union had a right, by treaty, to maintain troops in Iran until March 15 [1946], it did not want to withdraw before that date. At that time, he said, it would be necessary to examine the situation and see whether or not it was possible to evacuate the soldiers. That decision would depend upon the conduct of the Iranian Government. He pointed out that the 1921 treaty with Iran gave the Soviet Union the right to send troops into northern Iran if there was a possible danger from an outside source.[30]

This statement by Stalin is perhaps the best official definition of the Soviet claims. The Soviets relied on the terms of the 1942 tripartite treaty as a basis for refusing to evacuate before March 1946, and on the terms of the 1921 treaty, combined with alleged danger to the Baku oil fields, as a basis for a possible refusal to withdraw after the March deadline.

Despite the failure of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' conference in December 1945, all US troops were withdrawn from Iran by 1 January 1946.[31] The British did not complete their evacuation until the date prescribed by the 1942 treaty, but their remaining forces were not large.

30. James F. Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper; 1947), p. 119.

31. Dennett and Turner, op. cit., pp. 851–2. On 24 November the United States announced that the order had been given for complete evacuation by 1 January 1946; there is no evidence that any US forces remained after that date.

On 19 January 1946, the Iranian government (then under Premier Ebrahim Hakimi) lodged its first complaint with the UN Security Council: 'Owing to the interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium of its officials and armed forces, in the internal affairs of Iran, a situation has arisen which may lead to international friction.'[32] The Soviet representative at the UN denied the truth of the Iranian complaint and attempted to present the issue as a purely Soviet–Iranian matter, appropriate for bilateral negotiations rather than international consideration.[33] The United States and Britain, while supporting Iran, were reluctant to take an extreme position, and the Security Council finally passed a resolution calling on the parties to negotiate (but did not drop the complaint from its agenda).[34]

The Soviets kept up their pressure on the Iranian government, including severing all trade between Azerbaijan and the rest of Iran. According to one analyst, 'the economic strain thus created was intolerable'.[35] In the face of this and other pressure there was a cabinet crisis in Iran while the Security Council debate was taking place, and Premier Hakimi was replaced by Premier Ahmad Qavam, 'known for his flirtation with the Tudeh'.[36] Qavam took several steps directed at propitiating the Soviets, such as arresting General Hassan Arfa, who was considered pro-British. Qavam then went to Moscow for negotiations on 19 February 1946. The negotiations were not successful. The Soviets made extreme demands: for instance, that Soviet troops continue to stay in some parts of Iran for an indefinite period and that the Iranians agree to an Iranian–Soviet joint-stock oil company, 51 per cent Soviet-owned.[37] During this period the Iranians received assurances of US and British support.

32. Van Wagenen, op. cit., p. 111.
33. ibid., pp. 32, 36; Fatemi, op. cit., p. 276.
34. Van Wagenen, op. cit., pp. 30–41.
35. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 295. 36. ibid. 37. ibid., p. 296.

Sub-Phase B: 2–25 March 1946

This was the peak of the conflict, in terms of the threat to general international peace. It was dominated by military developments, even though no actual fighting took place. The Soviets did not evacuate on 2 March and thus unambiguously violated the 1942 treaty. At this point the other party to the treaty (Britain) and the other parties to the Tehran Declaration (Britain and the United States) were drawn actively into the conflict. The United States and Britain both sent notes of protest.

After 2 March the US government began receiving reports from Tabriz of a massive Soviet military build-up in the province. According to the US consul in Tabriz[38] the movements consisted almost entirely of armour and motorized infantry with supporting artillery; at least fifteen armoured brigades, composed of some five hundred tanks with appropriate auxiliary forces, were introduced in a massive, sudden, offensive build-up. According to a report from Tehran dated 22 March a 'responsible' source said official estimates of Soviet strength in northern Iran had reached nearly 100,000.[39]

The new troops were divided into three assault forces and one reserve. One assault force was deployed in a manner to menace Tehran, and the other two were directed toward Turkey and Iraq. While introducing this major offensive force into Azerbaijan, the Soviets simultaneously moved another armoured force through eastern Bulgaria, deploying it along the frontier of European Turkey. They concurrently opened a diplomatic and propaganda offensive against Turkey, while the Kurdish People's Republic of Mahabad proclaimed rights of sovereignty over the Turkish Kurds.[40]

On 9 March the United States sent another protest to the

38. Rossow, op. cit., p. 20; Peter Lisagor and Marguerite Higgins: *Overtime in Heaven: Adventures in the Foreign Service* (New York: Doubleday; 1964), pp. 156–8.

39. *The New York Times*, 25 March 1946.

40. Rossow, op. cit., p. 21.

Soviet Union,[41] and in British and American newspapers during the weeks that followed there were daily headlines and frontpage reports on the Soviet–Iranian situation. One account speculated:

> The seizure of Iranian Azerbaijan and northern Kurdistan and the extraction of various concessions from Iran were the primary Soviet goals. Now it seems clear that these are only subordinate means toward a far larger end – the reduction of Turkey, the main bastion against Soviet advance into the entire Middle East.[42]

As far as can be determined, neither Britain nor the United States threatened a direct military response.[43] During March, however, the US battleship *Missouri* was sent to Istanbul with the remains of the Turkish Ambassador Mehmetmunir Ertegon, who died 7 March 1946. According to military analyst Hanson Baldwin, this cruise was a response to the Soviet build-up in Iran; Baldwin also reported that plans to send the entire Eighth (*sic*; in fact there *was* no 'Eighth' Fleet) Fleet on a Mediterranean cruise were cancelled at the instigation of the US State Department, which decided that such a sizeable force might be interpreted as unnecessarily provocative.[44]

Iranian Premier Qavam returned from negotiations in Moscow shortly before 14 March, the last day of the term of the Majles. Since a law had been passed the year before that no new Majles could be elected while foreign troops were still in the country and since Tudeh-sponsored demonstrations prevented a quorum from entering the parliament building until after the date had passed when any action could be taken, Premier Qavam became the virtual dictator[45] and remained so until elections were held the following January.

41. *US Department of State Bulletin*, 17 March 1946, p. 435.
42. Rossow, op. cit., p. 21.
43. In a news conference in 1952 President Truman referred to an 'ultimatum' he had sent Stalin during the Iranian crisis, giving him a 'day certain in which they were to get out . . . or we would put some more people in there'. *The New York Times*, 25 April 1952. No available evidence makes it possible to confirm or refute the existence of such an ultimatum.
44. *The New York Times*, 18 March 1946.
45. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 297.

Premier Qavam remained silent when the Soviets poured in additional offensive forces and when the Soviets on 16 March warned Iran that resistance 'might prove calamitous to her existence'.[46] A complete Soviet take-over looked imminent. The US ambassador in Tehran told Qavam that if he did not submit the case to the Security Council, the United States would do so itself. 'As a result of the American activities in Teheran and the pressure on the part of the Shah on March 17, Qavam decided to refer the Iranian case to the Security Council.'[47]

On 18 March the second Iranian complaint was lodged at the Security Council,[48] and Iran requested that it be put on the agenda of the next regularly scheduled council meeting, 25 March. The United States supported the Iranian position. The Soviet Union requested that the meeting be postponed until 10 April on the grounds that negotiations with Iran were continuing. On 24 March, the day before the meeting was to take place, Moscow announced that all Soviet troops would be evacuated within six weeks, 'if no unforeseen circumstances occur.'[49] This announcement marked the end of the most acute period of the conflict.

Sub-Phase C: 25 March–10 May 1946

The Moscow announcement of 24 March was greeted with considerable scepticism. The Security Council met as scheduled and included the Iranian question on its agenda despite Soviet opposition. 'In essence this represented more a vote of no confidence in the USSR than any positive knowledge of the actual situation.'[50] The council then had to choose between several possible courses of action: delay debate until 10 April, as the Soviet Union requested; delay until further information in writing from Iran

46. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 300.
47. ibid., p. 301.
48. Van Wagenen, op. cit., p. 45.
49. ibid., pp. 46–71.
50. ibid., p. 49.

had been received;[51] or immediately hear the Iranian representative. On 27 March the council rejected a Soviet motion to postpone discussion, whereupon the Soviet delegation, led by Andrei Gromyko, walked out.[52] After continued debate the council on 4 April deferred further proceedings until 6 May, when both Iran and the Soviet Union were requested to report to the council as to whether Soviet troop withdrawal had been completed. The council reserved the right to take up the matter sooner than 6 May should there be any unfavourable developments.

The Council resolution of 4 April held that troop withdrawal should not be contingent on the outcome of other matters under negotiation between Iran and the Soviet Union. But on the same day Premier Qavam signed an agreement with the Soviet government which stipulated: that the Red Army be evacuated within six weeks after 24 March; that a joint-stock Iranian–Soviet oil company be established and ratified by the next Majles; and that the matter of Azerbaijan was an internal Iranian affair to be settled between Tehran and the 'government and people of Azerbaijan.'[53] Troop withdrawal and oil rights were thus in fact linked in the agreement. Since the oil company agreement depended for ratification on the political composition of the next Majles, it was by no means a certain Soviet gain, but it was at the time widely interpreted as such. Following the signing of the agreement the Soviet government put even heavier pressure on Iran. It was reported that Soviet troop movements increased without evidence of preparation for withdrawal[54] and that the Azerbaijan government began to move troops in the direction of Tehran.

This threat of renewed hostilities led to further Security Council

51. During this period Ambassador Hussein Ala of Iran was receiving contradictory instructions from Premier Qavam, who was under intense pressure from the Soviet ambassador in Tehran, and his veracity and authority to represent his government were questioned by the Soviet representatives. There was genuine doubt as to whether an agreement between Tehran and Moscow existed or not.

52. Van Wagenen, op. cit., pp. 50–54.

53. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 300.

54. Van Wagenen, op. cit., p. 67.

attempts to obtain Soviet withdrawal, although during the same period the Soviet Union made a concerted effort to get the matter entirely off the council agenda. In view of reports from Iran the council decided to reopen discussion earlier than 6 May. When it met on 15 April, however, the council learned that Premier Qavam now also requested that the matter be taken off the agenda. The Iranian request was widely thought to be the result of pressure from the Soviet Union. While the United States and Britain had no desire to see the matter off the agenda there was a 'question of principle dressed in procedural clothing'[55] since both parties had requested that the council not consider the question. After a week's debate on the proper interpretation of the UN Charter in such a situation, the council on 23 April voted against removing the matter from its agenda.

'Suddenly, on April 22, they [the Soviet troops] began coming north in droves. . . . On 5 May Tabriz itself was evacuated to the accompaniment of a brass band.'[56] Evacuation of Soviet troops from Iranian territory was completed sometime in early May, probably by 10 May.

Sub-Phase D: 10 May–19 October 1946

Despite its withdrawal of troops, the Soviet Union vigorously pursued its objectives in Iran through non-military means. On 22 May the Security Council voted to retain the Iranian question on its agenda indefinitely, in view of conflicting reports concerning Soviet evacuation. But this was the last time the council was to discuss the conflict.

On 14 June Premier Qavam concluded an agreement with the Ja'afar Pishevari régime in Azerbaijan which preserved the nominal authority of Tehran over the province but made concessions to the Azerbaijanis in many important areas – election laws, land distribution, choice of the governor, and ultimate incorporation of Azerbaijan's army and irregular soldiers into the national army

55. ibid., p. 69. 56. Rossow, op. cit., p. 24.

and gendarmerie.[57] The Azerbaijanis thus were in a position to infiltrate the Iranian army and to send Tudeh representatives to the next Majles. At the same time, for the immediate future they retained their army and *de facto* control over the province.[58]

The main Soviet effort during this period went into an attempt to gain control of the Iranian government at the cabinet level. On 2 August Qavam reshuffled his cabinet to include three members of the Tudeh; this 'popular front' government was formed while violent riots provoked by the Tudeh broke out in Khuzistan.[59] Then the British entered the conflict actively. On 3 August, the day after the new cabinet was announced, British troops were moved to Basra in Iraq, near the Iranian border, allegedly to protect British interests.

A tense period followed the British move. Soviet troop concentrations were reported north of the Azerbaijan border, and anti-Tudeh tribal unrest developed. The arrest by Qavam, on 18 August, of a number of Tudeh leaders did not ease the tension. On 23 September an open tribal rebellion broke out in Fars. The several rebellious tribes demanded the dismissal of Tudeh ministers from the cabinet, local self-government for the southern provinces, and an increase in parliamentary representation.[60] According to General Arfa, on 3 October a confederation of western tribes joined the southern tribes in their demands, and the army was 'lacking in enthusiasm for a fight on what they considered the Tudeh side'. Arfa says that during the period of the tribal uprisings the Tudeh and the government of Azerbaijan offered to allow the Azerbaijani forces to assume garrison duties in Tehran and other towns in order to allow the regular forces to be sent to the south.[61]

The Soviets accused the British of sponsoring the tribal rebellions; and, in response to Soviet allegations, the Tehran government requested the recall of one British consul. It cannot be

57. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 302. 58. Rossow, op. cit., p. 25.
59. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 303; Rossow, op cit., pp. 26–7.
60. Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 304–5.
61. Arfa, op. cit., pp. 374–5.

definitely established that the British instigated or supported the tribal rebellions, but there is no question that the rebellions were favourable to British policy. In mid October the central government signed an agreement with the tribes, meeting most of their demands. Following an interview with the Shah, Qavam reformed his government on 19 October, eliminating all Tudeh members.

Sub-Phase E: 19 October–10 December 1946

Following the appointment of his new cabinet, Qavam announced on 21 November that elections for the new Majles would begin on 7 December. He further stated on 23 November that they would not be held unless the government could supervise them in all areas of the country, including Azerbaijan. On November 24 he announced that central government troops would march into Azerbaijan for that purpose.[62]

The Soviet government informed Iran that it would take a serious view of disturbances in Azerbaijan and advised that the central government troops should not be sent. At the same time, in Tabriz, the Soviets informed the Azerbaijani régime that it was on its own militarily.[63] At this juncture the US ambassador in Tehran made a public statement in support of Iran's right to send its troops into Azerbaijan. Premier Qavam, thus supported, notified the UN Security Council of the Soviet protest and of the fact that Tehran had not yet established control over Azerbaijan but intended now to do so.[64]

PHASE III_2
10–15 December 1946

On 10 December minor hostilities broke out when forces of the central government entered Azerbaijan. On 13 December the

62. He also arrested approximately one hundred Tudeh leaders in Tehran.
63. Rossow, op. cit., p. 30.
64. Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 307–8; Van Wagenen, op. cit., pp. 84–5.

government forces entered Tabriz and arrested several Azerbaijani leaders, although Pishevari and many of his followers had already fled across the border into the Soviet Union. Pishevari's army put up little resistance and the fighting ended with a complete victory for Tehran.[65] On 15 December the government troops also took control of the Kurdish People's Republic of Mahabad.

PHASE IV_2
15 December 1946–22 October 1947

During this period there were no further hostilities or threatened hostilities, either between Iran and the Soviet Union itself or between Iran and Soviet-supported rebel forces. With the issue of control over Azerbaijan resolved, however, there remained the question of the Soviet–Iranian oil company agreement.

Following the re-establishment of its control over the entire country, the Tehran government took vigorous action against the Tudeh, raiding its Tehran headquarters, arresting 150 of its leaders, and suppressing its newspapers.[66] In the elections held during January and February 1946 only two Tudeh members were sent to the new Majles.

On 22 October 1947, by a vote of 102 to 2, the Majles passed a bill sponsored by Qavam himself declaring null and void his earlier negotiations with the Soviet Union for an oil agreement. Before the vote the Soviet ambassador had pressed hard for ratification; the US ambassador had made a public statement to the effect that Iran was free to accept or reject the oil agreement and could count on US support against any Soviet threats or pressure.[67]

65. Rossow, op. cit., p. 30; Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 308–9; Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 268.
66. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 309; Fatemi, op. cit., p. 323.
67. Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 310–11.

SETTLEMENT
From 22 October 1947

With the refusal of the Majles to ratify the oil agreement that had been extracted from Qavam while Soviet troops were still in Iran, the conflict passed into settlement. The *status quo ante* World War II was re-established, in so far as Azerbaijan and Soviet oil interests were concerned. The opposing forces were, however, stabilized at a higher level than before the outbreak of the conflict: the Soviet army was a much more powerful instrument than in pre-World War II days and the Iranian army continued to receive direct and indirect US aid and support.

Summary of Control Measures

In summary form, the key conflict-control measures in this case might have been the following (an asterisk indicates that the measure was actually taken):

KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY
Avoidance of great-power war.
Avoidance of presence of foreign troops.
Neutralization of Iran.
Renunciation of spheres of influence.
Development of alternative energy sources.
Long-range air-lift capability.
Strengthening of internal political, social, and economic fabric.
International military presence.

PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
Stronger, healthier Iran.
Strong counter force in area.*
Credible great-power deterrence.
International jurisdiction for:
  standstill agreement,
  diplomatic delays,
  fact-finding,
  border-watch,
  sanctions.

MODERATING/TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Acceptance of pro-Soviet victory.
Encouragement of country's disunity.
Disregard of treaty commitments.
Reduction of locally available counterforce.

RESTRICTING THE SCALE/SCOPE OF POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

More specific US deterrence.*
More specific UN actions.
Local arms limitation,
Backed by:
Multilateralized deterrence.
Limited and non-vital concessions.
Ways for interested powers to achieve influence without war.
Secure frontiers.
UN observation and patrol.

MODERATING/TERMINATING RESUMED HOSTILITIES

Stronger national fabric.*
Effective Western deterrence.*

6

The Bay of Pigs, 1960–61[1]

The Phases of Conflict

PHASE I
Background of the Conflict

Ever since the Spanish–American war, Cuba and the United States had – until 1960 – enjoyed close relations both politically and economically. A large percentage of Cuban business was US-owned before the coming to power of Castro, and the United States traditionally exercised great influences over the island government.

The Bay of Pigs conflict centred around a force of Cuban exiles, equipped and trained by the US government, who invaded the island of Cuba in an effort to precipitate the overthrow of Premier Castro and establish a new government acceptable to the United States. Military action against Castro was devised by and dependent upon a coalition of the Cuban exiles and the US government; neither of these forces was in a position to carry out this action independently.

Out of concern for international opinion, the United States was apparently unwilling to initiate direct US military action against Castro.[2] The US government, however, felt that it could

1. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution to this chapter of Miss Priscilla A. Clapp.

2. Haynes Johnson: *The Bay of Pigs* (New York: W. W. Norton; 1964), p. 66, adds that, without the proxy of the Cuban exiles, the United States

utilize anti-Castro Cuban exiles. The Cuban exiles, for their part, were split into too many factions to organize themselves into an effective counter-revolutionary force. Support and training from the United States provided them with the necessary rallying point from which to attempt perhaps the only objective upon which they could all agree – the overthrow of Castro.

The US government was concerned with Castro's anti-Americanism and his desire to export his increasingly Communist dominated revolution to the rest of Latin America. The Cuban exiles desired to return to their homeland and set up a different type of government.


The End of the Batista Régime

When it became obvious that the Batista government had lost its popular support, the United States (both the government and the public) began to see Castro as a possible alternative. During the early days of his insurgency, many of his supplies and arms came from friends in the United States.[3] Within Cuba those who were later to make up the bulk of the Cuban exile forces were either sympathetic to the Castro cause or actively fighting beside him.

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would have run the risk of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. (Johnson's book is based on information obtained from Cuban exiles as well as on Washington sources.) There is some reason to doubt the degree to which possible direct Soviet involvement weighed heavily in decisions concerning the Bay of Pigs. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, mentions his own personal concern at Soviet reactions in other parts of the world; Schlesinger: *A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1965), pp. 215–97. Theodore C. Sorensen mentions the possibility of a direct US–Soviet clash if a full-scale US invasion had been attempted; Sorensen: *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row; 1965), p. 297. Neither of these men, however – the former a participant in the decision-making process, the latter writing on the basis of conversations after the event – places these considerations high on the list of factors influencing US policy.

3. Earl E. T. Smith: *The Fourth Floor* (New York: Random House; 1962), p. 65; Theodore Draper: *Castro's Revolution* (New York: Praeger; 1962), p. 110. Earl Smith was US Ambassador to Cuba during the last years of the Batista régime.


CUBA
MILES
0
150
FLORIDA
Miami
Key West
ATLANTIC OCEAN
BAHAMA ISLANDS
GULF OF MEXICO
Havana
Managua
HAVANA
PINAR DEL RÍO
San Julián
San Antonio de los Baños
Ciudad Libertad
MATANZAS
LAS VILLAS
ESCAMBRAY MTS
Trinidad
Bay of Pigs
ISLE OF PINES
CAMAGÜEY
ORIENTE
SIERRA MAESTRA
Nicaro
Moa Bay
Baracoa
Santiago de Cuba
Guantánamo Bay
(U S Naval Station)
CARIBBEAN SEA
Playa Larga
Bay of Pigs
Roads or trails
Playa Girón
Green Beach
BAY OF PIGS
0
10 MILES

The dispute – both between the United States and Castro and between Castro and his former Cuban supporters in exile – developed only after Castro came to power on 1 January 1959; it was caused and aggravated by his progressive steps toward Communism and alliance with the Soviet bloc.

Many previous Cuban governments had forced their opponents into exile, usually to the United States. Castro's did the same. Members of Batista's government and others who had been close to him comprised the first anti-Castro exile group; they began independent military action against Castro shortly after they went into exile. But the bulk of the Bay of Pigs fighting forces were early supporters of Castro who had become disillusioned with him at various points during the course of his reforms.

Castro's First Months in Power: Deteriorating Relations with the United States

When Castro first assumed power the US government recognized the new Cuban government immediately and greeted the change with friendly reserve. Castro, however, made a point of his anti-Americanism. Some argue that Castro needed the United States as an enemy in order to retain his image as a strong rebel leader and to shift popular discontent from his régime on to the great neighbour to the north.[4]

In January 1959 Philip Bonsal was appointed US Ambassador to Cuba, in part because he was generally identified as a liberal.[5] Friendly overtures to the Castro government from the US government were, however, being compromised by bombing flights over Cuba mounted from Florida by exiled Batistianos. Castro vociferously blamed the US government for the resulting deaths of

4. Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer: *The Cuban Invasion* (New York: Ballantine Books; 1962), p. 13. Tad Szulc was an important figure in press coverage of Cuban affairs for *The New York Times*.

5. Robert F. Smith: *What Happened in Cuba?* (New York: Twayne Publishers; 1963), p. 245; Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 20.

Cuban citizens because no successful efforts were made to prevent these flights; he charged that some of the pilots were US citizens or were US-trained.[6] Castro also demanded the return of exiled Batistianos with the money they took with them when they fled.[7] The United States, however, was not prepared to send the exiles to certain execution. The mass political executions that Castro had initiated upon his take-over were by now turning US public opinion against him.

In April 1959 Castro made his first visit to the United States as Cuban Premier. He was accompanied by the moderates in his government,[8] but he received a very cautious welcome. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was on a golfing trip, and the Secretary of State, Christian Herter, received Castro in a hotel room.[9] On this visit Castro was mild in his approach and asserted that he was not a Communist. After a three-hour talk with the Premier, however, Vice-President Richard Nixon became alarmed that Communist influences were gaining control in Cuba. He reportedly expressed this view to President Eisenhower and suggested that Cuban exiles be trained by the US government to fight Castro.[10]

When Castro returned to Cuba he resumed his verbal attacks on the United States and, in May 1959, introduced a radical land-

6. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 25, 41.

7. R. Hart Phillips: *The Cuban Dilemma* (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc.; 1962), p. 57, states, however, that 'an official [of the US embassy] told me that no formal documented petition had been presented by the Cuban government. It was obvious that Castro did not want to extradite the Batista officials.' Phillips was head of *The New York Times* office in Havana during this period.

8. The fact that they were the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy, the head of the National Bank of Cuba, and the managing director of the Cuban Bank of Foreign Trade led US officials to believe that Castro was interested in loans. His aides, however, made no approaches to the State Department, the Development Loan Fund, or the International Cooperation Administration in Washington. *The New York Times*, 13 March 1960.

9. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 246.

10. Johnson, op. cit., p. 25, states that Nixon urged a 'stronger policy within Administration councils' and 'favoured a military solution, if necessary'. See also Draper, op. cit., p. 62; Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 226.

reform law.[11] After unsuccessful attempts by the Ambassador, Bonsal, to have the law moderated, relations between the United States and Cuba began to deteriorate.[12]

The Problem of Expropriated Property

The land-reform law helped to confirm suspicions in the United States that Castro's was a Communist revolution. The spectre of a possible Communist political and military base of operations ninety miles from the Florida coast began to take on ominous substance. It was also becoming evident that steps taken by the US government to moderate Castro's policies were producing just the opposite results. Castro began interpreting the actions of the United States as hostile to his revolution and using them as fuel for his 'anti-Yankee' campaign.[13] And since the United States had exercised virtually total control over the Cuban economy since the Spanish–American war Castro was able to persuade many Cubans that the United States was responsible for all the economic and social inequalities present in Cuba.

Following the introduction of the Agrarian Reform Law, great pressure was brought to bear upon the US government by those who had economic interests in Cuba. Just after the law was drafted Senator George Smathers of Florida, speaking before the Sugar Club of New York, voiced the first public warning to Cuba that its sugar quota would be reduced if it chose to carry out drastic land reform.[14] At that time, five American sugar companies owned or controlled more than two million acres of Cuban land and stood to lose all but 16,650 acres.[15] The US government soon told Cuba officially of its fear that the new land-reform law would

11. The Agrarian Reform Law was promulgated on 17 May 1959; under Article 48 of this law the INRA (National Institute of Agrarian Reform) was established with, among other powers, the authority to seize lands and redistribute them.
12. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 246.
13. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 18.
14. *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 June 1959.
15. ibid., 12 June 1959.

not give American investors fair compensation. At the same time Castro was proposing to sell eight million tons of sugar in the United States in 1961.[16] The regular sugar quota only provided for three million tons, a third of total US consumption; under a reciprocity agreement signed by Cuba and the United States in 1934 Cuba had been guaranteed a US market for three million tons of sugar a year at two cents per pound above prices in the world sugar market. During 1959 the US State Department suggested that the premium quota payment be put into an internationally administered fund to compensate American landowners until Cuba agreed to settle their claims.[17]

In October 1959 the Cuban government passed a law that would deprive American owners of most of their mining and petroleum rights on the island.[18] Later, in answer to threats of curtailment of the sugar quota, the Cuban government issued this statement:

> It might be interesting to ask the American statesmen and public opinion at large if they believe it possible for a small country like Cuba to bear indefinitely a trade and payment deficit resulting from its relations with its powerful neighbors . . . particularly considering that the international exchange reserve of the Island, with which that deficit was covered, was practically exhausted . . . owing to the fatal policy so unwisely followed by the tyranny [i.e., of Batista].[19]

In reply, Secretary of State Herter offered the alternatives to Cuba of discussing complaints peaceably with the United States or of pursuing anti-American policies and risking loss of the sugar quota.[20]

In January 1960 Ambassador Bonsal attempted new negotiations regarding confiscation of American property. *The New York Times* gave a good summary of his case:

16. ibid., 16 June 1959.
17. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 248; Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 63–4.
18. *The New York Times*, 29 October 1959.
19. *Boletín* of the Republic of Cuba, Ministerio de Estado, no. 92 (8 December 1959).
20. *The Wall Street Journal*, 11 December 1959.

Though several notes have been exchanged between the United States and Cuba since the [agrarian reform] law was promulgated last spring, the Government of Premier Fidel Castro has made no concessions to Washington's demand that, under international law, United States citizens whose land has been expropriated should receive 'prompt, adequate and effective' payment. . . . The Cuban Government is apparently willing to let the matter drift. . . . Since the exchange of these notes, the United States has become increasingly concerned over the manner in which the Cuban Government has implemented the agrarian reform.[21]

Despite continued US efforts at negotiation, the Cuban government increased the pace of its seizures of American-owned property in 1960. In February Castro announced the start of his industrialization programme with the statement that private foreign investment would be accepted in Cuba only if delivered to the government to be used as it saw fit.[22]

Other Sources of Tension

Although uncompensated confiscation of American property in Cuba seemed to be the main issue at this time, there were other issues that were being debated. Bombing runs over Cuba by exiled Batistianos continued and in early 1960 became more frequent;[23] it was even rumoured that Castro had instigated some of the raids himself, because they provided effective propaganda against the United States. In any event, *The New York Times* reported that an

analysis of the available evidence, including eyewitness reports, indicates that many, if not all, of the persons injured received their wounds either from stray rounds of 20 mm. and 40 mm. shell fragments from anti-aircraft fire of the Cuban armed forces or from grenades or bombs thrown from automobiles by terrorists.[24]

21. *The New York Times*, 10 January 1960.
22. ibid., 26 February 1960.
23. Some observers contend that, while some efforts were made to stop flights originating from US territory, they were not pressed very vigorously. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 24, 41; *The New York Times*, 17 and 23 October 1959.
24. *The New York Times*, 10 November 1959.

As the Batistiano raids increased over sugar fields in an effort to destroy the sugar crop, the Castro government complained bitterly about the refusal of the United States to sell it fighter aircraft and about attempts by the United States to dissuade Britain from exchanging with it several jet Sea Hunters for some obsolete Sea Furies. 'For this reason we cannot defend ourselves against the raiders,' it claimed.[25] On 6 March a shipload of guns from Belgium blew up in Havana harbour, and there were subsequent charges of US sabotage.[26] This incident provided Castro with some of his most effective propaganda against the United States at the time.

As early as the autumn of 1959 Castro was insisting that the United States would invade Cuba in the near future.[27] Likewise, he blamed all the exile activities against his government on US government policy. His refusal to negotiate differences with the United States was further indication of his determination to consolidate his revolution against the United States.

In 1959 US concern over Castro's continued hostility increased as members of the original revolutionary government were gradually replaced by Communists. This trend culminated in February 1960 in a trade and economic agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union[28] that gave the Soviets a major role in Cuban affairs.

This pro-Soviet trend in Cuba's orientation made more serious another development that had taken place during 1959: Castro's engaging in military forays in Central America and the Caribbean. The US State Department charged that he had 'aided or supported armed invasions of Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. These projects failed and all invited action by

25. Boston *Daily Globe*, 17 February 1960.
26. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 42.
27. ibid., p. 26.
28. On 14 February 1960 Anastas Mikoyan signed a trade agreement in Havana under which the Soviet Union would buy one million tons of sugar a year and extend $100 million of credit to Cuba. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 42.

the Organization of American States.'[29] Efforts to get decisive OAS action failed, however. The strongest language the OAS foreign ministers could agree on at their Santiago, Chile, meeting in August 1959 was that 'the existence of anti-democratic régimes constitutes a violation of the principles [of OAS] . . . and a danger to united and peaceful relations in the hemisphere.'[30] Many Latin Americans were at that time sympathetic toward the Castro revolution. Even those who may have shared Washington's concern over the nature of the Castro government were too committed historically to an anti-intervention stance to contemplate decisive OAS action.

Efforts to negotiate differences with Cuba continued, despite mounting US concern over the political orientation of the Castro government and over its active efforts to stimulate similar movements elsewhere in the hemisphere. For example:

> As late as January 1960 the United States government made a new effort to reach an understanding using Dr Julio A. Amoedo, the Argentine ambassador to Havana and a personal friend of Castro's, as an intermediary. There appears to have been still another attempt in March through [Cuban Finance Minister] Rufo Lopez Fresquet. On the morning of March 17, 1960, President [Osvaldo] Dorticós [Torrado] rejected this last United States overture.[31]

Schlesinger reports that 'on the same day in Washington President Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to train a force of Cuban exiles for possible use against Castro'.[32]

29. US Department of State: *Cuba*, Department of State Publication 7171 (Washington: GPO; April 1961), as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., p. 322.

30. US Department of State: *Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tensions in the Western Hemisphere, 1959–1960*, Department of State Publication 7409 (Washington: GPO; July 1962), p. 70.

31. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 222. When Fresquet told Dorticós that he would resign if no reconciliation were possible with the United States, Dorticós accepted his resignation. According to Phillips, op. cit., p. 178, two other high-ranking Cuban officials also resigned on 17 March in protest against Communist control in Cuba: the Cuban naval attaché and the military and air attaché in the Washington embassy.

32. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 222.

If the various Cuban exile groups were to be united and to make effective contact with the underground that was rising inside Cuba, some external party needed to assume the role of organizer and benefactor to these groups. The fact that the US government decided to organize the potential for military action against Castro did not necessarily mean a commitment to use that force. It seems clear, however, that the US decision to utilize Cuban exiles was a result of both an increased readiness to employ force in the mounting US–Castro crisis and an unwillingness to use US force directly. There were, of course, circumstances that could have changed this decision. During this period, however, Castro appears to have been very cautious not to provide the United States with a clear case for direct military action; for example, he made no move against the Guantánamo Naval Station. Sensitivity to world opinion appears also to have played a large part in determining the extent of US action against Castro; although there were certain to be widespread presumptions of an active US role in the exiles' activities, 'the hope existed that it could be plausibly disclaimed by the United States government.'[33]

PHASE II
March 1960–April 1961

Three main sub-phases can be identified in Phase II. The first extended from the spring to the autumn of 1960, when the proposed use of indirect US force through the Cuban exile groups centred around prospects for effective guerrilla opposition within Cuba. The second sub-phase, from the autumn of 1960 to early 1961, saw a gradual shift of emphasis from activities designed to support and encourage the guerrilla movements toward plans that involved an invasion by exile forces. The third sub-phase, from early 1961 to the April invasion, saw many modifications and amendments

33. Information from an interview with former CIA official Richard M. Bissell, Jr, in the Washington *Star*, 20 July 1965.

of the proposed Cuban assault, and, more significantly, was the period in which the decision to *use* force – as distinct from having it readily available – was made.

Sub-Phase A: Spring–Autumn 1960

In the spring of 1960 the United States made contact through its intelligence system with Cuban exiles here and with underground leaders inside Cuba. These Cubans were reportedly told that wealthy interests in the United States who were sympathetic to their cause were prepared to give them financial and other support.[34] The Cuban exiles and the underground leaders report, however, that they realized from the beginning that their benefactors had the full support of the US government. This support provided the incentive these Cubans needed to embark on a serious campaign against Castro despite problems posed by their unreconciled factions; they believed that with the backing of the United States they could not lose. As one of the Cuban troops later said, 'We thought Uncle Sam was behind us. He wanted to do this secretly. That was all right because he was Uncle Sam, and he is strong.'[35]

One group of Cubans with professional military experience was gathered at Miami and sent to a small island in the Carribbean to be tested for officer ability. Twenty-eight were chosen from this group to train in guerrilla tactics at the US Army jungle-warfare school in the Panama Canal Zone. On 22 August after seven weeks of training, they were taken to a camp on the Pacific coast of Guatemala,[36] where they assisted in training larger numbers of exiles in guerrilla tactics. The Cuban troops in Guatemala then numbered 160, forty-seven of whom were pilots. In the middle of September the first weapons arrived,[37] and shortly after that an

34. Johnson, op. cit., p. 31.
35. ibid., p. 37.
36. ibid., pp. 37–9.
37. Thirteen Springfield rifles, vintage World War I, and a few pistols. ibid., p. 48.

additional twenty guerrilla instructors of various nationalities were brought in to help train the Cubans.[38]

At this time there was no definite commitment by the United States to use the Cuban exile force, only a decision to train it. The US intelligence community was executing the mandate it had been given to carry out the day-to-day routine of military training. A recommendation to the President on the specific use to be made of the troops[39] was to be the prerogative of a special inter-departmental committee in Washington, consisting of top officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House.

Such planning *for actual use of the force* as appears to have existed when the force was conceived and being gathered was based on the assumption that existing isolated guerrilla bands in Cuba could be effectively co-ordinated by the creation of communication networks and that these networks would make it possible to bring in supplies and men for larger guerrilla operations. With such developments inside Cuba, the small numbers of exiles then training in Guatemala could be infiltrated to strengthen a guerrilla network sufficiently powerful to ignite an anti-Castro campaign. Simultaneously with the training of exiles in Guatemala, therefore, efforts were being made to establish effective liaison with guerrillas inside Cuba.

Meanwhile Castro continued to warn against impending invasion from the United States. Because his warnings contained a considerable amount of accurate detail about the training of exiles, it can be assumed that *his* intelligence network was keeping him well informed. As early as 1 May, while the Guatemalan camps were being readied – but before any Cubans had arrived – Castro had warned that the United States was preparing aggression against Cuba with the aid of Guatemala. By July he was stirring up public militancy against invaders and impressing upon the Cuban populace the idea that any invasion would be the direct responsibility of its enemy, the United States.[40]

38. ibid. 39. ibid., p. 53.
40. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 47.

During the spring and summer of 1960 political relations between Cuba and the United States deteriorated steadily, and soon it became impossible for the two countries to communicate diplomatically.[41] Castro refused to meet with the US ambassador to discuss differences. Instead, he told a CBS correspondent that Cuban–US relations would be improved if he could meet privately with President Eisenhower or Secretary of State Herter. A State Department spokesman answered that Castro should tell this to Ambassador Bonsal.[42]

Castro's continued expropriation of US-owned land led to the suggestion in Congress in March 1960 that the Cuban sugar quota be cut.[43] In May the State Department announced that the small remaining economic-aid programme to Cuba would be ended within six months.[44] By June, as signs in Washington pointed toward the likelihood of a cut in the sugar quota, Castro warned that this 'economic aggression' by the United States would be met with the seizure of all remaining American-owned property and business in Cuba.[45] On 5 July President Eisenhower received authority from Congress to cut the quota; and the next day he announced that he was reducing the quota sharply, adding that

> The inescapable conclusion is that Cuba has embarked on a course of action to commit a steadily increasing amount of its sugar crop to trade with the Communist bloc, thus making its future ability to fill the sugar needs of the United States ever more uncertain.[46]

41. Also, the popular support in the United States that Castro had enjoyed when he first came to power had largely disappeared, weakened by his mass executions of counter-revolutionists and his apparent repudiation (which he made official on 1 May 1960) of promised elections and representative democracy.
42. *The New York Times*, 18 April 1960.
43. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 277; Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., pp. 60–62.
44. *The New York Times*, 28 May 1960.
45. ibid., 27 June 1960.
46. President Eisenhower, statement on signing of the Cuban sugar Quota Bill, 6 July 1960, as cited in R. Smith, op. cit., p. 278.

Castro seized the US oil refineries on the same day. The next day he was given authority by his government to expropriate US-owned land with 'nothing more than a decision and a signature.'[47] On 8 August, in retaliation for alleged economic aggression by the United States, Premier Castro began implementation of this authority to nationalize US-owned property in Cuba.[48]

Since February 1960 Cuba had been drawing closer to the Soviet Union. Just after the sugar quota was cut the Soviet Union promised to buy more Cuban sugar, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that he would defend Cuba with rockets if necessary.[49] On 8 July 1960 Castro announced the imminent arrival of Soviet-bloc arms in Cuba. On 26 July he told the militia that it was the last time they would have to march without arms, because Czech rifles had already arrived.[50]

As US–Cuban economic and political relations rapidly deteriorated over the summer of 1960, the number of incidents in Central and South America which the United States attributed to Castro increased. One later account summarized these as including all the following: Guatemala and Nicaragua were facing rebel movements directly inspired by Castro and armed from his arsenal; many copies of Major Ernesto Guevara's book on guerrilla tactics had been sent into Chile along with supplies for earthquake victims; the Cuban ambassador to Panama, who was endowed with a fine voice, was singing in villages and asking parish priests to lead Friends of Cuba chapters; Fidelista rifle groups in Peru were training members in guerrilla tactics; the peasant revolt in north-eastern Brazil was becoming Fidelista; radical groups in Venezuela were demanding alliance with Cuba and land reform

47. *The Wall Street Journal*, 7 July 1960.

48. *The New York Times*, 8 August 1960. It is interesting to note that Castro did not begin to use the authority until after Soviet arms had arrived.

49. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 72.

50. *Revolución*, 27 July 1960, cited in Andrés Suárez: *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966* (Cambridge: MIT Press; 1967), p. 93.

The US State Department later confirmed the arrival of Soviet arms in July. *The New York Times*, 18 November 1960.

on the Cuban pattern (the Fidelista movement centred in Caracas had actually battled with police and soldiers); the Cuban ambassador to Bolivia was sponsoring anti-US demonstrations; and British Guiana had gone to Cuba for a $5 million loan.[51] With a good supply of weapons in Cuba to add force to pro-Cuban movements in other Latin American countries, Castro's threat of exporting his revolution was appearing more real and immediate.

On several occasions in the summer of 1960, the United States registered its growing alarm over Castro's policies with the Inter-American Peace Committee, which in the previous year had been given the responsibility for a general survey of causes of tension in the Caribbean. In August the OAS foreign ministers met again, at San José, Costa Rica, to consider US charges against Cuba. The final resolutions adopted were stronger than those of the previous summer but still fell short of the condemnation the Secretary of State, Herter, is said to have wanted,[52] much less a decision for action that some had thought possible. The Declaration of San José condemned 'energetically the intervention or threat of intervention ... by an extra-continental power in the affairs of the American republics' and said further that 'the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or social situation of any American state' could endanger the peace and security of the hemisphere. At the same meeting, however, the ministers also reaffirmed the general OAS prohibition of intervention by one state in the affairs of another.[53]

On 26 September 1960, at the UN General Assembly, Castro reiterated all the charges that he and the Soviet Union had made against the United States. His speech ended with a plea that the United Nations condemn the US government for supporting insurgents in Cuba and for planning an invasion of Cuba in the

51. Tad Szulc, 'Castro Tries to Export "Fidelismo"', *The New York Times*, 27 November 1960.

52. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 277.

53. US Department of State: *Inter-American Efforts* ..., pp. 368–9.

near future.[54] He also stressed the Soviet pledge of 9 July to defend Cuba with rockets.[55] A month later, however, Khrushchev announced that his pledge to defend Cuba with rockets should be interpreted 'really to be symbolic.'[56]

On 19 October the United States increased its economic pressure on Castro by imposing an embargo on US exports to Cuba. The US Department of Commerce charged that from the start of the Castro régime a variety of discriminatory taxes and trade regulations had been instituted in an effort to divert trade away from the United States and that as a result US exports to Cuba had fallen to less than 50 per cent of the 1958 total. The department also cited Castro's seizure of American-owned properties and claimed that 'all efforts on the part of the United States to reach a fair and equitable solution . . . have been rebuffed by the Castro regime.'[57] On the same day that the United States announced the embargo Major Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, who served as president of the National Bank of Cuba, was reported to be making plans to leave for the Soviet Union to negotiate a new trade agreement.[58]

During the summer of 1960, while the camps for training Cuban exiles were being developed in Guatemala, Castro was establishing firm control over his militia and the civilian population. He was also carrying on a vigorous campaign against a counter-revolutionary guerrilla group that was operating from the Escambray mountains in central Cuba.

As was noted earlier, contingency plans for the use of trained Cuban exiles were, at this time, based on the development of anti-Castro guerrilla forces within Cuba; this development required, in

54. The Cuban complaint was placed on the General Assembly's agenda, but the Assembly had not reached the item when the invasion at the Bay of Pigs occurred.

55. Speech by Fidel Castro to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 26 September 1960, as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 284–303.

56. TASS release, 30 October 1960.

57. US Embargo on Exports to Cuba, 19 October 1960, as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 280–2.

58. *The New York Times*, 20 October 1960.

turn, the improvement of communications both among isolated guerrilla groups and between them and those seeking to supply them by air. But the communication network was proving very difficult to achieve. Failure to develop communications skills adequate enough to guide in supplying aircraft was resulting, by the autumn of 1960, both in Castro's frequent interception of supplies intended for the guerrillas and in greater risk-taking by the guerrilla bands as they were forced to leave secure bases to forage for supplies. The guerrillas were also becoming isolated in small, weak groups vulnerable to attack by the Castro forces. In effect Castro was succeeding in localizing guerrilla operations against him. The situation seemed bound to worsen as the unsettled autumn weather made air supply even less reliable.

Castro was also strengthening his military forces during the summer of 1960. A State Department release in November 1960, summarizing these developments, stated that Castro had already built a force ten times the size of Batista's and larger than any other Latin American army. When the eight-thousand-man 26th of July Movement had taken power it had gained, in addition to its own arms, *matériel* sufficient for 25,000 men. On this base Castro had, in less than two years, equipped with modern light and heavy arms a militia of over 200,000 and an army of at least 40,000. In 1959 Cuba had bought 100,000 rifles in Belgium, and since July 1960 at least 28,000 tons of arms had been shipped in from the Communist bloc. Among these supplies were anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery, tanks, helicopters, mortars, other light arms, and ammunition. The State Department pointed out that arms deliveries from the Soviet bloc had stepped up noticeably since the OAS resolution in August which had disapproved of extra-continental intervention in the American continents.[59] Many observers were alarmed at the speed with which Soviet-bloc arms were arriving. It appeared that within six months Castro's forces would be sufficiently large and well equipped to make effective action by guerrilla forces impossible.

59. ibid., 18 November 1960.

Sometime between August[60] and November 1960 the contingency plans for a small force of exiles designed to augment a guerrilla movement inside Cuba became transformed into plans for a larger force capable of invading the island and establishing and holding a beach-head.[61] This change was more probably the result of an accruing number of small decisions than of one single act of decision. Two lines of development appear to have been central to the transformation. First, the expectations about guerrilla operations inside Cuba had not been fulfilled, so that the force as originally designed had no role to play. Second, worsening US–Cuban relations, particularly Cuba's growing reliance on the Communist bloc, increasing military strength, and expanded intervention in the hemisphere, added urgency to the need to act.

During the months when the decision to build an invasion force was being formed, the United States was in the midst of an election in which Cuba had become a major issue. Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy appeared especially anxious to debate this issue with his opponent. Nixon advocated non-intervention in Latin America, saying that US support for Cuban exile forces would be a violation of international law; Kennedy insisted that Castro was an outlaw and that the US government should train and support Cuban exiles. The Vice-President was aware of the contingency preparations under way; the Senator from Massachusetts had not been briefed on the situation.[62]

Perhaps even more significant, however, was the fact that, regardless of its outcome, the election would bring a new President to office. It was the highest executive office – that of the President – that had made the decisions to limit US involvement, thus far, to indirect support of anti-Castro forces. By the time of the election period the President was finally divorced from the threat of political repercussions that might be produced by exposure of

60. One source (Johnson, op. cit., p. 53) places in August the first suggestion that the plans be changed.

61. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 229; Johnson, op. cit., p. 54; Sorensen, op. cit., p. 295.

62. Johnson, op. cit., p. 49.

growing US participation in what might become a Cuban invasion. There was, therefore, no strong political voice to present the case *against* invasion.[63]

Sub-Phase B: Autumn 1960–Early 1961

In the camps in Guatemala the remaining months of 1960 were spent in training the exile force for its redefined mission. Castro continued to warn that invasion was imminent. For example, in late October he mobilized his militia in anticipation of an invasion from the United States. One newspaper speculated that his mobilization was an answer to the recent landing of 1,450 marines at the US naval base at Guantánamo.[64] By and large, however, the US press expressed bewilderment at Castro's furious preparation for imminent invasion. For example, *The New York Times* called Castro's actions 'hysterical' and remarked,

> All this would be comic if it were not so tragic. The United States Government has made it clear that it has no intention of invading Cuba. . . . One obvious intent of this Castro maneuver is to inflame his people's passions against this country and build hatred of the United States. . . . Another reason for this paranoid behavior may be to take the Cuban people's minds off their growing difficulties at home. . . . Finally, there is the worst possibility that Castro may be planning some provocation against the United States, at Guantánamo or elsewhere. This is certainly a time for us to guard against any such provocations, should they occur.[65]

Then, in December, Castro began to demobilize the militia. A new President had been elected in the United States and Castro expressed hopes that perhaps this would provide the beginning

63. Haynes Johnson states that factors 'in the nature of the Presidency itself and also in Eisenhower's personality . . . created an atmosphere of not bothering the chief, of going ahead in an interim period, in effect of postponing the final collection in the certainty that payment would be made'. The final decision would rest with a new administration. ibid., p. 54.

64. *The New York Times*, 31 October 1960.

65. ibid., 1 November 1960.

of a new attitude toward Cuba in Washington.[66] Despite the fact that, during the election campaign, Kennedy had openly advocated that the United States support the overthrow of the Castro régime, Castro appeared to believe that he could reach an accommodation with Kennedy as President.

In early January 1961 Cuba again urged immediate consideration in the United Nations of its charge that the United States was planning an invasion of the island.[67] Subsequently, Castro declared that the US embassy in Havana was the centre of counter-revolutionary activities against his régime and ordered that its staff be reduced to 11 within forty-eight hours. Eighty per cent of the 300 officials, he charged, were spies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Pentagon. There were actually only 42 US officials in the embassy at the time and 87 US employees in all.[68] Eisenhower answered Castro's charges as follows:

> This unusual action on the part of the Castro Government can have no other purpose than to render impossible the conduct of normal diplomatic relations with that Government.
>
> Accordingly, I have instructed the Secretary of State to deliver a note [which] . . . states that the Government of the United States is hereby formally terminating diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba . . . .
>
> This calculated action on the part of the Castro Government is only the latest of a long series of harassments, baseless accusations and vilifications. There is a limit to what the United States in self-respect can endure. That limit has been reached.[69]

Cuban representative Raúl Roa then delivered a speech in the United Nations assailing President Eisenhower for breaking diplomatic relations. He remarked that, 'although the Central Intelligence Agency has very often changed its plans and postponed

66. *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 November 1960.
67. *The New York Times*, 1 January 1961.
68. ibid., 3 January 1961.
69. President Eisenhower in a statement announcing the break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, 3 January 1961, as cited in R. Smith, op. cit., p. 282.

them, we have accurate information that we are now facing the final blow.' In his speech were details about where Cuba expected the attacks.[70] Apparently still with the belief, however, that the Kennedy administration would pursue significantly different policies from those of its predecessor, Major Guevara appeared on Cuban television to say that 'it was important that President-elect John F. Kennedy took no part in the United States' diplomatic break with Cuba.'[71]

Guevara had recently returned from Moscow, where he had been promised increased economic trade and aid. This was a multilateral trade agreement, he announced, under which Communist countries would purchase four million tons of Cuban sugar. Other benefits obtained in the treaty included: assistance in resuming operations at the formerly American-owned Nicaro and Moa Bay nickel plants; technical training in Communist nations for 2,400 Cubans; equipment from Poland for a shipyard capable of building ships of up to 10,000 tons, for facilities to produce shoes and electric batteries, and for two slaughter-houses capable of handling three hundred cattle and three hundred pigs daily; equipment from Communist China for twenty-four plants to make such things as automobile parts, paper, dynamite, and rubber, at prices 50 per cent below those 'in capitalist countries, and 40 million pesos of credit from Czechoslovakia to be used to build a plant for producing motor vehicles in Cuba'.[72]

During January 1961 Castro again mobilized his militia against an imminent invasion. At the same time, in an intensified drive, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 militia and regulars were battling from 300 to 1,000 guerrillas in the Escambray mountains.[73] On 2 January Soviet tanks, vehicle-drawn artillery, and four-barrel anti-aircraft guns were displayed in a Havana parade.[74] The forti-

70. *The New York Times*, 5 January 1961.
71. ibid., 7 January 1961.
72. ibid., 14 January 1961.
73. These figures are from several newspaper accounts. It is quite probable that the number of remaining guerrilla troops was exaggerated, because they were completely defeated about three weeks later.
74. *The New York Times*, 2 January 1961.

fication of Havana was then stepped up.[75] On 9 January there was a stir in Cuba when a US aircraft carrier sailed into Guantánamo to be incorporated into the forces there.[76] By late January reports of executions of Escambray insurgents were becoming more frequent. It had also become expensive to maintain the 200,000-man militia supposedly ready to defend Cuba from invaders, and most of it was demobilized. Castro claimed that he had expected the invasion to come before Kennedy's inauguration.[77]

During late 1960 dissension had developed among the exiles. The political voice for the exile forces was a group in Miami called the Frente. It reportedly 'represented the centre of the exile world at a time when the Right was still unduly prominent.'[78] In December 1960 disagreement had developed between the Frente in Miami and the exile leaders in Guatemala over the question of who would make decisions for the Cuban exile forces. Added to this problem was the fact that many of the lately arrived Cuban exiles demanded representation in the Frente for the socialist elements among them. By January 1961 this dissension was being carried into the Guatemala training camp as new recruits arrived from Miami. There was a general strike against the brigade leader,[79] who then resigned his command. US leaders, however, refused to let him step down and convinced the strikers that they should obey him.[80] This division among the exile troops threatened to force cancellation or delay of the invasion. Another of the problems in maintaining order at the Guatemala camp was

75. This was calculated, most likely, for its propaganda value, since it was improbable that invaders would choose Havana for their attack.

76. *The New York Times*, 9 January 1961.

77. ibid., 21 January 1961.

78. Draper, op. cit., p. 70.

79. The official name of the Cuban exile troops was Brigade 2506.

80. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 60–63. While available accounts of events in Guatemala at this point suggest that the strike was of serious proportions and arose from political differences among the exiles, the episode may have been exaggerated and may, in any event, have contained large elements of personal rather than political rivalry.

that many of the recent arrivals had no military background and were more concerned with their political beliefs than with military discipline.

Sub-Phase C: Early 1961–April 1961

After his inauguration President Kennedy called for a review of the invasion plan. As it stood at that point, the plan provided for a landing at Trinidad, a city of 20,000 at the base of the Escambray mountains in which there had been an extensive guerrilla force (although it was rapidly dwindling). The idea was that the invaders could link up with what remained of this guerrilla force and gain a foothold in Cuba that would serve as a base for operations against Castro. The Kennedy administration was anxious to conceal its participation in the proposed action and feared that a landing at Trinidad, with its relatively large civilian population, might require additional commitment by the United States. Another drawback to the Trinidad plan was that there was no near-by airfield capable of servicing B-26 bombers that could be easily secured and held. It was regarded as essential that Cuban exile aircraft operate from Cuban soil as soon as possible after the invasion.[81]

President Kennedy is reported to have been particularly concerned with the consequences of unfavourable world opinion regarding US intervention. He stipulated that no US forces whatsoever would be used in the invasion and that the US position remain correct in the United Nations: 'The integrity and credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our great national assets. I don't want anything to be done which might jeopardize that.'[82]

In early February the Cuban militia forces battling the Escambray guerrillas were reportedly increased to 40,000.[83] Beginning

81. This information is compiled from several sources: Johnson, op. cit., pp. 64–7; Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 242–3; and Charles J. V. Murphy, 'Cuba: The Record Set Straight', *Fortune*, September 1961.

82. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 271.

83. *The New York Times*, 10 February 1961.

at this time, several teams of Cuban exiles trained in the United States, Guatemala, and Panama were infiltrated into the island and began efforts to foster popular discontent and upheaval. They reported that Castro had tightened his militia operations to the point where it was impossible for them to receive any of the air-dropped supplies. As Castro had announced earlier in great detail, his troops were intercepting the air drops[84] and had also captured several US citizens who had been fighting against him.[85]

The captured US citizens were executed with much publicity; and Castro declared that if the United States could promote counter-revolution in Cuba, he could promote revolution elsewhere in Latin America.[86] By the end of February the guerrilla uprisings in Cuba had been virtually erased.[87] Reports also circulated that short-range Soviet rockets were in place near Havana.[88]

At the same time Castro continued to make overtures to Kennedy for negotiation of Cuban–US differences. Since January there had been a marked decline in anti-US harangues from Havana. Castro proclaimed that he was ready to 'begin anew with the United States', although he would wait to see what Kennedy would do about the 'anti-Castro mercenaries being trained by the United States in Florida and Guatemala.'[89] President Kennedy answered that the United States wanted a better life for Latin American people and would welcome progressive governments that promised this. He would not consider a restoration of diplomatic

84. ibid., 7 January 1961. The list of arms captured (from only two air drops) included 67 Garand rifles, 23 machine guns, 61 (unidentified) rifles, 3 bazookas, 2 mortars, hand grenades, and large amounts of ammunition. At this rate, Castro could have accumulated a good arms supply just from intercepted air drops.

85. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

86. *The New York Times*, 15 March 1961.

87. ibid., 28 February 1961.

88. New York *Herald Tribune*, 20 February 1961. These were reportedly 19·6 feet long, but no substantiation of the report can be found.

89. *The New York Times*, 20 January 1961.

relations with Cuba, however, 'as long as he was convinced that the Castro Government was aligned with the Communist bloc.'[90] Castro answered that Cuba's economic ties with Communist nations were totally without political commitments. He suggested that, if President Kennedy were to demonstrate by deeds that Washington would not interfere in Cuban internal affairs, Cuba was prepared to do its part to reduce tension in the Western hemisphere. He insisted, however, that the United States would have to end its 'economic aggression' against Cuba as a condition of negotiations.[91] In March President Kennedy cut off a large part of the remaining trade between Cuba and the United States.[92] The presence of Soviet military equipment and technicians in Cuba, as well as Castro's clear intention to continue his strong relations with the Communist bloc, made it politically impossible for Kennedy to accept Castro's professed good intentions.

Meanwhile, arguments among the Cuban exiles had been eased with the dissolution of the Frente and creation of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which provided representation to those exiles who had socialistic leanings. With this matter settled and a stronger bond established between the council and the camp in Guatemala, recruitment increased rapidly. From three hundred to four hundred men a week began to arrive at the Guatemala camp in February.[93]

At the end of February 1961, it has been reported, an inspection team from the Pentagon was sent to Guatemala to report on the readiness of the troops. When the team returned, with the judgement that morale was high and combat readiness good, the National Security Council met to consider the undertaking.[94]

By the middle of March a new invasion plan had evolved. The landing point had been changed from Trinidad to an area more remote from population centres and one with a suitable airstrip that could easily be secured. Such an airstrip would eliminate the

90. ibid., 26 January 1961.
91. ibid., 15 and 25 February 1961.
92. ibid., 11 March 1961.
93. Johnson, op. cit., p. 63.
94. ibid., p. 66.

need for long bombing runs from Central America. One other change in strategy called for by the new plan was a night landing, instead of a day landing as had been planned previously. By the time the Revolutionary Council had been formed the new plan was set for an invasion at the Bay of Pigs on 5 April. (The date was subsequently postponed to 10 April and finally to 17 April.)[95] The Kennedy administration stressed that under no circumstances would US forces enter the conflict – short of an attack by Castro on Guantánamo.[96]

To improve the chances of the exile landing it was decided that B-26 bombers manned by Cuban exiles would attack military airports in Cuba before the invasion in an effort to wipe out Cuba's small air force and thus prevent air strikes against the invasion force.[97] The exile air force was to consist of sixteen B-26 bombers, two of which would attack Managua, two San Antonio de los Baños, two Santiago de Cuba, four Ciudad Libertad (the main base), and one San Julián and Baracoa.[98] Castro's air force was regarded as disorganized and lacking experience, and few of its planes were considered to be in combat condition. Two bombing attacks on the Cuban air force before the invasion were calculated as sufficient to destroy it.

Up to this point it appears that, although detailed plans were far advanced for the use of the exile forces, the final commitment to their use had not yet been made. The time was rapidly nearing, however, when some action would have to be taken or the effort dismantled.

The authors of the plan urged its immediate implementation on various grounds. According to contemporary intelligence, by June Cuba would have fliers trained to man the Soviet MiG aircraft that Castro had received, a factor which might make the invasion effort disastrous. The number of Cuban exile troops in Guatemala had increased rapidly and, it was argued, it would be

95. ibid., p. 67.
96. Opinion of Stewart Alsop, as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., p. 70.
97. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 67, 70, 88.
98. Eight more bombers were later added to the sixteen originally planned.

unwise to return them to Miami in their present frame of mind. Morale was then high among the troops, but it was likely that unrest could break out anew at any time.[99] President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes of Guatemala was anxious that the troops be removed from his country by June, because their presence was causing political unrest.[1] And despite his repeated assertion that they were his own troops training to defend Guatemala from imminent attack by Castro,[2] it was becoming public knowledge that they were actually Cuban troops training with US aid. Also, the rainy season would start shortly in Guatemala, making further training operations impossible.[3]

On 3 April 1961 the State Department issued a strongly worded White Paper on Cuba that made clear the gravity with which the United States viewed the situation:

> The present situation in Cuba confronts the Western Hemisphere and the inter-American system with a grave and urgent challenge...
>
> What began as a movement to enlarge Cuban democracy and freedom has been perverted ... into a mechanism for the destruction of free institutions in Cuba, for the seizure by international communism of a base and bridgehead in the Americas, and for the disruption of the inter-American system.
>
> It is the considered judgment of the Government of the United States of America that the Castro regime in Cuba offers a clear and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas – to the whole hope of spreading political liberty, economic development, and social progress through all the republics of the hemisphere.[4]

At a news conference on 12 April President Kennedy said, however, that 'there will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces.' He declared that:

99. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 104.
1. ibid.
2. *The New York Times*, 21 March 1961.
3. Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 239–40.
4. US Department of State, *Cuba*, as referenced in R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 312–13.

The basic issue in Cuba is not one between the United States and Cuba. It is between the Cubans themselves. I intend to see that we adhere to that principle, and, as I understand it, this administration's attitude is so understood and shared by the anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in this country.[5]

On 10 April the Cuban exile forces in Guatemala (numbering about 1,400) were moved to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, the embarkation port. On 14 April the bulk of the force left for Cuba on several old cargo ships, which were armed with ·50-calibre machine guns.[6]

At the same time a diversionary action was being attempted between Baracoa and Guantánamo. This plan called for a small landing of Cuban exiles to draw Castro's attention and forces to the lower end of Cuba, away from the actual invasion point. This group of exiles never landed, however, reportedly because they encountered evidence that Castro's militia had anticipated their arrival and set up an ambush.[7]

On 15 April several B-26 aircraft manned by exile pilots trained in Guatemala bombed Castro's air force at various points on the island. Much of the Cuban air force was destroyed in the raid, but four fighters and two bombers survived. As was noted earlier, the invasion plan had called for *two* raids on Cuban air bases prior to the landing. The decision to cancel the second raid, and reportedly to scale down the one that did occur, is one of the more obscure and controversial aspects of the entire Bay of Pigs episode. That the failure to eliminate Castro's air power had serious implications for the invasion will become clear, although no one can say with certainty that the invasion would otherwise have succeeded. Among the explanations offered for the decision to limit the pre-invasion air attacks are: the adverse international reaction to the first raid; pressures within the US government, especially from

5. US Department of State: *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, Department of State Publication 7808 (Washington: GPO; 1965), p. 288.

6. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 74–87.

7. ibid., pp. 85, 88, 95.

Adlai Stevenson, then the US ambassador to the UN; faulty military advice as to the significance of the remaining Cuban aircraft; under-estimation of the number of planes remaining and their type; and failure to anticipate the novel use Castro would make of the remaining craft.

After the air raid and reports of ships off Baracoa, Castro braced himself once again for an invasion. On 16 April the Brigade 2506 paratroop battalion, numbering 176 men, left Puerto Cabezas in five C-47 transports bound for the Bay of Pigs.

PHASE III
17–19 April 1961

The Bay of Pigs invasion was designed to secure a relatively small base. If this could be accomplished US planners saw two possibilities for subsequent action. The first would be that the establishment of a beach-head would permit bombing of strategic military targets on all parts of the island, leading potentially to the disintegration of the Castro government. A second possibility would be that the two opposing forces might reach an impasse, in which the exiles could neither extend their territory nor be forced off the island; the impasse might result in a negotiated cease-fire and free elections.[8] In either event, the presence of the exile forces in Cuba would provide a rallying point for anti-Castro Cubans.

Initially, only a small area of combat would be involved. There were three major strategic points – Playa Larga, Playa Girón, and San Blas – which formed a triangle. The beach was firm, rocky soil extending inland for three miles, bordered by impassable swamps and accessible only by three highways. This is one of the reasons it was chosen as the invasion point, for the beach-head could be held fairly easily by a small number of troops blocking the access routes. Because the Cuban navy was believed

8. Information from an interview with Richard M. Bissell, Jr, Washington *Star*, 20 July 1965.

to be of no consequence[9] and because the air force would presumably have been destroyed by the Brigade's air raids, Castro would, it was assumed, have to depend upon his ground forces.

The Brigade infantry was to land at Playa Larga, Playa Girón, and a point twenty miles east of Playa Girón called Green Beach. From Playa Larga to Green Beach they would extend along forty miles of Cuban coastline. The battalion of paratroopers would land in three places – along each road crossing the swamps – and their commander would then establish his headquarters at San Blas, twenty miles north-east of Playa Girón.[10]

In this way Castro's counter-attack would be confined to very narrow approaches, and the area of battle would be predetermined by the attacking forces. Given sufficient ammunition and the proper weapons, the invading forces would be able to hold their positions despite the superior size of Castro's forces. The invading forces would be brought in by sea and by air. They would, therefore, need the airfield[11] and a protected port. These could easily be secured from ground attack by obstructing the roads; they would, however, be highly vulnerable to enemy air attack.

There were roughly 1,400 men in the invasion force,[12] divided into six regular battalions and one paratroop battalion. Of these, only 135 were professional soldiers; the rest were students, professional men, or peasants. The average age was twenty-nine, but ages ranged from under twenty to over sixty. About half of the men had received less than a month of training or none at all.[13]

9. No account mentions the Cuban navy as a consideration in the invasion plans. Early in April the US government made an agreement with some members of the Cuban navy for them to escape in several Cuban torpedo boats. The plan failed when a private US vessel stationed in the area to fuel the escaping boats was intercepted by a Cuban warship. Szulc and Meyer, op. cit., p. 117.

10. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 83–4.

11. The airfield was near Playa Larga.

12. This figure is compiled from various accounts, especially those of Schlesinger and Sorensen.

13. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 98–9

Their weapons were those readily available in Western markets. In addition, small arms were being taken along for Cubans who might join the invaders once they had landed.[14] These extra arms were never unloaded in Cuba, and ammunition for the invaders' own arms lasted less than two days. Because those who had been trained were trained well and used their training to advantage in battle, the invasion force was successful, while ammunition lasted, in holding positions against forces many times its size. The fact that many of the exiles had not received adequate training does not seem to have had a negative effect on their final performance.[15]

Castro's total force prior to the invasion was about 240,000 equipped troops – 40,000 regulars and 200,000 militia. The forces he deployed against the invasion were estimated at 36,000 troops (both militia and regulars) with forty tanks, 122mm artillery, mortars, two bombers, and four fighters (the other aircraft having been destroyed in the 15 April raids). The Cuban troops were not very well trained, and there is evidence that they did not perform well in battle although they were deployed well by their leaders.[16] The invading forces, at a disadvantage through lack of ammunition, were simply overwhelmed by numbers.

A large portion of Castro's troops was left behind to carry out police duties at the time of the invasion. In Havana alone, 200,000 people were arrested, and large-scale arrests were made all over the island.[17] Very few of the population defected when the invaders landed, and the underground that might have existed was effectively incapacitated by arrests.[18]

The invasion plan hinged on the supposition that it would take Castro enough time to mobilize his forces and reach the beachhead with effective weapons to allow the invaders to land and secure their positions. While it was hoped that the invaders'

14. ibid., pp. 84–5. It was estimated that 5,000 Cubans might join the brigade voluntarily in the first two days.

15. This comment is derived from Haynes Johnson's description of the battle, pp. 103–72.

16. ibid.

17. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 274.

18. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 103–72.

strength would be increased by defections, the immediate rallying of the Cuban population was not regarded, however, as a prerequisite for success in establishing the beach-head.

The cargo ships carrying the exile force reached the Bay of Pigs before dawn on 17 April and began landing troops under cover of darkness. The first troops ashore encountered some Castro militia guards but overcame them. Castro alerted all his forces in the Bay of Pigs area and mobilized several near-by battalions.[19] His principal objective was to crush the invaders at Playa Larga, the invasion point farthest inland. He also ordered the remainder of his air force to strike the supply ships at dawn.

When the Cuban air force attacked at dawn on 17 April, Brigade troops were still coming ashore, their landing having been delayed by reefs that had not been taken into account in planning the operation. The ships were, therefore, forced to leave with most of the supplies and some troops still on board. The command ship, bearing the bulk of the supplies, and the communications ship were sunk by Castro's pilots.

With tanks, heavy mortars, cannon, and bazookas, the invaders had little trouble defending their positions as Castro's troops moved down the highways into the swamps. The exile force did not have enough ammunition to carry on indefinitely, however, and the supply ships did not return that night for fear of further air attacks. During the first day of the invasion, the Brigade troops at Playa Larga faced and defeated ten to fifteen times their own strength in men, arms, and tanks. They retreated to Playa Girón the next morning because of shortage of ammunition.

Throughout the first day the paratroop battalion, with headquarters at San Blas, held its positions on the approach roads. The ferocity of the battle led Castro's 20,000 troops to believe that they were facing great numbers of men and caused them to delay

19. Upon arriving at the Bay of Pigs, Castro received word of another invasion in Pinar del Río Province, and immediately headed there. This was a simulated battle that had been set up with rubber rafts and sound devices to add to Castro's initial confusion. ibid., p. 110.

their attack, thus giving the paratroopers time to retreat to Playa Girón.[20]

On 18 April, the second day at Playa Girón, defences were set up with the hope that the United States might provide direct support rather than see the undertaking fail. When it became apparent to the Brigade leader that there would be no support from US aircraft, he ordered his troops to disband and destroy their equipment.[21] At this point US naval destroyers and the Brigade supply ships appeared offshore accompanied by several US fighter aircraft. In the belief that they were planning to attack,[22] Castro halted his forces approaching the beach, and the Brigade survivors escaped possible annihilation.

It had been decided *during* the invasion to make an attempt to bomb the main Cuban air force base at San Antonio de los Baños, but when the Brigade's B-26s had arrived there on 18 April, clouds obscured the field and they were forced to turn back without striking. It had also been decided that the B-26s would strike Castro's forces at the battle area under the protective cover of several US fighter aircraft. Due to a miscalculation of time the B-26s arrived an hour early at the Bay of Pigs on 18 April and were lost to Castro's aircraft. The US fighter aircraft never left their carrier.

For several days after the invasion US naval forces remained positioned off the coast of Cuba to rescue survivors. They also threatened to attack if Castro should begin to execute his captives.

20. A conservative estimate places Castro's losses during the entire battle at 1,250 dead on the battlefield, 400 dead from wounds and lack of medical care, and 2,000 wounded. ibid., p. 179.

21. An alternative plan had been to escape into the Escambray mountains eighty miles away and mount a guerrilla offensive from there, but the Brigade leaders had not been informed of this. It would have been impossible to conduct a guerrilla campaign in the impassable swamps around the Bay of Pigs. ibid., p. 224.

22. Earlier in the day, two unmarked F-86 Sabre jets had appeared overhead, and Castro later claimed that they fired on his troops. This has never been proved or disproved. ibid., p. 148.

On 18 April Premier Khrushchev had sent President Kennedy a note defining the position of the Soviet Union: 'We will extend to the Cuban people and its Government all the necessary aid for the repulse of the armed attack on Cuba.'[23] President Kennedy answered that the United States planned no military intervention in Cuba; but that, should an outside force intervene, the United States would honour its obligations to defend the hemisphere from external aggression.[24]

PHASE IV
From 19 April 1961

Addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 20 April, President Kennedy stated that, while the United States had held to its policy of non-intervention in Cuba, 'our restraint is not inexhaustible' and the United States would act to safeguard its security.[25] With this speech, Castro's fear of US intervention increased once again, especially in view of the continued presence of two US task forces in the waters off Cuba.[26]

There was no question of settlement between the United States and Cuba. So the dispute continued, setting the stage for direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962. The invasion force taken prisoner by Castro was eventually ransomed for a very large quantity of medical supplies; when the exiles returned to the United States they were still uncompromisingly against the Castro régime.[27] The United States remained for Cuba the imperialist neighbour threatening the Cuban revolution; and the US government continued to see Castro as 'no Tito, nor a satellite, nor an immediate military threat, nor simply a minor nuisance, but a persistent source and model for insurgency and terror in the hemisphere.'[28]

23. US Department of State: *American Foreign Policy . . .*, p. 295.
24. ibid., pp. 296–7.
25. ibid., pp. 299–302.
26. Johnson, op. cit., p. 189.
27. ibid., p. 352.
28. Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter: *Controlling the risks in Cuba*, Adelphi Paper No. 17 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies; 1964), p. 24.

Summary of Control Measures

In summary form, the key conflict-control measures in this case might have been the following (an asterisk indicates that the measure was actually taken):

KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Peaceful liberalizing policy prior to revolution.
Emphasis on political rather than military view of situation.
Containment rather than intervention policy.
Introducing a multilateral basis to dispute (e.g., UN, OAS).
Pressure on USSR not to intervene.
Preventive OAS action:
  inspection and publicity,
  believable deterrence,
  training of internal defence forces.
UN fact-finding machinery.
Internal political, economic, and social health.
Minimizing external subversion.
Limited US definition of strategic value.
Universal rules against unilateral intervention.
Ban on exile military training and activity.
International human-rights tribunal.
Dispersal of exile groups.
Isolation of remediable issues.
International arbitration, conciliation, good offices, mediation, and adjudication.
Guarantee of private investors from expropriation losses.

PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Strong UN measures:
  fact-finding and publicity,
  time-stretching delays,
  channels of communication,
  good offices and peaceful-settlement procedures.
OAS deterrence of unilateral intervention.
Soviet deterrence of United States.
Restriction on arms transfers to internal security needs.

MODERATING/TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

US restraint.*
Effective internal control.*
Better intelligence.
Mutual strategic deterrence.*
US marginal strategic superiority (preferably at low levels).*

7

The Greek Insurgency, 1944–9

The Phases of Conflict

Each of our other case studies begins with a full narrative reconstruction of the events of the conflict in order to develop its complete phase structure. In the analysis of the Greek insurgency that procedure will be omitted, and brief statements of the transitions from phase to phase and of the sub-phases will be substituted. This is possible in the present case because of the existence of a thorough history of the Greek crisis.[1] From it one can identify phases and transitions; we have used it as a basis for an analysis of factors bearing on conflict control.

1. W. C. Chamberlain and J. D. Iams: *Rebellion: The Rise and Fall of the Greek Communist Party* (Foreign Service Institute, Fifth Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, 2 June 1963 [mimeographed]). There is a large literature on the Greek insurgency, but this study, with its parallel histories of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the military aspects of the insurgency, seemed especially rich in the kinds of material this analysis required. The only aspects of the conflict for which supplementary material appeared necessary were the role of the United Nations and the details of US and Soviet policy statements. Materials on these have been drawn from David W. Wainhouse *et al.*: *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press in co-operation with The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; 1966), pp. 221–41; and *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49*, US Congress, 81st, 1st Sess., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Document no. 123 (Washington: GPO; 1950), pp. 765–82.



Transition from
PHASE I *to* PHASE II
10 March 1944

The decision of the wartime resistance coalition – the National Liberation Front (EAM), which was dominated by the Greek Communist Party (KKE) – to challenge the royalist government-in-exile for the control of post-war Greece led to the creation of

the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) on 10 March 1944. This marked the conjunction of the available force – EAM's wartime guerrilla resistance force (the National Popular Liberation Army, or ELAS) – and a political decision to employ it in a struggle for control of Greece. It signalled, therefore, the introduction of a military option into the long-standing political dispute between the Greek government and KKE.

Transition from PHASE II *to* PHASE III_1 3 December 1944

In a bid to seize power in Athens (virtually the only part of Greece not under ELAS control) from the returning Greek government and the British, KKE initiated major hostilities in Athens between ELAS and their forces.

Transition from PHASE III_1 *to* PHASE IV_1 12 February 1945

Militarily defeated, KKE agreed at Varkiza on 12 February 1945, to cease fire, disband its forces, and surrender its weapons.

Transition from PHASE IV_1 *to* PHASE III_2 February 1946

Since KKE was actively rebuilding its organization and expanding its political base, hostilities eventually broke out in the Greek countryside, particularly in the northern regions near the Yugoslav, Albanian, and Bulgarian borders.

Intensifications within PHASE III_2

Sub-Phase A: February–September 1946

Hostilities during this first part of Phase III_2 took the form of actions between the Greek government gendarmerie and small, isolated, largely unco-ordinated bands, not all of them under KKE control. During this sub-phase, guerrillas who had fled to Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria following the Varkiza Agreement began to re-enter Greece, although they continued to use territory north of the border as a sanctuary.

Sub-Phase B: September 1946–October 1947

After September 1946 the guerrilla bands grew larger and their operations more co-ordinated. Markos Vafeiadis became military leader of the guerrilla movement. On the government side the main arm of action shifted from the gendarmerie to the armed forces.

Sub-Phase C: October 1947–July 1949

Until October 1947 KKE continued to function as a legal political party, endorsing the rebels' aims but denying sponsorship of the insurgency. In that month KKE came out in open endorsement of the revolt and assumed open leadership of it. Shortly thereafter, KKE formed a Provisional Democratic Government. Militarily these events signalled the emergence of large, co-ordinated guerrilla units and a formal military command structure. During this sub-phase one threatened intensification – the involvement of the cities in the insurgency – failed to materialize.

Sub-Phase D: July–October 1949

In July the closing of the Yugoslav border to the guerrillas and their supplies forced on them a major tactical decision: whether

to continue the type of hostilities involving large guerrilla units, while holding the mountain strongholds of Grammos and Vitsi as sanctuaries and depots within Greece, or to revert to the less co-ordinated tactics pursued in Sub-Phase B. The guerrillas chose the former course.

Transition from
PHASE III_2 *to* PHASE IV_2
October 1949

In an effort to defend the Grammos and Vitsi strongholds against conventional assault by the Greek National Army, the guerrillas were decisively defeated and their remnants driven into exile in Albania. On 16 October 1949 the Provisional Democratic Government declared that it had, for the moment, put aside its arms.

Summary of Control Measures

In summary form, the key conflict-control measures in this case might have been the following (an asterisk indicates that the measure was actually taken):

KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Avoidance of great-power war.
Avoidance of Communist take-over of legitimate nationalist and patriotic resistance movements.
Avoidance of short-sighted wartime policies which created post-war conflicts.
Recognition of and support for popularly based non-Communist elements to provide democratic alternative.
Pressure on autocratic governments to liberalize.
Plebiscite on form of government.
Prevention of the acquisition of surplus arms by potential conflict makers.

PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Neutral administration of plebiscites with guarantees of fairness.
Support for popular non-Communist reform elements.
Clearly stated intentions on part of deterrers.

MODERATING HOSTILITIES

Discouragement of diplomatic recognition of insurgents.*
Urging of free elections under international supervision.*

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Threat of US intervention.

PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

International cognizance including investigation, fact-finding, reporting.*
Pressure on potential mischief-makers not to intervene,
Backed by:
Meaningful threats.*
Joint or impartial supervision, inspection, and control of arms-surrender agreements.
Post-war reconciliation, even-handed justice, and incorporation of dissenters into legitimate modes of dissent.
Economic and financial assistance,* preferably multilateral.
Vigorous internal-security operations, with foreign military assistance.*
Splitting of Communist opposition, isolation of irreconcilable radicals.
Accommodation of legitimate political demands.
Preventive international peace-keeping capability interposed between potential adversaries.

8

The Indonesian War of Independence, 1945–9[1]

The Phases of Conflict

PHASE I
Background of the Conflict

The islands of the East Indies archipelago fell under Dutch control in the seventeenth century. Despite stirrings of nationalist sentiment since the early 1900s the islands achieved their independence only in 1949, after more than four years of intermittent warfare. Our focus here is primarily on developments on the island of Java, for it was there and to a lesser extent on Sumatra that the Republic of Indonesia had effective power. In any event such political and military movements as developed on other islands were not so significant in determining the large course of the conflict or its eventual outcome.

Geographic and Physical Factors

The physical features of Indonesia had a profound effect on the manner in which the conflict unfolded. In the first place the centres of power and decision making of the adversaries were separated from each other by nearly half the world. Indonesia lacked resources to carry the war outside its borders, and for the Netherlands to bring its power to bear in an area many thousands of

1. The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions to this chapter of Mr R. Lucas Fischer and Mr Lewis Frank.

miles away added greatly to the cost of the conflict. The island nature of the Indies isolated the Indonesian nationalists from easy assistance by potential Asian friends. And, by virtue of Dutch control of the seas in the archipelago, it was difficult for efforts against the Dutch on the several islands to be co-ordinated or for one group to render effective assistance to another.

The terrain and climate of Java and Sumatra were favourable to guerrilla warfare. The mountainous jungle, extreme heat, and November-to-January rainy season facilitated Republican control of pockets of territory away from the Dutch-controlled roads.

The strategic location of the Indies at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their rich wealth in people, oil, and rubber made them valuable assets to the Dutch. The rivalries among the United States, Soviet Union, and Communist China that colour current perceptions of the area were not so central at the time of the Indonesian struggle for independence. But even then no great power with colonial, commercial, or security interests in the south Pacific, Oceania, or south and south-east Asia could be indifferent to developments in the region.

Wartime Experience

For both the Dutch and the Indonesians World War II brought invasion and occupation by Axis powers. But their experiences were totally different. While Nazi occupation of the Netherlands was brutally repressive and those few who collaborated with the occupying powers were reviled by the vast majority of Dutchmen, Japanese occupation of the Indies removed Dutch power and created an opportunity for the nascent Indonesian nationalism to develop. There were oppressive features to the Japanese occupation, and some Indonesian nationalists led anti-Japanese underground movements. But many of the men who were to become leaders of the post-war independence struggle participated in the Japanese-sponsored administration.

By the end of World War II a number of Indonesian political


JAVA
0
100 MILES
Djakarta (Batavia)
BAN-
TAM
Cheribon
Linggadjati
Semplak
(A.F.base)
Bandung
Semarang
Surakarta
Madiun
Jogjakarta
Kaliurang
Surabaya
MADURA
EAST
JAVA
P A S U N D
Renville Truce lines (Status Quo Line),
in turn approximating the Van Mook Line
EAST
SUMATRA
Medan
MALAYSIA
Kuala Lumpur
SINGAPORE
SUMATRA
Padang
Palembang
SOUTH
SUMATRA
SUNDA ISLANDS
BORNEO
Balikpapan
CELEBES
Malino
EAST INDONESIA
WEST
IRIAN
Djakarta (Batavia)
Bandung
Surabaya
MADURA
JAVA
PORTUGUESE
TIMOR
TIMOR
AUSTRALIA
MILES
0
400
INDONESIA
Dutch-held territory prior to First Police Action (21 July 1947)
Dutch gains from First Police Action
Republican-held territory prior to Second Police Action (18 December 1948)

parties emerged, many of which had their origins in the pre-war period. The largest and most important of these were the Indonesian Nationalist party (PNI), the Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Mushlimin Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations), the Socialist party, the Indonesian Communist party (PKI), and a strong group of followers of Tan Malaka, an independent Marxist. These parties differed in political and social philosophy, but they were united in demanding Indonesian independence.

During the occupation the Japanese created and trained Indonesian military forces. The Corps for the Defence of the Fatherland (PETA) included about 35,000 Indonesians trained and equipped by the Japanese as an auxiliary to their own forces. It served as a militia and was intended, in the event of Allied invasion of the Indies, to fight a rear-guard holding operation against the Allies while the Japanese, if necessary, withdrew.[2] There were also a variety of para-military organizations, for example labour battalions, that received some degree of military instruction. Other Indonesians acquired experience in guerrilla warfare as members of the anti-Japanese underground.

Although the Netherlands itself was occupied and control of the Indies was seized by Japan, Dutch forces continued to play an active part in both the European and Asian theatres. Operating not only in Dutch units under the authority of the Dutch government-in-exile in London but also integrated into other Allied units, the Dutch received from Britain, Australia, and the United States military *matériel* and training comparable to that given other Allied forces. In the immediate area of Indonesia in the closing days of the war, a battalion of the Dutch Army (KNIL) participated with Australian forces in recapturing the East Indian islands of Tarakan and Balikpapan; and an estimated 10,000 Dutch troops were being trained, at the end of the war, by the British in Singapore.

2. Guy Pauker, 'The Role of the Military in Indonesia', *RAND Memorandum RM-2637-PC* (Santa Monica: RAND 1 September 1960), p. 7.

As the end of the war approached, several events occurred that had profound effects on the subsequent course of the 1945–9 conflict. Early in 1945 the Japanese occupation authorities in Java promised early independence to the Indonesian leaders and in March created a committee of Indonesians to consider constitutional questions concerning the future independent state. A similar committee but with more restricted powers was created on Sumatra in July. Political developments in the other islands had been more restricted by the Japanese during the occupation, but on 7 August 1945, the Japanese set up an all-Indonesian preparatory committee to lay the foundations for independence.

On the Allied side, developments concerning the future of Indonesia were also taking place. The strategy of the war against Japan had placed relatively low priority on the liberation of the Indies, and only a few of the lesser islands had been reconquered at the time of the Japanese surrender.

Since 1942 the Indonesian archipelago had been divided between British and US areas of operational military responsibility. The South East Asia Command (SEAC) under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten included Sumatra and adjacent dependent islands. The rest of Indonesia was part of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) under General Douglas MacArthur.[3] As early as 1944 the British had pressed for the assignment of more of the Indies to SEAC in order to facilitate operations against Singapore. After initial resistance from SWPA the reassignment was approved in July 1945. The transfer was reportedly favoured by the US State Department, which feared US involvement in postwar colonial problems in the area.[4] At Mountbatten's request the formal transfer of authority was delayed, pending the collection of adequate intelligence on his new command.

3. Idrus N. Djajadiningrat: *The Beginnings of the Indonesia–Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe Talks* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958), p. 8. At the time he wrote this study the author was a member of the Indonesian Foreign Office.

4. ibid., p. 15 n.

PHASE II
17 August–Mid October 1945

The Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945 found Allied responsibility for the liberation of the Indies still divided between Britain and the United States, the Indonesian nationalists rapidly consolidating their position, and no Allied force in the major islands of the Indies. Furthermore there was little or no first-hand information available to SEAC about the situation on the islands. The response of the Allies to the Japanese surrender was to order Mountbatten to assume immediate command of that portion of the Indies that had been under SWPA, thus placing all of the Indies in the British area of operations. The Indonesian nationalists' reaction was to proclaim, on 17 August 1945, the Independence of the Indonesian Republic.

The Dutch had not objected to the consolidation of all of the Indies under British command. But Hubertus van Mook, then Lieutenant-Governor of the Netherlands East Indies, and Charles van der Plas, Dutch representative to SEAC, objected vigorously to the proclamation of the Republic and asked that orders be issued to the Japanese to restore the *status quo* as of the date of their surrender, 15 August. Such an order was in fact issued by Mountbatten, but the Japanese commanders in Indonesia refused to accept responsibility for events after 15 August. The transfer of the whole of the Indies to British command appears to have been a disappointment to the Indonesians, who felt that the United States was more likely to be sympathetic to the independence movement. Upon learning of the transfer the Republican authorities communicated to SEAC their determination to resist militarily any Dutch effort to re-establish control in Indonesia.[5]

There were, as was noted earlier, military resources available

5. Information from a conversation with Colonel Thomas L. Fisher, II, USAF (Retd), US Army liaison officer with the British 15th Corps in Java, October to December 1945. The message may have been in the form of a radio broadcast.

to the new Republic. Although the Japanese formally disbanded PETA, the organization remained essentially intact and retained the small arms that had been issued by the Japanese. In early October the Indonesian Republican army was formed, drawn primarily from former PETA forces. There were also irregular forces of uncertain numbers growing both out of the para-military groups sponsored by the Japanese occupation authorities and the anti-Japanese underground. In addition to the light arms originally provided by the Japanese to some of these groups, they captured, seized, and in some cases were given additional Japanese equipment.

The first Allied personnel to land in the main Indonesian islands was a small group parachuted into Djakarta on 8 September 1945, to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation and prepare for a larger Allied military mission. This group found the nationalists organized for recognition as the legitimate civilian authority in Indonesia. Although later developments suggest that the Allied group underestimated the magnitude of the problem, they did recommend to SEAC that the first Allied troops landed in Java be composed largely of British rather than Dutch forces in order to avoid immediate violence. On 16 September the military mission itself landed, and at the end of September the first British force of fewer than one thousand men arrived. Further landings continued thereafter, including in their numbers some small Dutch contingents.[6] These Dutch units were supplemented by liberated Dutch internees and prisoners of war, rearmed possibly with Dutch arms hidden in Java before the Japanese invasion and undiscovered during the occupation.[7] By early October the Dutch were estimated to number 1,700.[8] No US forces participated in the Allied landings, although a small US liaison mission was with the first forces to arrive.

The situation that had developed in Indonesia posed delicate

6. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 27.

7. Information from a personal conversation with Colonel Fisher (see earlier footnote).

8. *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 October 1945.

political problems for the British. The mission of the troops under their command was to accept the surrender of local Japanese forces and prepare them for return to Japan, to liberate Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, and to prepare to turn the country over to civilian authorities. There were, however, two competing groups claiming to be the legitimate civilian authority to whom power should be transferred. By the time of the British landings a tentative policy had evolved. Mountbatten told Van der Plas during meetings on 27 and 28 September that the British forces would not be used to impose Dutch authority on the nationalists.[9] The new commander of the Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies, General Sir Philip Christison, is reported to have characterized this policy as co-operation with and implicit *de facto* recognition of the Republican government.[10]

The Dutch government found the British policy highly unsatisfactory, charging that it implied recognition of a Japanese-inspired régime headed by collaborators.[11] On the other hand the Republicans protested the entry of Dutch troops into Java and either threatened or warned the British of violent action by the armed irregular groups. For their part KNIL troops, liberated and rearmed prisoners of war, and civilians were becoming engaged in provocative shooting incidents.[12]

As a result, the British began to take a more active role, encouraging the Dutch and the Indonesians to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the political question. During meetings on 10 and 11 October in Singapore, Mountbatten reportedly promised Van Mook and Van der Plas additional British forces to speed up the tasks of freeing Allied prisoners and internees and disarming the Japanese if the Dutch would agree to talks with the Republican

9. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 24–5.

10. David Wehl: *The Birth of Indonesia* (London: George Allen and Unwin; 1948), p. 42. The author was reportedly the chief intelligence officer at Mountbatten's headquarters.

11. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 27.

12. Frederick E. Crockett, 'How the Trouble Began in Java', *Harper's Magazine*, April 1946, p. 281. The author was a US Army liaison officer in Java from 16 September to mid October 1945.

leaders.[13] Van Mook met with the nationalist leader Sukarno twice in late October, but the meetings were repudiated by the Dutch government.

By late October 1945 clashes involving Indonesian forces, regular and irregular, Dutch and British patrols,[14] and European civilians[15] reached the level at which Phase III_1 may be said to have begun.

PHASE III_1
Late October 1945–14 October 1946

Sub-Phase A: Late October–Mid November 1945

The first major military clash, the battle of Surabaya, involved British–Indian troops which had landed at Surabaya on 25 October. By early November a division and a brigade of the British–Indian troops were engaged in heavy fighting against Indonesian armed youth organizations. The fighting lasted until the end of November, with heavy casualties.

After Surabaya, British operations were cautiously limited to avoid another battle of that scale.[16] Nevertheless, British forces involved in the task of bringing Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees from camps in the hinterland were frequently involved in serious fighting with the Indonesians, who particularly resented the fact that liberated Dutch prisoners and internees were being armed and were involved in actions against the nationalists. These developments delayed the disarming of the Japanese troops, and in several instances the Japanese were used by the British in com-

13. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 29–30.

14. George Kahin: *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1952), p. 144. This study is drawn from first-hand observation in Indonesia.

15. Charles Wolf, Jr: *The Indonesian Story* (New York: John Day; 1948), p. 22. Wolf was a US vice-consul at Batavia from February 1946 to June 1947.

16. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 48.

bat against the Indonesian forces and to guard Allied personnel.[17] Toward the end of October the Allied command announced the suspension of further landing of any Dutch forces in Java and Sumatra.

Until November 1945 Dutch attention in the Indies had focused on Java and Sumatra. At that point in the period during which Allied forces were re-entering Indonesia, Dutch attention turned to the Australian-controlled islands on the northern and eastern portions of the archipelago.[18] Republican sentiment was not strong in those areas, and the nationalists exercised almost no control there.

Sub-Phase B: Mid November 1945–24 April 1946

Efforts to induce the Dutch and the nationalists to negotiate continued, and in December the US State Department issued a statement expressing the hope that Dutch–Republican talks would take place. Finally, in meetings between British and Dutch officials in London on 25 December 1945, the Dutch government agreed to talks with the Indonesian Republican leaders.

The idea of negotiations was opposed by important groups in both the Netherlands and Indonesia. Dutch conservatives were critical of Van Mook's policy and urged the restoration of pre-war Dutch authority.[19] The first post-war elections in the Netherlands were scheduled to be held in May 1946. Dutch governments since liberation had been, for the most part, uneasy coalitions of parties that differed on Dutch policy in the Indies and on many other issues. Both the delicate balance of the successive coalitions

17. In January 1946 the Ukraine asked the UN Security Council to condemn the actions of British forces in Indonesia, particularly the use of Japanese troops. No action was taken by the Council. *The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1946*, Department of State Publication 2735 (Washington: GPO; 1947), p. 35.

18. Mountbatten had responsibility for all the Indies but had turned over to Australia responsibility for the islands north and east of Java, Sumatra, Bali, and Lombok. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 19.

19. ibid., pp. 51–3.

and the impending elections made domestic dissent on a major foreign-policy issue a very serious matter. At the time negotiations were undertaken the Dutch government was headed by the Schermerhorn–Drees cabinet, a Labour government with general Catholic support.[20] In Indonesia, where, in a November governmental reorganization, Soetan Sjahir (a former leader of the anti-Japanese underground) had become prime minister, there was an influential element opposed to any negotiations with the Dutch. Tan Malaka was one of the leaders of this group.

Despite opposition, negotiations opened in Djakarta in February 1946 between Van Mook and Sjahir, with the assistance of a prominent British diplomat, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr. The Dutch proposed an interim period in which the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia should be based on 'democratic partnership' within the Kingdom of the Netherlands; after this transition period the partners would independently decide on the nature of their relations.[21] The Republic, on the other hand, initially demanded immediate recognition of its sovereignty over the whole of the Netherlands East Indies. By the end of March the negotiators reached preliminary agreement. The Republic would be recognized as having *de facto* authority in Java and Sumatra and would co-operate in forming an Indonesian federation as a partner with the Netherlands for an interim period. The core of this preliminary agreement – the status of the Republic as a constituent part of an Indonesian federation in union with the Netherlands – was suggested by Van Mook, acting on his own initiative.[22] The negotiators in Djakarta were optimistic about the success of formal negotiations in the Netherlands.

The talks in the Netherlands – the so-called Hoge Veluwe negotiations – failed, however. The Dutch government sought to dilute

20. ibid., pp. 91–3. See also Alastair M. Taylor: *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1960), pp. 19–24. Mr Taylor, a Canadian, was a member of the UN Secretariat's field machinery in Indonesia during the later phases of the revolution and attended the Round Table Conference at The Hague.

21. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 51–2.

22. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 20–21; Djajadiningrat, op. cit., pp. 55–9.

the formula agreed to in Djakarta and, in particular, to restrict the Republic's *de facto* authority to Java. The Indonesian delegation was unprepared and unauthorized to make concessions that would, in their stated view, reduce the status of the Republic to a provincial administration for Java.[23]

While these futile negotiations were under way the military situation in the Indies was changing. The scale of hostilities in Java had greatly lessened in early 1946 as the Republic gained greater control over the activities of the various armed organizations. The British contingents were being withdrawn; the last was scheduled to leave by 30 November 1946. The Dutch had been successfully reoccupying the islands other than Java and Sumatra, thus limiting the Republic's *de facto* authority to those two islands. Finally, large numbers of Dutch troops were being landed in Java. By early March 1946 there were an estimated 21,000 Dutch troops in the Indies – 10,000 on Java and 11,000 on the remaining islands. A further reserve force of 13,000 was in Malaya.[24] These numbers were, however, still fewer than the Indonesian forces, which numbered around 37,500, not including para-military groups of from 200,000 to 250,000.

The Indonesian forces had adequate supplies of Japanese arms and ammunition at this stage of the conflict, although most of the heavier equipment and artillery had been lost at Surabaya or abandoned. US *matériel* supplies to the Dutch forces had ended with the Japanese surrender, but no shortages had as yet developed. The Dutch at this stage, however, had to rely on the British for logistic support and transport. Nevertheless, the World War II-type equipment of the Dutch forces was more plentiful, diverse, and powerful than that available to the Indonesians.

Sub-Phase C: 24 April–14 October 1946

Following the failure of the Hoge Veluwe negotiations the Dutch

23. Djajadiningrat, op. cit., p. 68.
24. Captain Edwin Klein, 'The Dutch Marines and the Indonesian Probem', *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1946, p. 15.

took another political initiative. The elections in May had put a Catholic-Labour coalition party in power and, while conservative opposition to concessions in the Indies persisted, the new Beel government operated from a more solid base of support than the pre-election coalitions. In July, Van Mook convened a conference at Malino on Celebes with representatives from the islands under Dutch control (the so-called Outer Islands). The conference agenda consisted of the Dutch proposal for a federated United States of Indonesia composed of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the Great East, each with a high degree of autonomy. The Republic of Indonesia regarded the conference as a fraud since the participants had been selected by the Dutch to consider a Dutch proposal.

In September 1946 the Dutch government appointed a high-level commission – including former Prime Minister W. Schermerhorn, Max van Poll (the head of the Catholic party), and Hubertus J. van Mook – to prepare a new political structure for the Indies and gave it almost plenary power to negotiate with the Republic. Negotiations began on 7 October under the chairmanship of a British representative. On 14 October the parties concluded a cease-fire agreement, calling for immediate stabilization of existing military positions and limiting the number of Allied forces (Dutch and British) in the Indies to 92,000.[25]

PHASE IV_1
14 October 1946–21 July 1947

The Linggadjati agreement, initialled on November 15, followed and was closely related to the cease-fire negotiations. The principal provisions of the agreement were: recognition of the *de facto* authority of the Republic over Java, Madura, and Sumatra; co-

25. Wolf, op. cit., p. 25. By this time there were 55,000 Dutch troops in Java, according to Wehl, op. cit., p. 134.

operation of the Netherlands and the Republic in setting up a sovereign federal state, the United States of Indonesia, consisting of the Republic, Borneo, and the Great Eastern State; and co-operation of the Netherlands and the Republic in forming a Netherlands–Indonesian Union composed of two basic units, the Kingdom of the Netherlands (which was made up of the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curaçao) and the United States of Indonesia. The agreement represented Dutch concessions in two important respects: Republican control was recognized as extending to Sumatra as well as Java and the United States of Indonesia would be a sovereign state in partnership with the Kingdom rather than only part of the Kingdom. Despite considerable opposition from groups in the Netherlands who regarded the agreement as capitulation, it was formally signed on 25 March 1947.

While the Linggadjati agreement resolved some basic issues it either did not deal with others or dealt with them ambiguously. These omissions and ambiguities formed the basis for subsequent controversy. For example, the agreement recognized the *de facto* authority of the Republic in Java and Sumatra but did not specify where *de jure* authority lay. Even the nature of the agreement itself was unclear: the Indonesians were later to contend that it was a treaty between sovereign states, while the Dutch regarded it as a statement of principles. The relationship between the Republic and the other states in the United States of Indonesia and the nature of the co-operation called for between the Netherlands and the Republic in forming it were ambiguous. The agreement was silent on the nature of the interim government of the Indies while the United States of Indonesia was being set up; in particular, the agreement did not deal with the important matter of where responsibility lay for internal order.

Even before the agreement was formally signed, political controversy was renewed. The Dutch created states in East Indonesia in December 1946 and in West Borneo in May 1947. In both cases, important governmental powers continued to be under Dutch control, and in neither case was the Republic allowed to 'co-operate', as it claimed the Linggadjati agreement required.

Furthermore the creation of a state of West Borneo, excluding eastern and southern Borneo where the Republic claimed support, did not follow the Indonesian interpretation of the agreement.

In addition the Indonesians charged that elements of the Dutch civil service and army fostered a short-lived and highly artificial Sudanese separatist movement in West Java.[26] Also the Dutch navy refused to allow the Republic to export any goods that could be considered as having originated on European-owned estates before the war; imports of military equipment by the Republic were forbidden as well.

The Dutch maintained that the foreign diplomatic activity of the Republic violated the Linggadjati agreement. The Dutch held that the agreement had granted only *de facto* recognition to the Republic and that *de jure* recognition as a sovereign state was to be accorded only to the United States of Indonesia. In addition the Dutch accused the Republic of numerous violations of the cease-fire agreement.[27]

In both the Netherlands and the Republic, groups favouring extreme policies gained in strength as the mutual trust and confidence that the Linggadjati agreement envisaged rapidly moved further away. In the Netherlands, conservative pressure on the Catholic–Labour coalition government was increasing. Indeed the parliamentary wing of the Catholic party was openly supporting the use of force, and even the Labour party, while still opposing force, wanted a speedy solution to the impasse.[28] There had been no appreciable resumption of trade, especially of Indonesian exports, since the reoccupation. Exports of oil were at a standstill, and exports of rubber were running at less than 15 per cent of the 1940 figure, while maintenance of the Dutch armed forces in the Indies was estimated to be costing roughly $1 million a day.[29]

On 27 May 1947 the Dutch presented a set of proposals to the Republicans with a demand for acceptance that amounted to an

26. Wolf, op. cit., pp. 108–9.
27. ibid., pp. 113–14.
28. ibid., p. 115.
29. ibid., p. 117.

ultimatum. The proposals called for an interim federal government to have power until 1 January 1949, when the United States of Indonesia would be established. This interim government would consist of representatives from 'the various political entities in Indonesia', as well as a Representative of the Crown who would be 'in a special position with power of decision'; the government would form and direct the federal organs and departments that eventually would be part of the United States of Indonesia. The proposals also called for a joint Indonesian–Dutch gendarmerie (not Republican–Dutch) under the interim government, empowered to enforce law and order anywhere in the archipelago. Furthermore, a joint economic administrative council was to be set up under the interim government, with representatives from the Netherlands, the Republic, West Borneo, and East Indonesia, and the president of the Netherlands-owned Java Bank. Decisions of the council were to be arrived at unanimously; if this could not be done the interim government was to decide. A reply to the proposals was required from the Republic within fourteen days.[30]

Sjahir responded with concessions and counter-proposals, but in so doing he went beyond his weakened support in the Republican legislature and was forced to resign on 27 June. On the same day the United States sent an *aide-mémoire* to the Republic and to the Netherlands Indies Administration urging co-operation by the Republic in the formation of an interim government and promising economic aid after such an interim government would be established. The new Prime Minister of the Republic, Amir Sjarifuddin, stood by the concessions that Sjahir had offered, but refused to agree to the joint Indonesian–Dutch gendarmerie.

On 21 July the Dutch government informed the UN secretary-general that, since the Republic was incapable of maintaining law and order in its territory, the Dutch were impelled to take police measures 'of a strictly limited character'.[31] The Dutch

30. ibid., pp. 118–20.

31. *The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947* (Washington: GPO; 1948), p. 93.

initiated their first police action on the same day,[32] attacking with three divisions in Java and three brigades in Sumatra. The Dutch land, sea, and air force numbered 109,000 men.[33] Indonesian forces at the time were about 200,000 regular troops[34] and approximately the same number in irregular units.[35]

PHASE III_2
21 July 1947–19 January 1948

Sub-Phase A: 21 July–5 August 1947

The Dutch attack met with little resistance. On 25 July, for example, Van Mook reported that Dutch casualties were still under one hundred and that Indonesian casualties were not much higher. Within two weeks the Dutch had control of most of the cities and major towns of West and East Java, all remaining Republican deep-water ports in Java, and partial control over the roads in these areas. In Sumatra the Dutch concentrated on the rich estate area on the east coast, the oil fields in the south, and the chief ports on the west.[36] They were not, however, able to destroy the Republic's armed forces, which refused to engage in frontal combat and withdrew from the flat country and the roads to hilly and mountainous pockets. As they withdrew the Republicans adopted a scorched-earth policy. Guerrilla attacks were launched from

32. One source reports a statement by Van Mook to the effect that Dutch troops had begun to move on 24 June and that the US *aide-mémoire* caused a hasty postponement of the attack. Louis Fischer: *The Story of Indonesia* (New York: Harper; 1959), pp. 198–9. See also Justus M. van der Kroef, 'The Indonesian Revolution in Retrospect', *World Politics*, April 1951, p. 388.
33. *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office; 1962), p. 58.
34. ibid., p. 58.
35. Fischer, op. cit., pp. 108–9.
36. Kahin, op. cit., p. 213.

the Republican-held areas until the January 1948 truce. But their scale decreased as arms and ammunition shortages developed, both because of losses in the police action and because of the tight Dutch blockade.[37]

India and Australia both brought the conflict to the UN Security Council in July 1947. The Australian submission implied strong condemnation of the Netherlands, for it asked that the matter be handled by the council under Article 39 of the Charter, which dealt with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, and which could have led to council consideration of collective measures against the Netherlands. India, on the other hand, invoked the authority of Article 34, under which the council's action, however severe, could only be in the form of a recommendation. Also at issue in these distinctions was the question of whether the Republic had been recognized by the Dutch as a state, as the Republic maintained, or not, as the Dutch argued. The council declined to commit itself on these serious issues. On 1 August it adopted a US compromise resolution that, without mentioning the specific Charter article under which action was being taken, called for a cease-fire and settlement of the dispute by arbitration or other peaceful means.

Both the Netherlands and the Republic issued instructions to their forces to carry out the cease-fire at midnight 4–5 August.

Sub-Phase B: 5 August 1947–19 January 1948

The cease-fire was ineffective, however. While generally halting its forward advance,[38] the Dutch army began mopping-up operations in the huge tracts of territory by-passed by its armoured columns.

In the UN Security Council, France vetoed creation of a commission to observe and supervise the truce; but a motion was

37. ibid., p. 228.

38. Though territory *beyond* the farthest advance at the time of the cease-fire was captured by the Dutch as late as November 1947 – the eastern half of the island of Madura, off the coast of Java.

approved to have a Consular Commission made up of governments with consuls at Djakarta report to the council on the situation in Indonesia, including implementation of the cease-fire. The council also created the Good Offices Committee to assist the parties to arrive at a stable cease-fire and to negotiate their differences. The Security Council thus equipped itself with a source of information on events in Indonesia independent of the parties directly involved and made its auspices available on the scene to encourage and hasten a settlement. The Good Offices Committee of which the United States, Australia, and Belgium were selected members, arrived in Indonesia on 27 October.[39]

During the period between the abortive cease-fire and the arrival of the Committee the Dutch continued their mopping-up operations. On 29 August they unilaterally proclaimed the Van Mook Line, which connected the points of farthest Dutch advance into Republican territory,[40] and announced that the areas within the Line were under Dutch control, although in fact they included substantial areas of Republican resistance. The Van Mook Line had the effect of restricting the Republic, especially in Java, to poor agricultural land. In addition the Dutch threw a nearly absolute economic blockade around the Republic.

During October, debate at the United Nations centred on the demand of the Republic that the Dutch withdraw their forces to the positions of 20 July. This demand received support from the Soviet Union and Australia, but was opposed by the United States, Britain, and France as pre-judging the issue.

On 1 November a US motion was adopted which called on the parties to consult with each other directly or through the Good Offices Committee about means to put the cease-fire resolution

39. For a useful summary of UN action on the Indonesian question, see David W. Wainhouse *et al.*: *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press in co-operation with The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; 1966), pp. 293–323.

40. At best. The Consular Commission found in many areas that the Van Mook Line lay beyond the points of farthest advance reached at the time of the cease-fire. UN Security Council, Document S/586/Rev.1.

into effect and advised the parties that an interpretation of the cease-fire that allowed the use of armed forces to extend control over territory not occupied as of 4 August was inconsistent with the original cease-fire resolution. On 14 November special committees of the two parties began preliminary meetings with staff members of the Good Offices Committee.

The Good Offices Committee had its first formal session with Dutch and Republican delegations on 8 December 1947, on the USS *Renville*, a US naval transport anchored in the harbour of Djakarta to provide a neutral meeting ground. The Committee took an active role in the talks, submitting proposals to the parties for approval. The Dutch, however, refused to give ground on the question of the withdrawal of Dutch forces and the restoration of the Republican civil authority in the territory occupied by the Dutch since the beginning of the police action on 21 July.

The Dutch put forth a set of twelve political principles as a basis for negotiation. Their statement accepted the continued participation of the Good Offices Committee in the negotiations. It at no point, however, mentioned the Republic by name, and it hinted that further states might be set up in the newly occupied territory.[41] This hint was, in fact, substantiated while the truce negotiations were still in progress – on 29 December Van Mook announced the establishment of East Sumatra in territory captured from the Republic.

The Dutch applied strong pressure for the acceptance of their principles. On 9 January 1948 they submitted an ultimatum demanding the Republic's acceptance of their proposals within three days – later extended to five days. It was made clear that if the proposals were not accepted the Dutch might resume their freedom of action. The Good Offices Committee attempted to find a solution by suggesting six supplementary principles. The most

41. Wolf, op. cit., p. 187. The significance of the creation of such additional states was that it implied both a permanent diminution of the Republic's territory and also additional units in the projected federated United States of Indonesia, lessening the chances that the Republic would dominate the federation.

important of these called for: (a) plebiscites under UN supervision in the various parts of Java and Sumatra 'within a period of not less than six months ... after the signing of this agreement'[42] to determine whether each territory wanted to be part of the Republic or a separate state within the United States of Indonesia; and (b) after the plebiscites, convening of a convention to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia, in which states would be given representation proportional to their population. Since the population of Java and Sumatra was a large majority of the total population of the Indies this meant that if the Republic regained control over all of Java and Sumatra – which it felt plebiscites would ensure – it would have a dominant position in the United States of Indonesia.

The Dutch accepted the additional six principles on condition that the Republic accept all eighteen within the five-day time limit. Under strong pressure from the Good Offices Committee (especially from the US member, Dr Frank Graham) and after an unofficial Committee interpretation of the meaning of the twelve Dutch principles, the Republic agreed, though not without the opposition of Sjahir, the Masjumi, and PNI. On 17 and 19 January 1948 the Netherlands and the Republic signed the *Renville* agreement, including a military truce based on the Van Mook Line, the twelve principles of the Dutch, and the six additional principles of the Good Offices Committee.

PHASE IV_2
19 January–19 December 1948

The *Renville* agreement did not clarify many of the issues that had led to the breakdown of the Linggadjati agreement. The nature

42. The Dutch later interpreted this to mean six months after agreement to a final political settlement, whereas the Indonesians contended that it meant six months from the signing of the *Renville* agreement. Kahin, op. cit., p. 241.

or extent of the Republic's authority prior to the creation of the United States of Indonesia was not mentioned, nor was the question of the Republic's relations with foreign states. While the Netherlands was to create a provisional federal government prior to the establishment of the sovereign United States of Indonesia, the provisional government's structure and functions were not defined and the power of the Representative of the Crown during this period was not specified.[43]

The specifically military aspects of the *Renville* agreement were implemented fairly smoothly. The approximately 35,000 Republican troops remaining behind the Van Mook Line – now called the Status Quo Line – were evacuated to Republican-held territory.[44] The Line itself was delineated, demilitarized zones were established along the boundary, and prisoners of war were exchanged.

After the signing of the *Renville* agreement the parties and the Good Offices Committee set up the *Renville* conference. The conference had the immediate tasks of implementing the military truce and overseeing the resumption of trade and commerce between Republican and Dutch areas. It also faced the complex of problems related to the construction of the United States of Indonesia and the definition of the role and powers of the interim federal government which was to operate prior to the transfer of sovereignty.

At this time a new government took power in the Republic. Because of their opposition to the *Renville* agreement the Masjumi and PNI (the two largest parties of the Republic) withdrew their support and forced Sjarifuddin to resign. A cabinet was formed that would be responsible to President Sukarno rather than to the legislature. The new Prime Minister was Mohammed Hatta, formerly the Republic's Vice-President, and the Masjumi and PNI dominated the cabinet.

Since the Dutch refused to lift their tight blockade the Republican-controlled areas were short of food, fuel, raw materials, and medicines. Hatta tried to control expenditures and stabilize the

43. Taylor, op. cit., p. 95. 44. ibid., p. 104.

economy, for example by reducing the number of people employed in the government and the larger factories and transferring them to the farms and small industrial units.

In part as an economy move, in part as an effort to increase military efficiency, and in part as a consolidation of political control, Prime Minister Hatta also began a reorganization and restructuring of the Indonesian army, which had been renamed the National Indonesian Army in May 1947. Under Hatta's direction, numbers were reduced to 160,000, with the goal to be a force of 57,000.[45] Only the first stage of the reduction was actually carried out, however, because the reductions brought Hatta growing opposition from the People's Democratic Front (FDR), a coalition including the Labour party, the Communist party, and Sjarifuddin's Socialist party.[46] FDR possessed a strong political base in the army, and the discontent of the demobilized troops proved a fruitful issue for FDR to exploit. Several times in 1948 troops had to be used against units that refused to disband.

Meanwhile the negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic were breaking down over conflicting interpretations of the *Renville* agreement. The Dutch were continuing their policy of creating states in the regions they had occupied. The state of Madura was created on 21 January 1948, on the basis of an unsupervised plebiscite,[47] and the state of West Java was created in late February. The Dutch position was that the states were only provisional and thus not in contravention of the *Renville* agreement.

In March 1948 Van Mook announced the establishment of an interim federal government, to function until the creation of the United States of Indonesia. The Republic, the Dutch contended, could not participate in the interim government until a final political agreement was signed. In May the Dutch held a conference with the Dutch-created states, now thirteen in number

45. Pauker, op. cit., p. 29; Kahin, op. cit., p. 262.
46. Sjahir had left the Socialist party in protest against its increasingly Marxist tendencies and had formed his own Indonesian Socialist party.
47. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 235–8.

with five on Borneo alone, to consult on various federal matters. Again the Republic was excluded. At the same time the Dutch protested the Republic's continued expansion of its foreign relations and accused the Republic of being responsible for the small-scale clashes that occurred along the Status Quo Line.

The Dutch encountered some opposition from the Dutch-created states as well as from the Republic. In July 1948 the prime ministers of the states of East Indonesia, Timor, and Pasundan convened a meeting of the Dutch-created states which took the name Federal Consultative Assembly. The members of this assembly, who came to be known as Federalists, wanted more direct control over the interim government than the Dutch had provided for. They proposed that the interim government be composed of Indonesians chosen by representatives of the states and be given full control over the administrative departments. This proposal differed from the interim government the Dutch had created, in which the states were represented by the heads of administrative departments selected by the Dutch rather than elected, and frequently Dutchmen rather than Indonesians. The assembly's plan, furthermore, interposed Indonesian, elected ministers between the administrative departments and the Netherlands government.

In an effort to prevent the breakdown of the *Renville* accord the US and Australian members of the Good Offices Committee produced the so-called DuBois–Critchley plan, calling for an indirectly elected constituent assembly representing all Indonesia that would delineate the boundaries of the states of the United States of Indonesia, elect a President who would in turn appoint a Prime Minister responsible to the assembly, and have a large measure of self-government. The plan provided for a Netherlands High Commissioner with veto powers and the power to declare an emergency and assume command of the armed forces. The Republic accepted the proposal, but the Dutch refused to consider it.

In July 1948 the Netherlands held general elections. The result was an increase in conservative strength; Labour lost two of its

twenty-nine seats in the parliament. The new government, with Willem Drees (Labour) replacing Louis J. Beel as Prime Minister, was a coalition of Catholic, Labour, and VVD (a new centrist party). Beel of the Catholic party replaced Van Mook and took the title of High Representative. The Ministry of Overseas Territories also passed from the Labour party to the Catholic party's E. M. J. A. Sassen.

In September the Republic went through a severe crisis. The Communist-dominated FDR[48] denounced the *Renville* agreement, demanded that negotiations with the Dutch cease until the Dutch withdrew from Indonesia, and called for nationalization of Dutch and other foreign properties without compensation. At the end of August 1948 Labour-party members and the Socialists merged with the Communist party; the head of the new party was Musso, just returned from twelve years in the Soviet Union and just appointed general secretary and leader of PKI.

In late September 1948 an insurrection was begun in Madiun and Surakarta by local army officers, members of PKI, who were under orders from the Republican government to demobilize their units. The revolt was unsuccessful. Musso's calls for general popular risings had no response, and the area under the control of the troops supporting Musso was quickly subdued by some of the Republic's best military units. The last large rebel military unit was captured 28 October, and Musso was killed in a skirmish three days later.

The extent of Communist-led opposition within the ranks of the Indonesian nationalists became manifest at a time when the United States and other Western powers were becoming increasingly alarmed over the post-war policies of the Soviet bloc. In China, Greece, western Europe, Malaya, and elsewhere, Communist efforts to exploit the chaos left by the war, and legitimate nationalist and liberal aspirations, were causes of grave concern.

In September the new US member of the Good Offices Com-

48. Sjarifuddin himself later claimed that he had been a secret Communist during this period and during his six months as Prime Minister. Fischer, op. cit., p. 108.

mittee, Merle Cochran, attempted again to break the deadlock in negotiations. The Cochran Plan was similar to the DuBois–Critchley plan, but provided increased safeguards against Republican domination of the United States of Indonesia. The Netherlands agreed to discuss the Cochran Plan but proposed extensive modifications. While the proposal was under consideration, the new Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, arrived in Java to negotiate directly with Hatta.

The Dutch position emphasized that organs of the interim government should be selected rather than elected and that the Representative of the Crown should have ultimate discretionary control in the most important areas of government. The Republic maintained that the Cochran Plan required it to give up control of its armed forces with no safeguards against unilateral use of federal troops against it. The Republic also saw in the proposed Dutch modifications of the Cochran Plan ways in which the Dutch could further increase the number of states in the federation at the expense both of the territorial size of the Republic and of its voice in the federal government.

Despite these problems the Stikker–Hatta negotiations made some progress. Hatta accepted the principle that the organs of the interim government be selected rather than elected. He also accepted the states that had been formed after the Dutch police action. And he agreed that the High Commissioner should have emergency powers and veto rights in some cases.

A second series of talks began in November 1948, with the Dutch represented by Stikker, Sassen, and a group of members of the parliament. The Dutch put much emphasis on the growing number of truce violations and asked for a binding political commitment from Hatta. Not receiving it, the Dutch informed Cochran that agreement was impossible to reach, that further negotiations were futile, but that the possibility of including Republican areas in the federal system must remain open.[49] There was no longer any suggestion in the Dutch position that the Republic should participate as a government in the federal scheme.

49. Taylor, op. cit., p. 158.

Hatta's position continued to be conciliatory. He stated that the Republic was willing to admit that *de jure* sovereignty rested with the Netherlands, that the Representative of the Crown should be given emergency powers, and even that the Representative should himself be the judge of the propriety of the use of these powers in given circumstances. The Republic asked only that definite standards be laid down for the Representative's decision.

The Dutch reply on 17 December amounted to another ultimatum, demanding complete Republican acceptance of the Dutch plan within eighteen hours. At eleven thirty p.m. on 18 December Cochran was informed that the Dutch were terminating the *Renville* truce. Cochran was in Djakarta and was refused use of telegraph facilities to notify the rest of the committee, which was at Kaliurang in Republican territory.

PHASE III_3
19 December 1948–1 August 1949

Early in the morning of 19 December a Dutch parachute force captured the airport at the Republican capital of Jogjakarta. By mid afternoon Sukarno, Hatta, and half the cabinet were captured by Dutch marines and KNIL troops brought in by air. Between 19 and 22 December Dutch attacks were begun in other parts of Java and Sumatra.

Militarily the second Dutch police action started well. The Dutch army of 130,000 raced forward with few casualties and quickly occupied most of the major cities in the Republic's territory. An emergency Republican government had begun operating in Sumatra, however, and Republican military units were infiltrating Dutch lines to reach assigned areas from which guerrilla operations could be begun.[50]

50. Abdul H. Nasution: *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger; 1965), pp. 179–80.

Politically, however, events went differently. On 20 December the prime ministers and cabinets of East Indonesia and Pasundan, two of the states that had previously co-operated in large measure with Dutch plans, resigned in protest against the Dutch military action; other states of the Indies followed the same course. The reaction of nations throughout the world was almost unanimous in condemning the Dutch action. On 22 December the United States suspended Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands East Indies Administration. On 24 December the UN Security Council met in emergency session and called for a cease-fire and the immediate release of Sukarno and other political prisoners.[51] The Dutch informed the council that hostilities on Java would cease by 31 December and shortly thereafter on Sumatra. The Republic's representative said that his government could not respond while its leaders were held captive.[52] On 10 January the Dutch informed the captured political leaders that the Republic was no longer recognized as a political entity with a territory of its own.[53]

On learning from the Good Offices Committee that compliance with the December resolution was not satisfactory, the Security Council on 28 January adopted a further resolution. In addition to reaffirming its demand for a cease-fire and prisoner release, the council transformed the Good Offices Committee into the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) with greatly expanded powers. UNCI was authorized to reach decisions by majority vote (with the effect of placing authority in US and Australian hands, bypassing the Belgian member who tended to be more sympathetic to the Dutch view than were his colleagues), to assist the parties to carry out the Security Council's resolutions, to recommend the extent to which areas should be progressively returned to the Republic, and to recommend to the Security Council the

51. The initial draft resolution included a demand that troops be drawn back to the *Renville* truce lines. *United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948* (Washington: GPO, 1949), p. 88. Without this clause, Dutch compliance with the cease-fire would have left the Netherlands in control of substantially more Republican territory than before the police action.

52. ibid. 53. Kahin., op. cit., p. 343.

conditions necessary to ensure free and democratic elections under UN observation.[54]

Direct action against the Netherlands was threatened when, on 7 February, the Brewster resolution was introduced in the US Senate urging that all Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands be stopped until the Dutch ceased hostilities, withdrew their troops, released the Republican leaders, and opened genuine negotiations. This strong US opposition to Dutch policy, evidenced both by its position in UN debates and by its apparent willingness to apply sanctions, created a serious problem for the Dutch cabinet. Negotiations were under way for what was to become NATO, and the Dutch shared the general western European perception that US power must be brought to bear to prevent a Soviet takeover of all Europe. There were some who would have made an effort to explain the Dutch view to Washington in order to persuade the United States to reverse its policy. Sassen, for example, proposed that the cabinet appeal to the United States for cooperation against UNCI, with the warning that the Dutch would otherwise have to abandon Indonesia. The cabinet refused to take this approach, and Sassen resigned to be replaced by a liberal member of the Catholic party.[55]

To the plan of action proposed by the United Nations the Dutch finally offered an alternative which represented a substantial departure from their former position that the Republic had ceased to exist. The plan called for an accelerated transfer of sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia. The transfer would be arranged by a Round Table Conference, to be convened at The Hague, which would at the same time establish the Netherlands–Indonesian Union and an interim government for a brief

54. *United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949*, (Washington: GPO 1950), p. 30.

55. Kahin, op. cit., p. 144. Dutch Communists in the Netherlands parliament were caught in a dilemma. While the Soviet and other Communist parties were assailing the Dutch government for its actions in Indonesia, the Dutch Communists charged that the government was 'sacrificing national interest to the Marshall Plan and "Pax Americana".' Taylor, op. cit., p. 198.

period. The Republic would participate in the Conference. But the Dutch proposal made no provision for the return of the Republican leaders to Jogjakarta. Sukarno refused to consider the new Dutch proposal for this reason. At first the Federalists approved the proposal and accepted the invitation to the Round Table Conference.[56] Later they reversed themselves and made acceptance conditional on the restoration of Republican leadership. The United Nations found the proposal acceptable but held that no progress could be made unless the Dutch first restored the Republican government to Jogjakarta.

During this period the Republican guerrilla campaign, which had been carefully prepared and organized, had significant success. By the end of February, one source states, less than half of Pasundan and East Java were under Dutch control and the Republican forces had nearly recaptured Jogjakarta.[57]

At the end of March, Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker visited Washington for talks with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, where it was made clear the US aid would be cut off if the Dutch did not agree to a cease-fire, the return of the Republican leaders and government to Jogjakarta, and the inclusion of the Republic in the projected federal structure.[58] On 1 April Senator Arthur Vandenburg offered an amendment to the economic aid bill, obligating the United States to withdraw assistance from any government against which UN enforcement actions were proceeding. Vandenberg's amendment was adopted on 6 April, instead of a more drastic amendment by Senator Owen Brewster which would have withdrawn aid if the orders and requests of the Security Council were not being carried out.

On 14 April the preliminary conference between Republican and Dutch officials began, with UNCI taking an active part in the negotiations. Progress was made despite the mutual suspicions of the two parties. The Netherlands wanted an early Republican commitment to a cease-fire, saying that continuing

56. Wolf, op. cit., p. 22. 57. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 410–12.

58. This is Kahin's view; other sources are less definite about the detailed requirements.

guerrilla warfare might force Dutch military responses. The Republicans, on the other hand, insisted on a commitment that the Dutch would not continue their policy of dividing captured territory while the Republic was paralysed by a cease-fire agreement. After some days of private discussions[59] the Van Royen–Roem statements were produced. The Republican government did not formally agree to order a halt to guerrilla warfare, promise to co-operate in restoring peace and maintaining law and order, or promise to participate in the Round Table Conference; but Sukarno and Hatta gave their personal assurances that they favoured these steps in conformity with the Security Council resolution of 28 January and would undertake to urge the adoption of such a policy by the Republic as soon as possible after its restoration to Jogjakarta.

For the Dutch, Van Royen announced that, in view of the undertaking of Sukarno and Hatta, the Republican government would be returned to Jogjakarta and freed to govern in that residency; that all Dutch military operations would be discontinued; that the Dutch would refrain from recognizing states on soil controlled by the Republic prior to the second police action; that the Dutch favoured the existence of the Republic as a state in the United States of Indonesia, with one third of the total membership in the federal representative body; that, in all areas (outside the Residency of Jogjakarta) where Republican civil, police, and other officials were still operating, these would remain in operation; and that the Round Table Conference would discuss accelerating the unconditional transfer of complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.

The Van Royen–Roem statements were not unanimously endorsed by all groups in the Netherlands or the Republic. Beel resigned from the Dutch cabinet in protest, but the Labour party fully supported the government. In the Republic, opposition centred around Sukarno's and Hatta's apparent acceptance of

59. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 421–2, states that Cochran applied heavy pressure on the Republicans to make concessions, promising that the United States would stand behind a transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch.

the states that had been formed by the Dutch between the first and second police actions and the one-third limit on the Republic's representation in the United States of Indonesia. It is also possible, as one source suggests, that the increase of guerrilla activity in June reflected Communist dissatisfaction with the terms.[60]

The Dutch evacuation from the Residency of Jogjakarta began on 24 June 1949, and was completed on 30 June; Sukarno and Hatta returned on 5 July. On 1 August final agreement on a cease-fire was reached by the Dutch and the Republicans, to take effect 11 August on Java and 15 August on Sumatra. With that accomplished, Republican and Federalist delegations left for The Hague for the Round Table Conference.

PHASE IV_3
2 August–27 December 1949

The five months following the end of Phase III_3 were not marked by military moves or military preparation. Negotiations were concerned primarily with setting up the Netherlands–Indonesian Union, settling a variety of economic questions (principally that of who would pay the debt of the Netherlands East Indies), and taking up the West Irian (Dutch New Guinea) question. With the settlement of those issues – or agreement to postpone the most intractable – the conflict proceeded to settlement with the formal transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949.

Summary of Control Measures

KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY

Avoidance of colonialism.
Constructive outlets (e.g., regionalism) for colonialist impulses.

60. Taylor, op. cit., p. 221 and n.

Third-party fact-finding.
Restricted availability of surplus arms.
Tightened controls on use of military assistance.
Equity tribunal for peaceful change.

PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Governmental cohesion and stability.
Preventive interposition by neutral or third-party forces.
International fact-finding.
Diplomatic recognition as legitimation and stabilization of *de facto* situation.
Time-stretching diplomatic devices.
Ceasing supply of arms into crisis areas.
Local arms balances at relatively low levels, guaranteed by potential sanctions.
UN publication of arms inventories and trade.

MODERATING HOSTILITIES

Multilateral machinery on ground.*
Influential great-power involvement.*

TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

UN peace-keeping capability.
Peaceful-change mechanism.*
Arbitration of alleged violations.*
Stern economic pressures.
Superior co-operation.

PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

Truce supervisory machinery geared to guerrilla tactics.
Involvement of great power,*
Supporting:
UN peace-keeping.
Super-power co-operation.

9

Conflict in the Middle East, 1956–67[1]

The Phases of Conflict

We shall examine in this chapter two threads of conflict that sprang from diverse backgrounds but, at a critical juncture, converged to spark the Suez crisis of 1956. One thread of conflict – the dominant and persistent one – is the clash between Israel and its Arab neighbours. That conflict entered Phase II even before there was a state of Israel, as millions of Jews fleeing Nazi extermination sought refuge in the homeland Britain had promised them – land occupied by Arabs. The Arab–Israeli conflict went through Phase III_1 in 1948–9 and was, at the time this analysis begins, in Phase IV_1. The second conflict was that between Britain and France on the one hand and Egypt on the other; we might call it the British–French–Egyptian conflict, or Suez conflict. Dispute and conflict among the three had existed at times since the early nineteenth century, but it acquired renewed virulence in the mid 1950s.

In mid 1956 the two conflicts converged. The Suez war of 1956 is common to both. After the end of that brief war the British–French–Egyptian conflict quickly moved through Phase IV to Phase V. The Arab–Israeli conflict, by contrast, remained in an increasingly tense Phase IV_2, until June 1967 when with increased intensity fighting was renewed.

We shall examine here, first, the convergent conflicts – in 1956 – and then the continued Arab–Israeli conflict (1957–67).

1. The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions to this chapter of Mrs Irirangi C. Bloomfield, Miss Patricia A. Clapp, and Mr Philip M. Raup.

The Converging Conflicts

The Arab–Israeli Conflict

PHASE IV_1

1949–29 October 1956

Sub-Phase A: 1949–July 1956

The Arab–Israeli conflict arose from the establishment of the Jewish national state on the territory of Palestine. The war that resulted in 1948 (Phase III_1) reached a stalemate in 1949, and UN mediation produced a series of armistice agreements (Phase IV_1) that set the Israeli borders that persisted until mid 1967.

For the first several years after the 1949 armistice, Israeli–Egyptian relations were relatively peaceful. Then gradually the conciliatory climate deteriorated. Efforts at negotiation broke down as impasses were encountered on major substantive issues. For example, Israel, while willing to consider granting land-access rights across the southern Negev between Egypt and Jordan, balked at what it regarded as excessive and suspicious demands for a broad corridor.[2] And Egypt refused to consider lifting the ban it had maintained since 1948 on use of the Suez Canal by Israeli ships. In fact in 1953 the ban was extended to all cargo to and from Israel, regardless of whose ships carried it. In addition Egypt blockaded Israeli ships from using the Strait of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, which linked the Israeli port of Elath with the Red Sea.

During this time, in response to prolonged Egyptian pressures (and the urgings of the United States), Britain began negotiations for the evacuation of its Suez base.[3] Initially, Israel had endorsed Egypt's efforts to see Britain evacuate the canal zone. But in the

2. Earl Berger: *The Covenant and the Sword: Arab–Israeli Relations, 1948–56* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1965), pp. 172–3.

3. Kennett Love asserts (in an unpublished manuscript, 'The Politics of Force at Suez', p. 3) that Israel began contemplating war when these negotiations opened.


ISRAEL AND NEIGHBOURING STATES
Areas under Israeli control at cessation of hostilities, June 1967
0 MILES 70
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LEBANON
Beirut
Damascus
SYRIA
SYRIAN HEIGHTS
Qnaitra
L. Huleh
Eshed Kinrot
Acre
S. of Galilee
Haifa
Nazareth
Jordan
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Jenin
Nablus
Amman
Ramallah
Jericho
Jerusalem
MT SCOPUS
Hebron
Es Samu
DEAD SEA
Gaza
GAZA STRIP
Rafah
Khan Yunis
Dimona
NEGEV
El Auja
Damietta
Port Said
Port Fuad
El Arish
Abu Ageila
El Quseima
Suez
Canal
Ismailia
El Cap
Bir Hama
Bir Gafgafa
GEBEL LIBNI
Cairo
Port Suez
MITLA PASS
Nakhl
SINAI PENINSULA
JORDAN
Elath
Aqaba
Nile River
U A R
(E G Y P T)
GULF OF SUEZ
GULF OF AQABA
SAUDI ARABIA
TIRAN
Strait of Tiran
Sharm el Sheikh
RED SEA

cooling climate of Israeli–Egyptian relations, the prospect of Britain's withdrawal looked more dangerous to Israeli leaders, who felt that the presence of British soldiers in a band separating the Sinai Peninsula from the rest of Egypt was a deterrent to Egyptian attack on Israel. Even any minimal Egyptian move to send large numbers of troops and *matériel* past the British would be readily observed and the information supplied to Israel. British control of the canal area had not prevented Egypt from stationing some 60,000 troops in the Sinai Peninsula. Still, the British presence may well have acted as a brake on aggressive tendencies.[4] Most importantly, Israeli officials believed it so acted.[5]

Soon after the agreement for British departure from the canal area was initialled (27 July 1954), an organized campaign of terrorism against Israel was launched, the so-called *fedayin* (self-sacrificers) raids. These came primarily from the Gaza Strip, with its heavy concentration of refugees from the 1948–9 war. During the following eight months the scale of incidents increased and saboteurs penetrated deep into Israel, killing military personnel and civilians and blowing up key installations, notably water pipes. In December 1954, a high Egyptian official stated that the ruling military junta did not intend then to make peace with Israel and never would.

Israeli activists became united in their demands for an end to the terrorism, and David Ben Gurion, who had never agreed with the attempts at reconciliation with Egypt, returned to the Israeli government in charge of the defence ministry. Soon after, on 28 February 1955, the Israeli army penetrated the Gaza Strip, killing thirty-eight and blowing up key military installations. If Israel took its cue from the growing aggressiveness of Arab propaganda and the expanded scale of sabotage and terrorism, Egypt took its cue from the Gaza raid in February. And as a result of spiralling

4. Erskine B. Childers: *The Road to Suez* (London: MacGibbon and Kee; 1962), pp. 286 ff.

5. Jon and David Kimche: *Both Sides of the Hill* (London: Secker and Warburg; 1960), pp. 267–72.

events, both countries returned to a state of merely suspended war.[6]

Both Egypt and Israel took their cases to the UN Security Council – the former asking that Israel be punished for the Gaza raid and the latter asking the council to condemn Egypt's sponsorship of the *fedayin* attacks. The pattern of small Arab incursions and massive Israeli reprisal raids was – and remains – a common one along the armistice lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In this instance – as had been and by and large continues to be the case – the Security Council's response was to condemn Israel's reprisal action without dealing substantively with the Arab actions in any but the most general terms. The Council, however, urged both adversaries to co-operate in implementing some of the measures proposed by the head of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) to make border violations by either side more difficult to carry out and easier to detect – barbed wire, joint patrols, etc.

During the months that followed the Gaza raid the scale of *fedayin* attacks increased, and terrorists penetrated as far as the suburbs of Tel Aviv. In response the Israeli army raided the Gaza town of Khan Yunis on 31 August 1955, killing thirty-six. At the same time Israeli military units, organized as agricultural settlements, were being established at the important Negev crossroads of El Auja; and Israel resisted attempts, including pressures from UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, to remove them from that demilitarized zone.

Then, on 27 September 1955, Colonel Nasser announced that the Egyptian government would buy important quantities of Soviet-bloc arms from Czechoslovakia.[7] The imminent arrival of Soviet arms in Egypt would clearly affect the military balance

6. Love, op. cit., pp. 173–4, 178–80.

7. In *Arming the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press; 1969), Professor Uri Ra'anan of MIT and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy cites substantial evidence for a much earlier date. It appears that the preliminary arrangements for the arms deal date back to the opening months of 1955. In any event some Soviet-bloc arms had arrived in Egypt as early as July 1955.

between Israel and Egypt. Thus Israel began an urgent search for additional arms, in particular for more modern tanks, artillery, and jet fighters. Israel was ultimately successful in purchasing these things from France.

Israel also sought security guarantees from the West, but its reception was disappointing. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, issued a statement in November 1955 calling for peace in the Middle East and urging Israel to seek a compromise with Egypt on borders somewhere between the existing truce lines and the original UN partition-plan boundaries. Israel refused, since this would involve surrender of some of its territory. Also, in late 1955, rumours circulated about discussions between Britain and Iraq that suggested the division of Jordan between Iraq and Israel; this would have brought a military power instead of a weak, British-dominated state to Israel's eastern border.[8]

While the US government did not adopt a hostile attitude toward Israel during this period, the pronounced neutrality of the Eisenhower administration was viewed by Israelis with disquiet because of their great dependence on US aid. In response to the Czech arms deal President Eisenhower asserted that the United States would not contribute to an arms race in the Middle East.[9] Mr Dulles, the US Secretary of State, later made more explicit the interpretation of this policy to mean no additional arms shipments to Israel. Furthermore, he emphasized, Israel should look for protection not to the United States but to the United Nations.[10] Britain shared this stand, which reaffirmed the position on arms shipments to the Middle East that the two states and France had followed since 1950.[11]

Egyptian actions also contributed to growing Israeli unease. In

8. ibid., pp. 194–6.

9. US Department of State: *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1950–1955*, Department of State Publication 6446 (Washington: GPO; 1957), p. 2238.

10. US Department of State: *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, Department of State Publication 6811 (Washington: GPO; 1959), pp. 581–4.

11. ibid., *1950–1955*, p. 2239.

September 1955 the Egyptian government expanded its blockade of Israel, banning flights of Israeli planes, which were generally on a commercial run to Africa, over the Strait of Tiran.[12] While the magnitude of these Egyptian actions was relatively small compared to existing limitations on Israel's trade, the actions were taken as an indication of future efforts to isolate totally the Jewish state.

In Israel, as a consequence of domestic uneasiness over the deepening crisis, moderate Premier Moshe Sharett was replaced in November 1955 by Ben Gurion. Sharett retained the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until June 1956, when he was replaced by another activist, Mrs Golda Meir.

Finally, during the period March – June 1956, the number of border skirmishes, sabotage incidents, and killings by *fedayin* increased dramatically. In response to these provocations the Israelis shelled the market place in Gaza, killing more than sixty Arabs. In the first ten months of 1956 some two hundred Arab deaths resulted from Israeli actions, as compared to fifty-eight Israelis killed by Arabs. The impact of the violence was greater, however, in Israel than in Egypt since the Israelis felt that their whole country was threatened.[13]

The British–French–Egyptian Conflict

PHASE I

Background of the Conflict

Egypt lies at the meeting point of the Indian Ocean (through its extension, the Red Sea) and the Mediterranean; and since the seventeenth century Britain has had important military and

12. Moshe Dayan: *Diary of the Suez Campaign* (New York; Harper and Row; 1966), pp. 10–12. Major-General Dayan was Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Force.

13. ibid., p. 207. Unlike the surrounding Arab states, Israel does not have buffer zones between its main centres of population and borders. Israel could be quickly divided in two or more parts and overrun in a matter of hours, if surprised and unprepared.

economic commitments in the Middle East. The importance of Egypt in British strategic and economic calculations increased enormously in the late nineteenth century when the Suez Canal was completed – on territory nominally under the sovereignty of Egypt but in reality controlled for most of the history of the canal by Britain.

Prior to World War II the canal (and, as a consequence, Egypt) was more than just one in a long chain of staging points in the Middle East; it was the linchpin, the key to Britain's position in the whole Middle East and the vast lands 'east of Suez'. These strong British interests in the canal had led on three occasions to British occupation of Egypt to ensure the stability of the canal area and the security of this vital waterway.

Following World War II, and particularly as the Cold War deepened, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East generally acquired an added significance in Western strategic thinking. As part of the series of military-alliance systems being developed under US leadership to contain Soviet expansionism, Britain and the United States attempted to build an alliance structure in the Middle East around a Western pact with Egypt – the so-called Middle East Command. When this was rejected by Egypt in late 1951 the West turned to the concept of a defence arrangement with the 'northern tier' states bordering the Soviet Union. Out of this grew the Baghdad Pact, which later became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and which linked Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain in a mutual-defence system for the region; in this the United States, though not a member, played a large role. Two consequences of this development are important here. First, CENTO reduced, at least for the moment, the strategic importance of Egypt in Cold War terms.[14] Second, the injection of the Cold War into the Middle East challenged growing neutralist-nationalist sentiment there and also strengthened Iraq, Egypt's chief rival in the Arab world.

While the strategic and military importance of Egypt and the

14. John C. Campbell: *Defense of the Middle East* (rev. edn.; New York: Harper; 1960), pp. 42–6.

Suez Canal to the West in general and to Britain in particular was changing, the economic importance of the area to Western Europe was increasing. At the base of this change was European reliance on Middle Eastern oil, which assumed growing importance as Europe recovered from the war and modernized and expanded its economy. It was estimated that, by 1956, 15 per cent of British energy requirements and 17 per cent of those of Western Europe were supplied by oil. Some 75 per cent of Western Europe's oil came from the Middle East, and fully 50 per cent of it was shipped through the Suez Canal, much of the remaining 25 per cent reaching non-European Mediterranean ports via pipeline.[15]

Also substantial were British investments in the region. British companies held a 50-per-cent interest in Kuwaiti oil production, a 40-per-cent interest in oil production in Iran, and a 23-per-cent interest in Iraq and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms.[16]

France and the United States also had economic interests in the area that, though large, tended to be dominated by other considerations. For the United States the strategic concerns of the Cold War have already been mentioned; a parallel and at times conflicting concern was a genuine sympathy with nationalist revolutions and a desire not to be identified, in the Middle East or elsewhere, with those who sought to preserve overlong the prerequisites of empire.

Arab nationalism had been waxing since the end of World War II. But it found its leader only with the rise to power in Egypt of Colonel Nasser. In many ways Arab nationalism, particularly under Nasser's leadership, appeared to be a threat to the many Western interests.

Economically Nasserism appeared to endanger the security of Europe's vital oil supply. Politically the appeal of Nasserism throughout the Middle East threatened to remove from European influence – mainly British – such footholds of Western influence

15. Herman Finer: *Dulles over Suez* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books; 1964), pp. 12–13.

16. Royal Institute of International Affairs: *British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press; 1958), p. 27.

as Jordan, where local Nasser supporters forced the removal of Sir John Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion in April 1956. In terms of global politics, Nasser's acceptance of Soviet-bloc arms enabled the Soviet Union to leap over the 'northern tier' and establish its influence in the heart of the strategic Middle East.

Nasser's open and direct support of the Algerian rebellion against France encouraged France to see Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism as a direct threat to French interests. Initially, the government of Premier Guy Mollet attempted to negotiate with Nasser. But when, in April 1956, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau failed to obtain Nasser's agreement to halt aid to the Algerian rebels, French policy became openly hostile toward Egypt.

For both Britain and Egypt the Suez Canal quickly became the focus of dispute. To most Egyptians British occupation of the canal zone and operation of the canal by an entirely foreign-owned company were visible symbols of foreign domination. After a period of terrorist activities against British forces, and with strong US urging, Britain agreed in 1954 to withdraw its forces. The withdrawal took place gradually over a period of some months and was finally completed in June 1956. While the withdrawal was in progress Nasser announced that he wished to revise the agreements with the Suez Canal company regarding income from the canal's operations,[17] of which Egypt had received a share only since 1936.

At the same time Egypt was engaged in negotiations for international assistance in building the Aswan High Dam, which would cost a total of $1·24 billion.[18] Of this amount, $760 million would be labour and materials supplied by Egypt; the balance had to be obtained from external sources. A formula was worked out with Western governments and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that would provide $70 million

17. Terrence Robertson: *Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy* (New York: Atheneum; 1965), p. 6.

18. 'Billion' is used throughout in the American sense of one thousand million.

in grants and $480 million in loans over a period of fifteen years.

During the early loan negotiations the Egyptian government rejected Western conditions that would give the lenders supervision of Egyptian finances. By the time the Egyptian position was softening on this point, US policy began to harden. Secretary of State Dulles was reportedly angered by, among other things, Nasser's recognition of Communist China and hints that he might accept Soviet help for the dam if Western aid were not forthcoming.[19]

Thus, when Egypt announced its acceptance of the US–British–International Bank offers in July 1956, the US portion of the offer was withdrawn. The Department of State reported that 'it is not feasible in present circumstances to participate in the project.'[20] Not surprisingly, Nasser was angered by the rejection and by what he regarded as the insulting reference to Egyptian ability to repay. In immediate reaction he announced in a violently anti-Western speech the nationalization of the canal company. The move was partly in retaliation and partly because the canal company was a profitable property that could contribute toward the costs of constructing the Aswan Dam, the canal company having earned more than $56 million in profits in 1955.[21]

The Arab–Israeli Conflict
PHASE IV_1 *Sub-Phase B*
The British–French–Egyptian Conflict
PHASE II
July–October 1956

Nasser's nationalization of the canal thus precipitated Britain and France's growing quarrel with Egypt into a conflict at the

19. Finer, op. cit., pp. 40–42.

20. US Department of State: *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, pp. 603–4.

21. Childers, op. cit., p. 165.

same time that Israeli–Egyptian relations were approaching a crisis point. The Suez Canal became for Britain and France the visible symbol of their conflict with Nasser, just as it had been the symbol of foreign domination for Egypt. For Israel the British–French–Egyptian conflict presented an opportunity for the support it felt it needed to counter Egypt's growing military strength and aggressiveness and rapidly increasing predominance in the Arab World.

Nasser asserted that he had no intention of interfering with canal operations beyond continuing to bar Israeli ships and cargoes, a policy to which the old canal company had never objected. But the possibility of other interference with the smooth functioning of the canal was a particularly serious threat to Europe. As was noted earlier, a high proportion of Europe's oil came through the canal; substituting Venezuelan, Canadian, or American oil or shipping Middle Eastern oil via the Cape of Good Hope would cost Britain and France an estimated additional $500 million in 1956 alone.[22] On the other hand, experience during World War II had demonstrated that use of the Cape route, though costly, was possible.[23]

The Western governments all condemned the nationalization. But while the US expressed concern over the 'far-reaching implications' of the act,[24] Britain and France reacted with strongly worded protests and concrete acts. Terming the nationalization totally unjustifiable, the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, froze all Egyptian assets in Britain. French Premier Mollet denounced Nasser as another Hitler. Other European countries did not take the British and French view. What interested them was assurance from Egypt of their right to unhindered canal passage. Similarly, American oil companies indicated that they were prepared to co-operate with the Egyptian authorities.

Toward the end of July both British and French cabinets instructed their defence ministers to prepare contingency plans for

22. Finer, op. cit., p. 245.
23. Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 126.
24. *US Department of State Bulletin*, 6 August 1956, p. 221.

a situation where military action against Egypt was decided upon.[25] The larger historic terms in which the British and French saw the issue were clearly set forth in a telegram to President Eisenhower from Prime Minister Eden, who was determined neither to repeat the errors of appeasement nor to yield British primacy:

> If we do not [take a firm stand], our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will . . . be finally destroyed.
>
> The immediate threat is to the oil supplies of Western Europe, a great part of which flows through the Canal. . . . It is, however, the outlook for the longer term which is more threatening . . .
>
> We should not allow ourselves to become involved in legal quibbles about the rights of the Egyptian government to nationalize what is technically an Egyptian company. . . . I feel sure that we should take issue with Nasser on the broader international grounds.
>
> As we see it we are unlikely to attain our objectives by economic pressures alone. . . . My colleagues and I believe we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses.[26]

Meeting with Eden in July, Secretary of State Dulles reportedly asked the British Prime Minister if the British and French had weighed carefully the risks of using force. 'He said – and [Foreign Minister] Selwyn Lloyd repeated it often – they'd rather risk a world war than sink to the level of a third-rate power with a depleted economy.'[27]

*

It is difficult to determine the date on which Israel became set on a policy of preventive war. It seems clear that the decision was not made earlier than November 1955 (when Ben Gurion resumed leadership of the Israeli government) and not later than July 1956 (when the possibility of substantial British and French

25. Childers, op. cit., p. 62; *The New York Times*, 29 and 31 July 1956.

26. Sir Anthony Eden: *Full Circle* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1960), p. 476.

27. Robertson, op. cit., p. 81.

support became apparent). The first serious discussions with French officials regarding military assistance are reported to have been held in the autumn of 1955, when Israel began its urgent search for arms to counterbalance the Soviet-bloc arms just promised Nasser. By January 1956 this contact was expanded to the point where secret talks were reportedly held in Paris, including, on the French side, Foreign Minister Pineau.

One source states that it was at that meeting that France agreed to meet Israeli arms requests to the extent possible, to co-ordinate military planning, and to continue talks between military officials.[28] Until July 1956, however, no concrete co-ordinated military moves were considered seriously. The French were militarily tied down in Algeria and in NATO commitments and were not in a position to carry out a major military action against Egypt unilaterally. Another analyst argues that the key date for the Israeli decision was April 1956; after that time the only important considerations were tactical.[29] Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan suggests a number of interim decisions leading to a decision to act in July 1956. He notes a speech by Prime Minister Ben Gurion to the Knesset on 2 November 1955, in which the government's intention to halt terrorism and remove the blockade of Tiran was made clear.[30] Dayan also notes that the need for preventive action was brought about by the fear of Egyptian attack: 'The decisive intimation to Israel of approaching Egyptian attack was the arms deal concluded between Czechoslovakia and Egypt in September 1955.'[31] Finally, he notes the importance of British and French support: 'If it were not for the Anglo-French operation, it is doubtful whether Israel would have launched her campaign; and if she had, its character, both military and political, would have been different.'[32]

Thus Britain, France, and Israel each came separately to consider a military solution to its conflict with Egypt. Israel, con-

28. ibid., p. 49. 29. Berger, op. cit., p. 206.
30. Dayan, op. cit., pp. 12–13.
31. ibid., p. 4. See, however, p. 169, note 7, on the date of this agreement.
32. ibid., p. 3.

cerned particularly with a lack of air and naval cover, did not begin serious planning for action until French aid was assured. And France, lacking landing equipment and heavy bombers, did not move until Britain indicated willingness to co-operate.

As has been noted, British and French military leaders had been instructed immediately after the nationalization to prepare plans for possible military action. French Defence Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury reported that it would take at least one month for France to prepare if acting alone, or six weeks if in co-ordination with the British. The most important needs were for landing craft, the training of paratroops, and the use of the British base in Cyprus for the short-range Mystère fighter squadrons.[33] The British Defence Minister, the Rt Hon. Sir Walter Monckton, reported that British forces were quite unprepared. There were no landing craft in Cyprus (they would have to come from England and Malta); the paratroop units needed retraining; the nearest supporting artillery units were under NATO command in Germany; and large numbers of troops would be required.[34]

In consultation, the British and French defence ministries prepared an initial contingency plan calling for 50,000 British and 30,000 French troops, a combined British–French naval fleet, bombing of Egyptian airfields by British Canberra bombers, and a target date for invasion of 15 September. It was reported that the landing would be first at Alexandria, later proceeding to Cairo, and only afterward moving to the canal zone.[35] A joint command structure was elaborated under the British Minister of War, Antony Head, with headquarters in London. Throughout the structure, British officers were in command, with French deputies.

While these developments were taking place, Foreign Ministers Pineau and Lloyd conferred in London with US Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy. When Murphy reported the extent of

33. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 75–6.
34. ibid., pp. 76–7. 35. ibid., pp. 77–8.

British and French concern and their pressure for immediate action,[36] Dulles joined the discussion to demonstrate the high priority the United States placed on restraining its allies from hasty and violent action. With some reluctance Britain agreed to Dulles's proposal for a conference of the signatories to the 1888 convention, under which the canal had been operated, and the present canal users; France went along with this in order to retain British support.

US diplomacy in the events that unfolded was determined first by British and French expectations at the outset that Washington would support them,[37] then by growing disillusionment on their part at what they construed as US betrayal, and finally by increasing irritation and concern in Washington at what seemed ill-conceived, archaic, and potentially dangerous illusions in the minds of its closest allies when it came to Egyptian policy. London and Paris were paving the way for war, whereas Washington was seeking to defuse the crisis.

At the mid August canal users' conference in London, the United States proposed an international operating authority for Suez in which Egypt would participate but over which it would not have sole control. Britain and France agreed to go along with the attempt to obtain Egypt's agreement to the plan. Important elements in Britain, including the entire Labour party, had demanded that all peaceful methods of settlement be attempted before resorting to force. In any case, as the defence ministers had made clear, no military action was possible before mid September. Scandinavian states at the conference were not enthusiastic in their support of the resolution, feeling that an accommodation with Nasser might be possible if the issue were limited to the right of free passage. The non-Western powers opposed the US resolution.[38]

In early September the Western proposals were taken in person to Cairo by a mission headed by the Australian Prime Minister,

36. Finer, op. cit., p. 68.
37. For example, see Love, op. cit., p. 60.
38. ibid., pp. 85–92.

Robert Menzies. Not surprisingly, since they would have repealed nationalization, Nasser declined to accept them. One factor that may have been partially responsible for Egyptian rejection was the statement by President Eisenhower that 'We are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else.'[39] Britain believed that this statement virtually eliminated what little bargaining power the Western states may have had to wrest concessions from Nasser.

It is also possible, however, that concrete results might have been obtained if the mission had been freer to negotiate. Nasser had already indicated a willingness to make concessions to allay the fears of the world community, proposing a new international treaty to replace that of 1888, which would reaffirm the right of free passage and authorize UN arbitration in case of disputes.[40] This was, however, unacceptable to Britain and France.

The British and French adopted a policy of non-co-operation with the new Egyptain canal authority in the hope, some observers contend, that this might lead to a breakdown of canal operations and provide an excuse for intervention. British and French ships refused to pay tolls to Egypt, depositing them instead in the canal company's accounts in Paris and London. In mid September 1956 the canal company instructed its pilots to leave, and it was widely believed in some Western circles that this would demonstrate the dependence of Egypt on skilled Westerners. Egyptian authorities were able to recruit foreign pilots, however, to supplement the Egyptian pilots who remained. As a result, canal operation continued smoothly, and it was reported in late September that Egypt was collecting more tolls than before nationalization (the Egyptian authorities did not refuse passage to British and French ships that did not pay tolls).[41]

With Nasser's rejection of the plan of the first canal users' conference, Britain and France continued their military preparations. The Soviet Union added to the uncertainty by veiled threats of intervention. A Soviet diplomat, for example, was quoted as

39. Finer, op. cit., p. 189. 40. ibid., 126–9.
41. ibid., pp. 178–9.

saying in London that 'if war broke out over Suez the Arabs would not stand alone; "It will be a just war for the Arabs, and there will be volunteers."'[42] Nevertheless, British and French military preparations proceeded, and by mid September the units on Cyprus were ready for action.

Concerned about the possibility of hostilities, Dulles tried yet another tactic that would keep the conflict at the conference table, if only temporarily. This took the form of a proposal to form a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA). Because of continuing concern over the danger of US–British disunity in foreign policy, Eden agreed to try this device. France again agreed to co-operate in order to retain British support for the military action it considered might be necessary. The Suez Canal Users' Association plan was announced on 13 September. It stated that the association would employ pilots to take ships through the canal and that if Egypt refused, then 'other appropriate' action would be taken. At this point Eden suggested that the 'other appropriate' action would be force; Dulles, however, reportedly stated that US ships would sail by way of the Cape of Good Hope. Once again the United States seemed to Britain to be undermining Western bargaining power, weakening Western efforts to make Nasser 'disgorge his spoils'.[43]

On 5 October, as a result of the growing British and French disillusionment with US delaying tactics, London and Paris took the matter to the UN Security Council. This step had reportedly been opposed by the United States since it seemed likely that the Soviet Union would veto any action that would satisfy the British and French. However, Eden and Mollet wanted to be able to argue that they had exhausted the possibilities for peaceful settlement before they resorted to force. There were also domestic political reasons that induced the British, at least, to go to the United Nations. Both Monckton and R. A. Butler (then deputy prime minister) opposed the use of force except after failure of UN

42. *The Times* (London), 28 August 1956, as cited in Finer, op. cit., p. 179.

43. Finer, op. cit., p. 234.

mediation, as did the majority of the Labour party and substantial segments of British public opinion.[44]

The Security Council was asked by Britain and France to consider the 'situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal.' Simultaneously Egypt, referring to the British–French military build-up in the eastern Mediterranean, asked the council to consider 'actions against Egypt by some powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom, which constitute a danger to international peace and security.'[45]

The foreign ministers of France, Britain, Israel, and Egypt attended the UN Security Council sessions. After the public debates, private meetings were held in the office of Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General, during the second week in October. In these meetings a strong possibility seemed to be developing that some compromise might be arranged.[46] The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud Fawzi, agreed to pledge a certain percentage of canal income to canal improvements, to fix tolls for a number of years, to recognize a users' association, and to negotiate a new treaty reaffirming rights of free passage. This preliminary agreement was announced in the form of six vaguely worded principles that all parties understood to represent the more concrete items mentioned above. Thus, when the Security

44. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 130–33. In the left wing of the Labour party sentiments were strongly anti-imperialist, frequently pacifist, and, on occasion, pro-Soviet. There were a few members of the Labour party, however, who felt that it had been hurt by its post-war identification with the break-up of the empire and should adopt a strong line against Egypt.

45. *The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956* (Washington: GPO; 1957), p. 43.

46. Robertson (op. cit., p. 129) quotes French Foreign Minister Pineau as saying: 'I felt that if we did not do something [to counter Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal company] we would put ourselves in an inferior position in Algeria, that we would give the FLN rebels a major trump.' At the same time the socialist Foreign Minister stated that his government was embarrassed to be acting apparently on behalf of the private Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, which had its seat of operations in Paris, and several thousand French stockholders.

Council meetings ended on 14 October it was generally expected that further negotiations would be held around 30 October.[47] The Secretary-General did, in fact, pursue the discussions with the Egyptian foreign minister and achieved a broad area of agreement; but, when Israeli operations against Egypt began, the discussions were suspended.[48]

While the United Nations was dealing with the problem, final plans were being made for the joint French–Israeli action and for possible British–French operations. There are differences of opinion as to the degree to which British officials were fully informed of French–Israeli plans; in any event they seem to have been aware that some consultation was taking place.[49]

On 23 September the Israeli officials in charge of co-ordinating plans with France arrived secretly in Paris to talk with French and British officials.[50] By 26 September a plan was elaborated by the British–French joint command calling for an attack through Port Said to the canal zone. In deference to British military opinion, French arguments for a paratroop action were dropped, and a massive sea-borne assault combined with heavy air support was agreed upon. On 29 September Moshe Dayan visited Paris, and during the next four days the details of a three-power co-ordinated operation were worked out.[51]

Under the revised plan the Israeli attack would come between 29 October and 5 November, a time picked primarily because it would coincide with US presidential elections. It was hoped that the elections would make decisive US action more difficult, in case Eisenhower actively opposed the invasion.

On 10 October Israel made a heavy reprisal raid against Jordan. Britain announced the next day that it would honour its obligations to defend Jordan and warned Israel against future raids.

47. Finer, op. cit., pp. 308–15.

48. *Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956*, p. 47.

49. Merry and Serge Bromberger: *Secrets of Suez* (London: Pan Books; 1957), p. 42.

50. Dayan, op. cit., pp. 24–5; Robertson, op. cit., p. 134.

51. Dayan, op. cit., pp. 29–31.

According to one source, the Israeli raid was a feint designed to create the impression that Israeli mobilization was aimed at Jordan rather than Egypt.[52] Another source contends that the British had been previously informed by the French of the possibility of such a raid and had seized upon it as an opportunity to demonstrate the pro-Arab bias of British foreign policy.[53]

By 16 October the French were becoming worried that the proposed operation was slowing down, and Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris two days earlier than planned in order to finish arrangements. Earlier, Eden had taken control of the defence ministry from Monckton, who was opposed to intervention; subsequently, Antony Head was placed in charge of the whole defence ministry (in addition to the joint British–French command that he had formed). During the 16 October meetings, decisions were made on the timing and circumstances of British–French intervention.

The Arab–Israeli Conflict
PHASE III_2
The British–French–Egyptian Conflict
PHASE III
29 October–7 November 1956

Sub-Phase A: 29–31 October 1956

Hostilities broke out when Israeli forces launched an attack into the Sinai Peninsula which was aimed at the two southern and the middle sectors of the Suez Canal and at Egyptian fortifications dominating the Strait of Tiran.

On 29 October Israel dropped a paratroop battalion at the strategic Mitla Pass, near the southern end of the canal. The unit

52. Childers, op. cit., pp. 231–2. Pro-Nasser groups won the Jordanian elections in October, and there was an immediate realignment of Jordanian foreign policy to support Nasser.

53. Robertson, op. cit., pp. 129–30.

took up position and awaited supporting troops, which, because of transportation difficulties, did not arrive until late on 30 October. With the advantage of effective air cover, Israeli troops secured the Mitla Pass despite heavy opposition and some strafing by Egyptian planes, but they did not proceed to the heavily fortified canal area.[54]

In the second area of Israeli attack, the central region of the Sinai Peninsula (near El Quseima), one Israeli brigade moved north to probe the heavily fortified positions around Abu Ageila. On 31 October another brigade attempted to take the Abu Ageila fortifications from the west but was stopped by heavy fire.[55]

After consultation with France and Britain as parties to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, the United States requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The council met on 30 October and heard from the chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization, who reported that the Israelis had attacked and had ignored his call for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. The United States offered a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw and on all UN members to refrain from the use of force or from giving assistance of any kind to Israel.[56]

The British delegate announced that his government and that of France had that day (30 October) presented an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to cease hostilities and to withdraw to within ten miles of the Suez Canal.[57] Also, in order to separate the belligerents and guarantee free transit through the canal, Egypt had been asked to permit British and French forces to move temporarily into Port Saïd, Ismaïlia, and Port Suez. Both Israel and Egypt had been given twelve hours to respond, after which British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength necessary to ensure compliance.

When the US resolution was put to the vote, it was vetoed by

54. S. L. A. Marshall: *Sinai Victory* (New York: William Morrow; 1958), pp. 65–93.

55. ibid., pp. 94–127; Dayan, op. cit., pp. 101–6.

56. UN Document S/3170, 30 October, 1956.

57. Israeli forces were not that close to the Suez Canal at the time.

Britain and France. The council then adopted, over British and French objections, a procedural resolution asking that the General Assembly be called into emergency session under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.[58]

Sub-Phase B: 31 October–5 November 1956

Hostilities in the opening days were confined to Israeli and Egyptian forces. But they intensified dramatically on 31 October when Britain and France, nominally following up their ultimatum but in reality as a result of pre-planning with the Israelis,[59] committed their air power and, in the case of France, some naval units. The uses made of British–French air power, in any event, were hardly calculated to apply force equally to Egypt and Israel. The primary British targets were Egyptian airfields, and the primary French role was in providing tactical support for Israeli ground operations and air cover for Israel.

While Egypt's inventory of modern jet aircraft exceeded that of Israel, the Egyptian air force was operationally weaker. In large measure this was a consequence of the lack of an adequate number of trained Egyptian pilots for the sophisticated planes received from the Soviet bloc. The combined French–Israeli air operations over Sinai led Nasser to ground most of his fighters. And the British bombing led him to evacuate many of them to bases in Syria and Saudi Arabia.[60]

On the ground the key item of military equipment in the fighting was the tank. Studies of the hostilities make it plain that effective Israeli use of Sherman tanks and the fast French-built AMX

58. *Report by the President to the Congress for the Year, 1956*, pp. 47–9.

59. The British government has consistently denied all accusations of collusion with Israel, and Anthony Eden (now Lord Avon), in his memoirs, claimed that British actions from 29 October only responded to Israeli moves. The contrary case, however, has now been amply demonstrated. See, in particular, Anthony Nutting: *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London: Constable; 1967).

60. Leo Heiman; 'Moscow's Export Arsenal: The Soviet Bloc and the Middle Eastern Arms Race', *East Europe*, Vol. 13, no. 5 (May 1964), p. 9.

light tanks was the key to the defeat of the several important positions fortified by the Egyptians. The Israeli tanks were never seriously challenged by Egyptian tanks during the fighting.

Concerning manpower, one report that was based on Egyptian sources states that Egypt's normal force in Sinai was 60,000 men, but that at the time of the Israeli attack only 30,000 were in position (the others having been withdrawn to the canal zone in August). Against this force Israel reportedly deployed approximately 45,000 troops. Moreover, some two thirds of the Egyptian force were support, rather than combat troops, compared to half or less of the Israeli forces intended for that purpose.[61] On the other hand, accounts of the war based on Israeli sources give the impression of small, highly mobile and well-equipped Israeli units defeating very large Egyptian troop concentrations centred on fortifications and fixed artillery.[62]

The air strikes that began on 31 October against the fortified Egyptian elevations were co-ordinated with heavy attacks by tanks and with the shelling of Egyptian defences by French naval vessels.[63] Egyptian positions in the northern area around Rafah were overrun between three and nine a.m. on 1 November. By the evening of 1 November, all Egyptian armour was withdrawing rapidly toward the canal area. Hundreds of military vehicles clogged the roads, offering targets for bombing and strafing by Israeli and French planes. On 2 November, Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip, acting under orders, surrendered after minor skirmishes.[64] In the central area, Egyptian troops from Abu Ageila left their positions, all armour retreated to the canal,

61. Childers, op. cit., p. 282.
62. See, for example, Dayan, op. cit.
63. Dayan (op. cit., p. 132) notes the shelling of the Rafah positions but does not indicate who was responsible for it. Also, in contrast to Marshall, who notes the contributions of air attacks in the taking of the Rafah fortifications, Dayan discounts their effectiveness as well as that of the naval bombardments. Marshall does not mention naval bombardments at all. Merry and Serge Bromberger (op. cit., p. 24) stress the significance of the French navy in neutralizing the Egyptian navy.
64. Marshall, op. cit., pp. 189–91.

and the air bases at Bir Hama and Bir Gafgafa were deserted.[65]

Subsequently, from 3 to 5 November the Israeli southern forces and a brigade proceeding from Elath advanced upon and took Sharm el Sheikh at the southern tip of Sinai, a post that controlled the Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. In the southern thrust, as in the central area, the French contributed to Israeli success by flying supplies from Cyprus aboard Noratlas transports.[66]

The First Special Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly met on 1 November. US Secretary of State Dulles characterized 'the violent armed attack by three of our members upon a fourth' as 'a grave error'. He offered a resolution for a cease-fire that was adopted in the early hours of 2 November with the Soviet Union concurring.[67]

This conjunction of US and Soviet policy in the Middle East took place against the counterpoint of the Hungarian rebellion and its suppression. At this particular moment, however, it appeared that Soviet armour was withdrawing from Budapest following a 30 October announcement of Soviet readiness to negotiate the stationing of its troops in Hungary with the members of the Warsaw Pact. The Hungarian situation was therefore outwardly headed toward a peaceful resolution.[68]

The UN General Assembly met again during the night of

65. Childers, op. cit., p. 292.

66. ibid., p. 288; Marshall, op. cit., p. 69. Marshall does not indicate the nationality of the planes.

67. *Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956*, p. 50.

68. ibid., p. 84. The Security Council, however, was called into session again on 2 November on receipt of news of large-scale Soviet troop movements into Hungary. The council met again on 3 November and at three a.m. on Sunday, 4 November as the scale of Soviet military intervention became apparent. The Council's attempted call for withdrawal of Soviet forces was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and the matter was referred, again under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, to a special emergency session of the General Assembly; ibid., pp. 84–6. There were thus two special General Assembly sessions meeting in New York, each dealing with an outwardly separate conflict but with the tensions of one reinforcing the tensions of the other.

3 November against a background of deepening crisis. Disregarding the 2 November call for a cease-fire the British continued to bomb Port Said and the Israelis to decimate whatever Egyptian forces they could catch in Sinai. The canal had been closed by ships which had been sunk, and oil pipelines in the Middle East had been cut. Hanging over the UN proceedings was the clear threat of further intensification of hostilities, involving British and French invasion of the canal zone with unknown implications of spiralling interventions on opposing sides by other great powers.

The Canadian delegation under Lester Pearson had been working on the notion of a UN peace force that would separate Israeli and Egyptian forces. Since the declared purpose of any British–French landing was also to separate these combatants, such a UN force would serve to make the presence of other landing forces unnecessary.[69] The Secretary-General was able to inform the General Assembly on 3 November that Britain and France had agreed to halt their military action if, among other conditions, both Egyptian and Israeli governments would accept a UN force to maintain the peace until an Arab–Israeli settlement and a Suez Canal settlement were reached. The proposal was strongly supported by the United States and approved, by a vote of 57 to 0 with 19 abstentions, just after midnight on 4 November.[70]

Sub-Phase C: 4/5–7 November 1956

Despite strong pressure from the United Nations, the United States, and many others, British and French land operations in the Suez Canal area commenced even as the General Assembly acted. The British and French had been bombing pre-landing targets in Egypt (including the Cairo airport) around the clock. After several delays – the force itself took longer than expected to assemble, and the highly selective pre-landing bombings of the area had been protracted in order to cut later ground casualties

69. William R. Frye: *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York: Oceana Publications; 1957), pp. 6–21.

70. *Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956*, pp. 52–3.

to a minimum – the British–French air-borne assault on Port Fuad began on the night of 4/5 November, and the city surrendered by that afternoon. There was heavy fighting in Port Said, and the local Egyptian commander initiated discussions for a surrender. At the same time, British and French forces moved south from the two ports, up the canal. Surrender negotiations in Port Said were broken off, and on 6 November the sea-borne troops pressing toward the occupation of the Suez Canal area encountered considerable Egyptian resistance, including that of an armed civilian population. By midnight of 6 November the allied forces had reached El Cap, only twenty-three miles from Port Said.

At this point, when Egypt's military plight was becoming extremely grave, strong diplomatic support was received from the Soviet Union and, indirectly, from the United States. The Soviet Union on 5 November sent a series of diplomatic notes: to the United States it was proposed that Soviet and US troops 'crush the aggressors and restore peace';[71] to Britain and France there were references, imprecise but ominous, to 'countries [that] could have used' rocket weapons against London and Paris.[72]

The Soviet Union also on 5 November requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider a draft resolution calling on all member states, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union, to give military and other assistance to Egypt if an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops were not effected. The Security Council refused to inscribe the Soviet item. The US representative commented on Soviet 'cynicism' in making such a request on top of the 'butchery which Moscow was in process of carrying out against the people of Hungary under cover of so-called "negotiations".'[73]

71. Frye, op. cit., p. 10. The US rejected this 'unthinkable suggestion'. *US Department of State Bulletin*, 19 November 1956, pp. 795–6.

72. Frye, op. cit., p. 10. The next day there were reports of Soviet jets over Turkey and of Soviet surface craft and submarines passing through the Dardanelles. For details, see Finer, op. cit., pp. 420–21. There continues to be controversy over whether, in fact, such manoeuvres took place.

73. *Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956*, pp. 54–5.

Domestic pressure for a cease-fire was pressing heavily on the British government during this period. The 5 November debate in the House of Commons reflected the fact that the Suez hostilities were highly unpopular with the majority of the Labour party and many other British subjects. A large number of Conservative Members of Parliament had indicated that they were giving serious consideration to refusing support for the government policy in Suez.[74] British oil interests feared disruption of their supply; some British feared the continuation of stress within the Atlantic alliance; others were disturbed by the fact that Canada was clearly opposed to the Suez action, as were African and Asian members of the Commonwealth; it was clear that world opinion was almost unanimously unfavourable to British actions. And Soviet pronouncements raised fears of a world conflagration growing out of continued hostilities.

In addition, the British financial situation was deteriorating rapidly, as other countries converted their sterling holdings. Estimating that $1 billion were required to offset the run on sterling aggravated by continuing British involvement in the Suez campaign, Britain on 6 November asked the United States for financial support. The support was promised on the condition that Britain declare a cease-fire by the end of the same day.[75]

By the early hours of 6 November the UN Secretary-General had produced plans for implementing the 4 November General Assembly resolution for an international peace force. The proposed force would not be used to exert political pressure on Egypt; the great powers would not participate; political control was to be placed almost entirely in the Secretary-General's hands.[76]

The proposed UN peace force offered the British a face-saving way to withdraw from an increasingly untenable position. To the neutralists and Egypt the peace force offered a means for getting rid of the British and the French. While they might have hoped for a more unequivocal solution, it was considered to be the strongest

74. Finer, op. cit., p. 427.
75. ibid., pp. 428–9.
76. Frye, op. cit., pp. 10–12.

measure the United States would support, as well as the only way to avoid long-drawn-out fighting. To the United States it was a way of keeping a direct Soviet presence out of the Middle East. The French preference was to carry the operation through to its end, toppling Nasser or, at a minimum, regaining control of the canal; the French government, however, recognized the impossibility of continuing without British support. Israel, on the other hand, had already achieved its immediate goals – destruction of Egyptian positions in Sinai, capture of war *matériel*, the opening of the port of Elath, and a dramatic blow to Arab prestige – and had been willing to accept the cease-fire even before the beginning of the British–French landings.[77] Israel, however, made it clear that a UN force would not be permitted on Israeli territory.

Britain and France accepted the cease-fire called for by the General Assembly on 2 November; Egyptian and Israeli acceptance had already been received. The cease-fire went into effect at midnight on 6 November.

The British–French–Egyptian Conflict
PHASE IV
7 November–23 December 1956

With the conclusion of the cease-fire there remained the task of obtaining agreement on the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces. Two resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on 7 November: the first completed the groundwork for the establishment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF); the second, sponsored by nineteen African–Asian members, called for immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. Britain refused to withdraw forces prior to the positioning of UN troops, alleging

77. *The New York Times*, 9 July 1966. See also Dayan, op. cit., pp. 180–82; Robertson, op. cit., p. 237. In the confusion of the moment, the Israeli delegate at the United Nations had announced acceptance of the 2 November cease-fire resolution soon after it was adopted, only to withdraw it the next day with the claim that there had been a misunderstanding.

that the separation of the parties would break down and hostilities be resumed.

UNEF observers were admitted immediately into the area of military operations. The movement of UNEF troops to Egypt began on 10 November. Four days later the first UNEF contingent arrived in Egypt. By 22 November, 869 UNEF troops were in Egypt, at which time final agreement was reached with the Egyptian government on the presence and functioning of the force. No British withdrawals had yet taken place, but about one third of the French forces deployed on 7 November had been withdrawn. Some pullback of Israeli forces had occurred along the entire battle line.

On 24 November, the assembly voted by 63 votes (including the United States) to 5, with 10 abstentions, a resolution regretting that withdrawals had been so limited. Thereafter, however, the phased take-over by UNEF proceeded steadily, and by 22 December 1956 British and French troops completed their withdrawal.

The Continuing Arab–Israeli Conflict

The net effect of the 1956 Suez hostilities was to remove the element of force from the calculations of Britain and France in reference to settlement of their differences with Egypt. These differences, defined in the narrow terms of the control of the Suez Canal vanished very quickly. The broader issues took a longer time to disappear. The Arab–Israeli conflict has proved more intractable.

The Arab–Israeli Conflict
PHASE IV_2
23 December 1956–5 June 1967

Sub-Phase A: 23 December 1956–March 1957

While British and French forces evacuated Egyptian territory with relative dispatch, Israeli forces pulled back very slowly – no

more than fifteen miles a week. By the year's end, Sinai was almost cleared, but Israeli troops still occupied the Gaza Strip and were deployed along a belt to the west of the Israeli–Egyptian demarcation line and at Sharm el Sheikh. Israel said that it would agree to clear these areas only if steps were taken to prevent a renewal of the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and to ensure that Gaza could not again be used as a base for raids against Israeli territory.

Israel held firmly to this policy despite strong UN pressure culminating in two General Assembly resolutions of 2 February 1957, deploring the failure of Israel to withdraw and authorizing the placement of UNEF troops on the Egyptian side of the armistice line. Israel continued to insist on guarantees. The United States promised that, while the United Nations had no authority to require a modification of the armistice agreement which gave Egypt the right to administer Gaza, the United States would use its best efforts to assure that UNEF did move into the area as contemplated by the UN resolution. As to Aqaba, 'In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.'[78]

On 1 March Israeli forces began to withdraw. On the same day the US Representative at the United Nations formally endorsed a statement by the UN Secretary-General regarding the procedures under which UNEF might be withdrawn, namely '. . . an indicated procedure would be for the Secretary-General to inform the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly.'[79] At a subsequent news conference Dulles, the American Secretary of State, asserted

78. *US Department of State Bulletin*, 11 March 1957, pp. 392–3, as referenced in *A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East*, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 90.

79. *A Select Chronology . . .*, p. 100.

that no private assurances going beyond these statements had been made.[80]

Sub-Phase B: March 1957–1964

With the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the emplacement of UNEF along the Egyptian side of the Israeli–Egyptian border – and in addition at Sharm el Sheikh – the causes of the 1956 war were at least temporarily shelved. With the clearance of the Suez Canal in 1957 normal traffic through that vital waterway resumed, although Israeli shipping was still barred.[81] But although immediate irritants had been effectively controlled, the underlying enmity to Israel remained. If anything, the events of 1956, notwithstanding the strong US action against the Israeli–British–French aggression, had reinforced Egypt's view of Israel as the tool of alien Western imperialism. The Soviet Union, by contrast, had emerged as the champion of radical Arab nationalism.[82]

The shattering of British and French influence among the Arab states and the activist policy of the Soviets led to grave US concerns that the Soviet Union, riding a crest of rabid Arab nationalism, would come to dominate the strategic Middle East. Initial US reaction was not to enter into direct competition with the Soviets for radical Arab favour.[83] It was rather to try to win the support of more moderate Arabs while isolating Nasser.

This policy found expression in the so-called Eisenhower doctrine by which the President, on 5 January 1957, pledged US economic and military help, including troops, to any Middle Eastern country seeking protection 'against overt armed aggres-

80. ibid., p. 103.

81. When the canal was first cleared, some Israeli cargoes were quietly allowed through in non-Israeli ships, but Egypt put an end to that in 1959.

82. *Sources of Conflict in the Middle East*, Adelphi Paper no. 26 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies; March 1966), p. 14.

83. For example the Soviets sent Egypt prompt shipments of wheat and of medical supplies for victims of British–French bombing, both of which the United States had declined to provide. And the United States refused to release blocked Egyptian funds.

sion from any nation controlled by International Communism.'[84] On 9 March Congress endorsed the President's pledge and authorized $200 million in aid.[85]

Nasser sought, in turn, to bring the Arab states firmly under his influence. He persuaded Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to join him in an Arab Solidarity Agreement. Jordan was to be supplied with money and arms to replace the British subsidy. All were to oppose the Eisenhower doctrine. By June of 1957, the Arab League Economic Council had endorsed Nasser's plan to proclaim a total boycott on Israeli trade. Not only was all trade forbidden between Israel and the Arab world, but also all foreign firms and ships doing business with Israel were to be blacklisted by the Arabs.

However, the long-standing rivalries for leadership within the Arab world soon enabled the United States to breach the united Arab front Nasser had sought to build. Within three weeks of the Arab Solidarity Agreement, Washington had successfully persuaded King Saud of Saudi Arabia – coincidental with a grant of $50 million in aid – to praise publicly the Eisenhower doctrine.[86] The US policy also found support in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan.

To the other Arabs, however, the enemy was Israel, not Communism. They appeared to have no desire to become partisans in the Cold War and resented being asked to choose.[87] Cairo Radio was able successfully to portray the doctrine 'as a nefarious new

84. President Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, 5 January 1957, as cited in *A Select Chronology . . .*, p. 81. One commentary on the diplomacy of this era calls the specific language in the doctrine 'a label, it would be charitable to assume, intended rather to placate a suspicious Congress than to indicate the State Department's true assessment of the Middle East situation'. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter: *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967*, Adelphi Paper No. 41 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies; October 1967), p. 9.

85. *A Select Chronology . . .*, pp. 83–4.

86. Richard H. Nolte, 'United States Policy in the Middle East', in Georgiana G. Stevens, ed.: *The United States and the Middle East* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; 1964), p. 165.

87. Secretary of State Dulles, it will be recalled, was unsympathetic to the notion of nonalignment.

imperialism with all the old tactics – gunboats, bribes, and puppet régimes – and the same old aim "divide and rule"'.[88]

Jordan provided the first test of the doctrine. In April 1957 King Hussein (Ibn Talal) accused his elected but pro-Nasser government of a Communist plot supported by Egypt. He promptly received assurances of US support and $10 million in aid. To give emphasis to the extent of US concern, the Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean. That summer a Syrian crisis developed out of rumours of a planned pro-American coup. The upshot, after American troop movements along the Turkish border countered by strong Soviet warnings against US aggression, was to send the Syrian leaders to Nasser in search of union to counter rising Soviet prestige and influence in Syria. The United Arab Republic, a federation of Egypt and Syria, thus emerged on 2 February 1958.

The last test of the Eisenhower doctrine occurred when President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon interpreted a domestic political crisis as being instigated by Egypt and called on the United Nations to intervene. UN observers found little evidence of intervention, but at that point a coup in Iraq overthrew the monarchy and with it Nuri es-Said, the West's firmest friend in the Middle East. Fearing an opportunity for Soviet penetration and an upheaval that would eventually sweep away the pro-Western Chamoun government in Lebanon, the United States responded promptly when the latter appealed for troops. Britain responded to a similar request from Jordan. A full-scale crisis resulted, replete with Soviet threats and war scares – a crisis defused eventually by the early withdrawal of foreign troops in compliance with UN requests.

By the end of the summer of 1958 US policy as defined by the Eisenhower doctrine had proved ineffective. Soviet prestige was everywhere evident – in arms supplies and cultural exchanges, and even in economic aid including an agreement to help with the Aswan Dam, symbol of Nasser's humiliation by the United States. Yet the Soviet government had been unable to prevent either the

88. Nolte, op. cit., p. 166.

continuing interventions by Western powers or the banning of local Communist parties in every Middle Eastern country except Israel. In general, non-alignment had proved more attractive to the Arabs than any consistent support of Soviet policy.

Lebanon had in the wake of the US withdrawal acquired a neutral government. Iraq had signed a mutual-defence agreement with the UAR, of which Yemen had also become a member. The two monarchies, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, alone remained in any sense either pro-Western or anti-Nasser. As for the Arabs themselves, moreover, no leader had emerged capable of challenging Nasser's leadership.

Out of the wreckage of US Arab policy emerged two convictions: first, that the best buffers against Soviet influence in the Middle East and penetration into Africa were strong, independent governments; second, that the greatest threat to peace in the area would be a military imbalance between the Arabs and Israel. In 1959 technical assistance was proffered to the UAR for the first time since the Suez crisis. After 1960, Egypt became the largest single recipient of US aid in the Middle East, excluding Turkey and Iran.[89] The United States refused to enter a mutual-defence pact with Israel but did permit arms sales if and when a specific weapon was required to match a UAR breakthrough.[90]

The possession of military weapons became in this period the intense concern of all parties to the continuing conflict. Militancy toward Israel was the only slogan that commanded wide allegiance in the Arab world. Every ruler felt driven to compete with his neighbour in the ardour with which he expressed this feeling. The degree of hostility toward Israel came to be judged in terms of the size and sophistication of the military establishment each

89. Harry B. Ellis, 'The Arab–Israeli Conflict Today', in Stevens, op. cit., p. 118. Prior to 1959 Israel had received more US economic aid than all Arab countries combined. The Israelis protested that the United States's supplying massive aid to Egypt ($200 million in 1963 compared with $80 million to Israel) released Egyptian funds for new arms purchases from the Soviet Union; therefore, efforts to limit the arms race were being exerted only against Israel.

90. ibid., p. 117.

ruler could display. The willingness of the Soviet Union to supply arms to the more militant Arab states and of the United States to arm the more moderate fostered the competitiveness between them and contributed to a spiralling demand for arms that Israel, for its own security, felt constrained to match.[91]

In the absence of the unifying effect of direct great-power intervention and with Arab–Israeli tensions in temporary abeyance, Arab politics fell in 'natural disarray'.[92] Old rivalries resurfaced. The historic antipathy between Iraq and Egypt proved stronger than the revolutionary brotherhood of Abdul Karim Kassim and Nasser.[93] 'Arab socialism' came to be viewed with increasing alarm by a conservative military group in Syria, which in 1961 overthrew the government and withdrew Syria from the UAR. This only increased Nasser's own revolutionary zeal and militancy against 'reactionary' Arab governments,[94] and the forces of imperialism, reaction, and Zionism. One ruler after another was blasted by Nasser and the masses exhorted to rise. In 1962 he found allies in Ahmad Ben Bella of newly liberated Algeria, in the republican faction in Yemen whom Nasser supported with troops, and shortly in Iraq and Syria following pro-socialist coups. Ben Bella, however, soon became diverted by his own role in Africa and particularly the Maghreb; the Yemen conflict was not resolved; and Nasser and the remaining two allies failed in attempts to agree on the form of a federation that was to unite them.[95]

Sub-Phase C: 1964–November 1966

In 1964 the issue of the use of the Jordan waters aroused a new spirit of unity among the Arab militants. The Jordan is formed from streams rising in Lebanon, Israel, and Syria which merge

91. *Sources of Conflict in the Middle East*, p. 41.
92. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 9.
93. ibid. See also, J. C. Hurewitz, 'Regional and International Politics in the Middle East', in Stevens, op. cit., p. 83.
94. Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 96–7.
95. *A Select Chronology* . . . , p. 15.

in the Huleh basin to become a single river whose riparian rights are shared by the same three countries. A joint diversion and irrigation plan which was worked out in 1954 by Eric Johnston, President Eisenhower's personal envoy, had been approved by Arab and Israeli engineers but had failed to obtain political approval.

Israel needed water from the Jordan River to irrigate the Negev desert region for new settlers. It therefore went ahead with its own diversion plans, and by 1964 the Eshed Kinrot pumping station was ready to begin operations. An Arab summit conference adopted plans to divert the Jordan headwaters and thus head off the diversion of water by Israel. An Arab Unified Command was agreed on to deter anticipated Israeli reprisals. States not directly confronting Israel pledged funds for those who did, and, finally, the Palestine refugees were enlisted in the struggle.

The refugee issue[96] had continued to fester over the years, although UNEF's presence had helped to keep the number of incidents low. The 700,000 who fled in 1948 had become some 1,200,000, comprising two thirds of the population of the Gaza Strip and over half the population of Jordan.

The refugees had remained passive until 1964. Then, at a succession of Arab summit conferences, the decision was made to form the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and a Liberation Army. By such means the conflict could be presented to the world as a struggle between a native people seeking to drive out the alien invaders.[97] Ahm ed Shukeiry, head of the

96. In 1961 Dr Joseph E. Johnson had undertaken a study of the problem for the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission. His solution – free choice, under UN auspices, of repatriation or compensation; guarantees for Israel; and financial assistance – was rejected by both Israel and the Arabs. Ellis, op. cit., pp. 143–4.

97. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 11. This was designed to appeal particularly to the developing areas of the world. Israel had very early established diplomatic and commercial relationships among the new African states. At the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, Nasser had thus been warned not to try for an anti-Israeli statement such as he had won at Bandung in 1955; Ellis, op. cit., p. 113.

new organization, added new fire to Arab militancy but actually received little practical help.

Despite these ominous developments the whole area was reasonably stable for an additional two years. Arab leaders meeting in Casablanca in 1965, for example, concluded that, while war with Israel was inevitable, it would not come for five or ten years. Arab socialism was played down. Nasser was increasingly diverted by his inconclusive intervention in Yemen. The new Arab Unified Command was frustrated by the unwillingness of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan to accept Egyptian troops on their soil. Even Egyptian differences with Saudi Arabia over Yemen seemed susceptible of solution.

In the competition between East and West for influence, economic aid – being relatively interchangeable – can be an unreliable guide to alignments. In the crucial area of military aid, the Soviet Union had the advantage in the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. Elsewhere arms were being supplied by the West.

The West retained its concern for the unimpeded flow of oil to Western Europe and Japan. But the threat of a cut-off did not invoke nearly such tremors as at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis, thanks largely to new suppliers and larger and faster tankers.

As for Israel, the government of Premier Levi Eshkol, which had taken over from Ben Gurion in June 1963, was regarded as moderate and in fact was under some criticism at home for its lack of vigour. Eshkol headed an uneasy coalition which was very sensitive to shifts in public opinion. His major concerns appeared to be Israel's worsening economic situation and a desire to retain the good will of the United States without antagonizing the Soviet Union.

Two events contributed to the reversal of this relatively placid situation. One was the coming to power in Syria of the leftist wing of the Ba'ath party, which ousted a more moderate, rightist group. This was, however, to be a difference only in degrees of radicalism; even the previous régime, for example, had not considered the formation of the PLO a substitute for unilateral action on its own part. In 1965 the El Fatah (Conquest) organization was formed;

it bore many similarities to the *fedayin* of earlier years. Now frequent commando raids across the border began to provoke strong Israeli reprisals wherever El Fatah units were suspected of operating, including the Lebanese and Jordanian border areas.[98]

Another crucial event was a call by King Feisal (Ibn Abdel Aziz Al Saud) of Saudi Arabia for an Islamic summit conference; King Feisal had succeeded King Saud in 1964 and had proceeded to court Iran and Jordan and to buy Western arms. His plan of an Islamic summit was a direct challenge to Nasser's leadership, and he became thereafter the rallying point for all the Arab forces who disliked and distrusted the social and political policies of Nasserism.[99] Feisal also seemed in a good position to fill the political and military vacuum being created by the withdrawal of British power from Aden and the Persian Gulf – a role that Nasser regarded as properly his. After Feisal's endorsement of an Islamic summit, Syria immediately demanded a counter-summit. Syrian pressure and Nasser's own interests eventually led Nasser to bring the Arab rift into the open once more by denouncing Feisal – eventually Hussein of Jordan and Bourguiba of Tunisia as well – as having sold out to the forces of imperialism.[1] Arab unity was again in shreds.

Sub-Phase D: November 1966–5 June 1967

In November 1966 two events occurred that in retrospect appear to have triggered the rapid rise in tension that led to a renewed

98. In May 1966 Israel asked the United Nations to list all the incidents that had occurred since the establishment of the Mixed Armistice Commissions in 1949. The Secretary-General declined, claiming such a report would be too long and unusable. The number was reported to have exceeded 100,000. *A Select Chronology* . . . , pp. 12–13.

99. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 12.

1. ibid. In March 1965 Habib Bourguiba had appealed for moderation and reason in order to solve the Palestine problem. The reaction among Arab radicals was one of outrage: the UAR withdrew its ambassador from Tunis, and Egyptian mobs ransacked the Tunisian embassy in Cairo.

outbreak of war. The first was the signing of a defence pact between the U A R and Syria, almost certainly with Soviet encouragement. The second event was an Israeli reprisal attack on the village of Es Samu in Jordan on 13 November. The Es Samu attack followed Israeli failure to get satisfaction after complaining to the Security Council about mines laid on Israeli territory by El Fatah units operating from Syria. More mines were laid near the Jordanian border. Israel responded on a scale hitherto unknown – with armour, aircraft, and infantry, and in daylight. The Security Council condemned Israel, but not the Syrian provocateurs. Erstwhile sympathetic opinion was shocked by the scale of the reprisal; and there were demonstrations in Jordan which threatened the stability of the régime. Despite strong criticism of its action, Israel remained firm. 'The action at Samu,' said the Israeli Minister of Labour, Yigal Allon, 'demonstrated to the Powers that Israel is not willing to submit its security to diplomatic bargaining.'[2]

A further serious incident on the Israeli–Syrian armistice line in April 1967 arose out of Israeli attempts to cultivate land in the demilitarized zone. An exchange of small-arms fire quickly led to an engagement involving artillery, tanks, and finally Israeli aircraft which silenced the Syrian artillery and then flew over Damascus in a victory celebration. Syria and Jordan taunted Egypt for hiding behind UNEF and failing to help them.[3] Premier Eshkol said in an interview that the US Sixth Fleet would support Israel,[4] an assertion Arab leaders appear to have assumed was a firm US commitment. Again, on 11 May, Eshkol warned that Israel would take retaliatory measures if sabotage did not cease. He also criticized the United Nations for failing to place blame for the incidents on Syria.[5] On the same day the

2. ibid., p. 13. 3. ibid., p. 14.

4. *A Select Chronology* . . . , p. 22. In 1964 he had told the Knesset that President Lyndon Johnson's commitment to defend Israel against Arab aggression was a 'firm political decision with all that involves'. ibid., p. 17.

5. ibid., p. 22.

UN Secretary-General did, however, publicly deplore the increase in El Fatah incidents.[6]

The increasing militancy on Israel's part may have been designed to quiet public opinion in Israel, but it was accompanied by private warnings that the use of retaliatory force might be the only way to curtail the increasing terrorism.[7] It is possible that these warnings, rather than serving to moderate the terrorist attacks, had the effect of convincing Syria, Egypt, and the Soviet Union that a major strike against Syria was imminent.

On 13 May, Eshkol announced Israel's determination to stop all Arab attempts at sabotage, to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open, and to resist all efforts to divert the Jordan water. Israel, he said, would choose the time, the place, and the means of countering the aggression.[8] At the same time General Itzhak Rabin, Israeli Chief of Staff, was quoted as having told a military audience that, as long as the current Syrian government continued in power in Damascus, the El Fatah raids could be expected to continue. This statement was interpreted by the Arab press as a threat to overthrow the Syrian government by force.[9] Whatever the intent of both statements,[10] the effect on the Arab world was electric, and the possibility of war between states backed by the rival superpowers became more real.

This increase in tension between Israel and the Arab states in the early part of May appears to have been fostered to some degree by Moscow.[11] During this period the Soviet ambassador

6. Charles W. Yost, 'The Arab–Israeli War: How it Began', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, no. 2 (January 1968), p. 307.

7. ibid., p. 308.

8. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 14; *A Select Chronology* . . . , p. 22.

9. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 14.

10. ibid., p. 15. The authors contend that Eshkol was under domestic pressure, having made too many concessions to the letter of the armistice agreements in planning the annual national day being held for the first time in six years in Jerusalem.

11. Benjamin Shwadron, 'Soviet Posture in the Middle East', *Current History*, December 1967, p. 331, maintains that 'the crisis was and still is in reality a struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States for positions in the Middle East'.

in Tel Aviv reported that Israeli forces were mobilized on the Syrian border, but he declined two invitations from the Israeli government to inspect the border.[12] On 19 May the UN Secretary-General, commenting to the Security Council on the alleged troop movements, reported that UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) observers had no evidence of troop concentrations on either side of the line. In a later speech (on 22 May), however, Nasser recalled: 'On May 13 we received accurate information that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border huge armed forces of about 11 to 13 brigades.'[13]

The effect of Soviet charges that Syria was about to be invaded increased pressure on Nasser to make a strong demonstration of support for Syria. On 16 May a state of emergency was declared for the Egyptian armed forces.[14] Egyptian troops were moved up to the Sinai border, and the Egyptian chief of staff requested the UNEF commander to withdraw from points along the eastern border.

On receiving this news from the commander, the Secretary-General informed the UAR representative to the United Nations that such a request could be made only by the UAR government to the Secretary-General, that a temporary or partial withdrawal was unacceptable because UNEF could not be asked to stand aside to enable the two sides to resume fighting, that the UAR had the right to withdraw its consent for the presence of the force; and that a request for temporary or partial withdrawal would be considered tantamount to a request for the complete withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai.

On the following day, 17 May, Egyptian troops began to move into and beyond some UNEF positions. The Secretary-General consulted with the seven countries providing UNEF contingents,[15] two of which, India and Yugoslavia, insisted that Egypt's request

12. ibid., p. 331. This sequence of events is described also by Yost, op. cit., pp. 308–9, and by Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 16.

13. *A Select Chronology . . .*, p. 132.

14. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 16.

15. Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.

must be respected promptly. On 18 May, the Secretary-General received the formal Egyptian request for withdrawal and referred it to the UNEF Advisory Committee. Yugoslavia and India again urged prompt withdrawal; others wanted to play for time. None apparently suggested requesting a meeting of the General Assembly.[16] The Secretary-General, having raised with Israel the possibility of stationing the force on Israeli territory and having been rebuffed, complied with the UAR request and began pulling UNEF units back.

The Secretary-General's action in rapidly withdrawing UNEF from Gaza, the Israeli–Egyptian border, and Sharm el Sheikh has been and probably will continue to be a matter of controversy. Few challenge the basic legal principle that UNEF was on Egyptian territory with Egyptian consent – and only so long as Egypt consented. The issue is rather whether there were not delaying devices the Secretary-General could have used to allow time for local passions to cool. Many of those most critical of U Thant's actions argue that, at a minimum, he should have consulted the General Assembly (as had been anticipated when UNEF was established)[17] or the Security Council. Even if these bodies had endorsed the Secretary-General's view, the reasoning goes, some few precious days might have been gained. Against this view some practical arguments have been advanced – primarily the Yugoslav and Indian determination to withdraw their units anyway – perhaps even before a General Assembly or Security Council determination could have been made. Also it is argued that the action of Egyptian commanders in virtually expelling UNEF from some of its posts gave U Thant no real alternative.[18]

The issue is complicated by differences over what Nasser's real intentions and expectations were. The former US Ambassador to the UN, Charles W. Yost, argues that the actions taken by Egyptian commanders, which forced U Thant's hand, were not authorized by Cairo. He further suggests that Nasser may not

16. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 19.
17. See above, p. 195.
18. This is argued in Howard and Hunter, op. cit., pp. 18–19.

have intended the UNEF units at Sharm el Sheikh to be withdrawn, but only those along the Israeli–Egyptian front.[19]

Regardless of what version of intentions and expectations is accurate, the withdrawal of UNEF left Israeli and Egyptian forces face to face in Sinai for the first time in ten years. It also placed Egyptian forces at Sharm el Sheikh, in a position to reimpose the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt was under considerable pressure to take this step, particularly from its radical Arab allies, notably Syria, who had consistently advocated militant action against Israel and seized every opportunity to taunt Nasser for not being as vigorous in anti-Zionist action as he was in words.

On 22 May, following limited mobilization of reserves by Israel and Egypt, Nasser declared the Gulf of Aqaba once again closed to all Israeli goods and ships. Israel had, as noted earlier, consistently asserted that it would regard such a step as intolerable. The Israeli port of Elath had become more important commercially to Israel since 1956, and, perhaps more important, the future industrial development of the Negev depended on this outlet. There can be little question, therefore, that Nasser knew his action would be regarded as a grave challenge.

The reaction in the Arab world was immediate. Nasser regained the stature he had lost by his earlier failure to take vigorous action after Israeli raids against Jordan and Syria. Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan pledged troops for the coming showdown. Overnight, intra-Arab quarrels were submerged. Yet, on 2 June, Nasser was telling foreign diplomats he had no intentions of initiating war.[20]

It is not clear what role the Soviet Union played in these events. Some analysts regard it as probable that the Soviets were consulted about troop deployments and UNEF withdrawal but not about the blockade.[21] Others contend that the Soviets not only

19. Yost, op. cit., pp. 313–14. 20. ibid., p. 317.

21. ibid., p. 315. The author quotes 'reliable Soviet sources' to this effect. The Soviet Union had never endorsed Egypt's legal arguments concerning the Gulf of Aqaba because of its own reliance on narrow exits from the Baltic and Black Seas; Howard and Hunter, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

expected the blockade but also expected the United States to prevail on Israel to acquiesce in it.[22] The Soviet Union warned on 23 May that any aggression in the Middle East would be met with strong opposition from the Soviet Union[23] and on 24 May opposed convening the UN Security Council.

The crucial questions now were how much support the United States would give Israel and how much it could, in any event, restrain Israeli activists. It will be recalled that in 1957 the United States had made quite explicit assurances on the freedom of passage through the strait; Eshkol now publicly demanded that these obligations be honoured. He also made clear that, unless the Western powers acted, Israel would.[24]

The United States, mired in Vietnam, and Britain, whose shaky economy could not readily withstand a withdrawal of Arab sterling balances and interruption of oil supplies,[25] cast about for support from other maritime powers to resolve the issue of the strait. Not only was support lacking, but the notion of concerted action by the maritime powers triggered a strong emotional reaction to 'Western imperialism' among the Arabs.

By the end of May it was clear that any forceful action to remove the blockade would have to be taken by Israel alone. But the United States had warned that US support was dependent on Israel not taking initiative on its own.[26] To accept the *fait accompli*, however, would undermine the whole philosophy of Israeli security. Meanwhile, seven Egyptian divisions were moving into Sinai. Even more significant, on 30 May King Hussein of Jordan appeared in Cairo to sign a defence pact with Nasser. This immediately raised the prospect of Egyptian or Iraqi troops being stationed among the volatile Palestinians in Jordan's West Bank, an event the Israeli high command had long judged to be as serious a threat as the closing of the Strait of Tiran.[27]

Domestically, confidence in the Eshkol government sank rapidly

22. Shwadron, op. cit., p. 333.
23. *A Select Chronology . . .*, p. 23.
24. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 21.
25. ibid. 26. ibid., p. 26. 27. ibid., p. 25.

as the Egyptian build-up continued. On 1 June General Moshe Dayan, a hero of the Suez war, and two opposition leaders joined the cabinet. The Dayan appointment to the defence ministry was received warmly at home and widely interpreted abroad as a sign the government had resolved on war.[28] By 4 June US displeasure should Israel be the first to resort to force was the only deterrent left.[29]

The Arab–Israeli Conflict
PHASE III$_3$
5–10 June 1967

At eight forty-five a.m. Cairo time on 5 June 1967 the Israeli air force struck Egypt's major air bases, destroying in minutes the powerful air arm with which the Soviet Union had equipped Nasser. As soon as planes were freed from their assignment in Egypt, similar raids effectively took out the Iraqi and Syrian air forces (also largely Soviet-supplied) and the air force of Jordan (largely British-supplied, with US endorsement). Israel claimed, in figures widely regarded as accurate, to have destroyed 'for certain 286 Egyptian, 52 Syrian, 27 Jordanian, and 9 Iraqi aircraft and claimed a further 34 probabilities.'[30]

The air attack against Egypt was followed immediately by an armoured attack on Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Here Israel had set three main tasks: to destroy the fighting force of the Egyptian army; to establish Israeli forces at Sharm el Sheikh; and to ensure this position by occupying the Sinai Peninsula.

As soon as news of the fighting reached the rest of the world

28. ibid., p. 26. 29. ibid., p. 27.

30. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 31. It is assumed that these figures represent mainly combat aircraft, because there were no subsequent offensive air strikes by the Arabs against Israel. In the case of Egypt it is likely that only a little over three hundred of the jet combat aircraft were operational, and of these the Israelis concentrated their early attacks on the Tu-16s, Il-28s, MiG-21s, and MiG-19s.

Premier Alexei Kosygin in Moscow employed the 'hot line' to assure President Johnson in Washington that the Soviet Union did not intend to commit its forces in the Middle East, and that it was in the interest of international peace that a cease-fire be reached as quickly as possible. This means of direct communication between Moscow and Washington was used several times in the course of the week to convey assurances of military neutrality.[31]

The United Nations Security Council met in an emergency session. While there was unanimous desire for a cease-fire, there was no agreement on the conditions under which it should take place. The Soviet Union and India demanded that Israel withdraw to its original position of 4 June, while the United States and Britain called for an unconditional in-place cease-fire. The major powers in the Security Council failed to compromise these opposing views at the 5 June meeting.

The Arab countries greeted the start of the war with exhortations to the public to seek the long-awaited revenge on Israel. Their governments were quick to declare war; after the UAR, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Sudan, and Algeria followed suit. Lebanon apparently sent a flight of three jet fighters along the Israeli border, but quickly withdrew when one of them was shot down.

Soon after the ground attack on Egypt was launched, Israel's prime minister, through the chief of staff of UNTSO, sent assurances to King Hussein of Jordan that Israel did not intend to make any land advances on Jordan so long as Jordan refrained from any serious military action against Israel. Jordan, however, began shelling targets in Israel within a few hours of the initial Israeli attack on Egypt.

There was further evidence of Israeli reluctance to open battle

31. *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 June 1967. Another occasion during the fighting when the 'hot line' was employed, this time on US initiative, was when Israeli aircraft attacked the USS *Liberty*, a communications ship with the US Sixth Fleet. Washington wanted to reassure Moscow that US air and naval activity was directed toward relieving the *Liberty* and not toward involvement in the fighting.

with Jordan on 5 June. The chief of staff of UNTSO called for a cease-fire for twelve o'clock local time, to which both Jordan and Israel agreed. Sporadic fire, however, continued from Jordan after the deadline; a second cease-fire was proposed for one thirty and again accepted by both sides. Jordanian artillery fire increased over Jerusalem, Mt Scopus, and Tel Aviv, with no retaliation from Israeli forces. At one thirty, Jordanian troops occupied Government House (UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem), and, soon after, Israeli and Jordanian troops began to exchange fire.[32]

At two thirty local time on Monday afternoon, Israeli ground forces were ordered to attack Jordan. During the afternoon and the night, two Israeli brigades fought their way around Jerusalem to the south and to the north, while an armoured force advanced north to Ramallah. By the next morning, 6 June, Jordan's main defences on the West Bank had crumbled.

Meanwhile in Sinai three Israeli divisional groups[33] had fought through the night to break the first line of Egyptian defences in the Gaza Strip, at El Arish, Abu Ageila, and Gebel Libni. Tuesday 6 June, was spent largely in mopping up and regrouping for the assault on the second line of Egyptian defences in Sinai.

On 6 June Nasser and Hussein accused the United States and Britain of lending air support to Israel. The charges were promptly denied by both Washington and London – and subsequently rescinded by Hussein – but reaction in the Arab world was sharp. Nasser broke diplomatic relations with the United States[34] and other Arab states followed suit. Oil flow and deliveries were interrupted. And, despite the falseness of the charges, the certainty is likely to persist in many Arabs' minds.[35]

32. *The New York Times*, 6 June 1967, p. 17.

33. Numerically weaker than the Egyptians, but with an equal amount of armour. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 35.

34. Relations with the United Kingdom had been broken earlier over the Rhodesian issue.

35. The Soviet Union, which was undoubtedly tracking US and British air and sea activity in the area, never joined in the Arab charges on this score.

On Tuesday 6 June the Soviet Union abandoned its insistence on withdrawal of Israeli forces as a condition for a cease-fire and the Security Council quickly called for an unconditional cease-fire. As the magnitude of the Israeli victory became more obvious, it was clearly more in the Arabs' interests to stop the Israeli advances as rapidly as possible, before the situation deteriorated even further.[36]

Israel agreed to comply with the cease-fire resolution if other parties also complied. Syria, whose forces had as yet confined themselves to shelling Israeli border settlements, rejected the request, as did Iraq. Egypt did not reply. Only Jordan, aware of its impending defeat on the West Bank, accepted the appeal from the Security Council. Israel, apparently reluctant to end the fighting with Jordan before certain objectives had been achieved,[37] noted that such an agreement with Jordan would have doubtful validity because Jordanian forces were under the nominal command of Egypt.

It seems clear that Israel built its military plans around the political assumption that world opinion, acting through the United Nations, would try to bring the fighting to a stop as rapidly as possible. Every major power stood to lose by continued instability in this volatile area. And, despite the cautious approach both the Soviet Union and the United States were taking in the hostilities, the danger always existed that events would get out of hand and drag them both in. One account – the best analysis yet to appear on the 1967 war – sums up the picture this way:

Although the sympathy of the Western world had not, on the whole,

36. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 31. These authors go on to suggest that Israel deliberately delayed release of information about its successes in order to accomplish just this delay.

37. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 38. King Hussein apparently had similar misgivings about Israel's intentions, for he told the United Nations later, 'I should like to state here for the record that Jordan complied immediately with the United Nations request for a cease-fire, but it was forced to continue the fight because Israel, although it had agreed to the cease-fire, obeyed it only when it had accomplished its predetermined objectives'. *The New York Times*, 27 June 1967.

been forfeited by Israel's apparent action in striking the first blow, it was not likely to extend to any blatant violation of a cease-fire resolution by the United Nations. Support from public opinion in the United States, so long as no American involvement was required, was overwhelmingly strong – so strong that Mr Dean Rusk felt it necessary to soften the statement of one of his officials that the United States was 'neutral in thought, word, and deed' by explaining that neutrality was a concept in international law which did not imply indifference. But for Britain, much as she sympathized with the Israeli cause, the prospect of prolonged conflict in the Middle East, with all that this implied for her relations with the Arab world, was intensely disagreeable. The French Government, to the fury of most articulate French public opinion, reaffirmed its position of glacial neutrality; while the Soviet Union could only view the humiliation of her clients in the Arab world with alarm and despondency.[38]

The Egyptian government, while beginning to realize the full magnitude of the defeat of its armed forces, continued to report to its people devastating UAR victories over Israel's forces. Charges of British and US collusion with Israel were continued.[39] The Egyptian diplomatic offensive became more agitated with each new Israeli advance. British consulates were burned, oil supplies were cut off, diplomatic relations were broken, and the harangues against Israel by Arab supporters in the United Nations became more and more heated.

On Wednesday 7 June the Soviet Union sponsored a stronger motion in the Security Council, *demanding* that the 'governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 20.00 hours GMT [Greenwich Mean Time] on 7 June 1967'; the motion received unanimous support.[40] Apparently this was the signal to Israel that it must now act with all remaining strength to gain its desired military objectives. In Jordan, Israeli forces were told to take the Old City of Jerusalem, with the warning that: 'We are already being pressed for a cease-

38. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 37.

39. Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill: *The Six-Day War*, (London: Heinemann and Penguin Books; 1967), pp. 159–61.

40. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 38.

fire. . . . don't let the Old City remain an enclave.'[41] By Wednesday evening Jerusalem and the entire West Bank of the Jordan River had been taken by Israel, and the war with Jordan was over.

On the Sinai front, Egyptian forces bowed to defeat in the north. As they retreated south-west toward the Suez Canal they were ambushed by Israeli armour at Nakhl, Gafgafa, and the Mitla Pass. Meanwhile, on Wednesday Egyptian forces had abandoned Sharm el Sheikh; the Israeli paratroop and naval-assault force that landed there two hours later met with no resistance.[42]

On Thursday afternoon and evening (8 June) Egyptian forces in Sinai suffered their final defeats. Nasser finally accepted the UN demand for a cease-fire on Thursday evening. By the time the cease-fire went into effect on Friday morning, Israeli forces were on the eastern side of the Suez Canal.

For the first three days of the war – after the initial Israeli attacks on the Syrian and other air forces – land action had been confined to the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts. Syrian artillery had shelled Israeli territory from the outset, but Israeli responses had only been defensive. An imminent change was signalled when, on Thursday morning, June 8, Israel launched a heavy air attack on Syrian emplacements in the hills along the border.

There is said to have been 'great pressure' to launch an assault against Syria on 8 June, 'before the Syrians could take advantage of the United Nations' demand for a cease-fire.'[43] And, indeed, the Syrian government did accept the cease-fire. At the appointed hour there may have been a lull in Syrian artillery fire and in Israeli air raids, but neither side appears to have been amenable to the idea of the cease-fire.

41. Churchill and Churchill, op. cit., p. 139. There seems to be general agreement on this point. 'By the morning of Wednesday the 7th the two Israeli pincers had almost closed round the Old City, and General Dayan ordered them to seize it before the ceasefire agreement reached at the United Nations the previous evening could come into effect.' Howard and Hunter, op. cit., pp. 33–5.

42. Churchill and Churchill, op. cit., p. 165.

43. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 39.

Who broke the cease-fire is impossible to say. Undoubtedly the Israelis were itching to get at the Syrians and would have regarded it as a most unsatisfactory end to the campaign if they had been stopped by the bell, since it was the Syrians who were in a large measure responsible for the situation which had led to the outbreak of war. Equally the Syrian Army, still feeling secure in its lines of bunkers and gun emplacements, saw no reason why it should obey the call for a cease-fire from New York or even from its own Government in Damascus.[44]

At eleven thirty a.m. on 9 June Israeli ground forces began their assault on the Syrian Heights, which, before bombardment by the Israeli air force, had been fortified with 265 guns, including the latest in Soviet artillery, and some 200 anti-aircraft guns. For years the Syrians had been building underground bunkers and emplacements, impervious even to 500- and 1,000-pound bombs. These defences extended in from the Israeli–Syrian border for more than ten miles. The Israelis suffered heavy casualties in taking the first line of these defences on Friday.

At the United Nations the Syrian representative endeavoured through Saturday morning (10 June) to convince the Security Council that Israel should be forced to accept the cease-fire. It may have been to reinforce their plea in the UN that Damascus Radio announced early Saturday morning that Qnaitra, headquarters of the Syrian army and the only major town between the border and Damascus, had fallen. With this, the Syrian troops holding out against the Israeli forces collapsed and fled.[45] It is likely that, had the Syrian army not disintegrated on Saturday morning, it could have taken weeks for Israel to break through the defences in the Syrian Heights.[46] Qnaitra actually did not fall on Saturday afternoon when the first Israeli forces arrived at two thirty. The cease-fire came into effect within hours, on Saturday afternoon, 10 June.

44. Churchill and Churchill, op. cit., p. 185.

45. The Israeli air force also claims some responsibility for the Syrian exodus on Saturday morning. Israeli aircraft had been pounding the Syrian bunkers non-stop, every ten minutes, for two days.

46. Howard and Hunter, op. cit., p. 39.

Thus, in a single morning's air strikes, Israel had eliminated the air forces of its chief local adversaries: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. With full control of the air ensured, in four days it had routed Egypt's forces from Sinai and reached the Suez Canal; in one and a half days of heavy fighting it had defeated Jordanian forces in Jerusalem and the West Bank; and, after a day's aerial bombardment, in two days it had scaled the heavily defended Syrian Heights.

The Arab–Israeli Conflict

PHASE IV_3

From 10 June 1967

Israel's military defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria left it in occupation of vast areas of Arab land – including, in Gaza and the West Bank – thousands of Arabs, many of them refugees from earlier rounds of fighting. Militarily, the new geographic shape of the country gives it a more readily defensible position. It remains to be seen whether a new and lasting peace can be constructed after the June 1967 war – peace that eluded the Middle East after the 1948 and 1956 wars.

Summary of Control Measures

In summary form, the key conflict-control measures in these cases might have been the following (an asterisk indicates that the measure was actually taken):

The Arab–Israeli Conflict

PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN 1956

Settlement of the underlying disputes on borders, refugees, waters, etc.,
With help of:
Unified pressures by the United Nations, great powers, and other external suppliers.

Readmission by Israel of symbolic numbers of refugees and compensation of others with international financial help.
Resettlement of refugees with international help.
Threat of unified Suez Canal boycott by users.
Threat of military action by maritime and air powers to reinforce rights.*
Retention of third-party troops for deterrence and intelligence,
Or:
Expanded international presence.
More effective identification, verification, and condemnation of raids and reprisals.
Joint or third-party border patrols backed by strong international support and sanctions.
Physical sealing of the Israeli border, with permission only to admit the United Nations.
Condemnation of propaganda warfare,
Accompanied by:
Increase in flow of UN broadcasts,
With aid of:
Strengthened UN information activity with satellite facilities.
Agreements among suppliers to restrict sale of arms to states likely to be engaged in conflict.
Enforcement of border guarantees.
Manipulation of and involvement in internal affairs.

PREVENTING THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN 1967

As before:
Settlement of the underlying dispute; above all, acceptance of Israel's right as a state to exist, also the substantive issues of waterways, borders, refugees, Jordan waters, etc.
Readmission by Israel of symbolic numbers of refugees and compensation of others with international financial help.
Resettlement of refugees with international help.
Retention of third-party (UN) troops for deterrence and intelligence.*
Threat of military action by maritime powers to reinforce rights.
More effective international identification, verification, and condemnation of raids and reprisals.*
Agreements among suppliers to restrict sale of arms to states likely to be engaged in conflict.
Internally, Israeli multi-racial policy; and Arab search for other bases for unity than hatred of Israel.

In addition:
Pressure on Soviets to abandon influence-seeking policies in area.
US willingness to abandon partiality for Israel,
And:
US impartiality among Arab factions,
Necessitating:
Distinguishing better between nationalist and Communist forces.
Credible US willingness to intervene to back its commitments, preferably through UN but unilaterally if necessary.
Extension of UN forces to other (i.e. Syrian and Jordanian) borders.
Overcoming Security Council veto in order to apply even-handed justice to complaints from both sides; i.e. recourse to General Assembly before war.
Reiteration of previous UN resolutions about free use of Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba.
Further development of technological and other substitutes for Middle Eastern oil* and river waters – nuclear-energy and desalination plants, etc.
Distractions of Egyptian army.*
Assistance to Egypt particularly in national-defence planning and improved intelligence.
A courageous and inventive UN Secretary-General.

TERMINATING RESUMED HOSTILITIES IN 1967
Maintenance of local military balance at lowest possible level, keeping destabilizing weapons out of area,
Or:
Overwhelming advantage to one side.*
Threat of great-power involvement.
Absence of nihilistic goals, or international pressure to keep them limited.
'Hot line' equivalents between local adversaries – through neutral embassy, press service, etc.

The British–French–Egyptian (Suez) Conflict

KEEPING THE DISPUTE NON-MILITARY
Development of strategic substitutes for oil and land bases:
nuclear energy,
long-range air-lift capabilities,
sea-based and land-based missile alternatives,
relocation of canal routes.

International régime for vital waterways.
Recognition of sense of regional identity and independence.
Support of popular régimes.
Encouragement of constructive internal and regional developmental goals.*
Strengthening of internal political, social, and economic fabric.
Multilateralizing of significant aspects of economic assistance.
Agreement by third parties to abstain from special privileges or exacerbation of local quarrels.

PREVENTING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Encouragement of internal opposition to war-makers.
Candid explanation of parties' aims and limits of their intentions.
Compromise, good offices, negotiations – all accompanied by guarantees.
Abandonment of overseas colonies.
Elimination of foreign bases.

MODERATING/TERMINATING HOSTILITIES

Early and credible super-power and UN deterrent threats.*
Balancing of arms in region.
Restraining agreements among external arms suppliers.
US–Soviet convergence of interests.*
Stand-by UN peace-keeping force,*
With:
Contingency plans for rapid recruitment and deployment.

10

Lessons for Conflict Control from the Five Conflicts

In Chapter 3, in describing our research on fourteen of the fifty-four post-World War II conflicts, we dealt with total numbers of control measures that we found applicable; these measures were interesting in the way they distributed themselves along the dynamic course of conflict and among different types of policy actions. *How these measures could actually have been applied* was, however, partly obscure. Let us make this 'How' more concrete by looking at what our five illustrative local-conflict cases in this volume may have to suggest to *today's* policy makers.

The five cases illustrate some widely different kinds of conflict-control issues that have confronted the United States and equally varied US responses to them. In Iran in the 1940s, for example, the Soviet Union fomented a conflict in which US interest grew as its perceptions of Soviet policy changed. But in those opening days of the Cold War the US role was indirect and low-key. Toward Cuba two decades later, on the other hand, the United States cast itself in the role of conflict fomentor, seeking to oust a régime in Cuba that seemed to have come increasingly under Soviet domination.

Toward Greece in the late 1940s, against a background of deepening Cold War, the United States became heavily committed to the struggle against an insurgency that was ultimately dominated by Greek Communists and exploited by neighbouring Communist states for their own national and ideological purposes. The parallels with Vietnam in recent years are striking, but with the very important distinction that US forces were not directly committed to the fighting in Greece.

The Indonesian war of independence illustrated a fast-vanishing variety of conflicts – war against a colonial power. But it was not of only historic interest. Many of the features of this four-year war are found in conflicts fought for other goals. And, more important, although colonialism in its nineteenth-century manifestation may be nearing extinction, other, less overt, forms of domination still persist. Moreover, moves toward expansion continue to occur – sometimes with the victims of past colonial domination now acting the role of 'imperialist'. The US stance during the largest part of the Indonesian conflict was that of the neutral good-officer. In the end, however, the US brought to bear its powerful political and economic influence on one of the parties – the Dutch – and moved the conflict rapidly from bloodshed to settlement.

Both the US and Soviets have taken ambivalent postures in the cluster of conflicts that have racked the Middle East for twenty years. The area is a rich prize in the super-power competition for influence; each has developed implicit commitments to local adversaries over whom it nevertheless has little control once local passions are loosed. Each has actively contributed to the deepening of the total conflict. But, in large part because of this deep involvement, each becomes an active peace-maker if fighting starts – until the guns are silenced and partial, competitive interests once again prevail. In the 1956 Suez part of the tragedy the United States found its interests further imperilled when its closest allies, Britain and France, became active participants in a brief but dangerous Middle Eastern war.

The remainder of this chapter consists of the general policy inferences our method enabled us to elicit from each of the five cases analysed.

The Soviet–Iranian Conflict: Lessons for Conflict Control[1]

Controlling the Conflict

Once portions of Iran were occupied by Soviet troops during World War II the time for preventive measures had been passed. Under the circumstances, controlling the hostilities that broke out in 1945 would have meant, in the first instance, keeping the dispute non-military, and then, in subsequent stages, preventing the Tudeh party from offering tempting prospects for Moscow, deterring the Soviets from directly intervening, and ending the fighting quickly once it broke out.

Keeping the Dispute Non-military

The first transition in 1941 from dispute to conflict was brought about by the creation of a foreign military presence in Iran that became the prime cause of the later outbreak of hostilities. To have prevented this pre-condition for 1945–6 would have required that there be no such presence in the first place. More fundamentally, if there had been no World War II, and therefore no strategic need for foreign military presence, no pressures making the dispute military in nature would have been created.

The above seems obvious and even trite. Yet once the larger pressures are set in motion – World War II, Cold War, thermonuclear arms race, imperialist drive, or whatever – powerful forces are at work to generate local conflicts. It goes without saying that most contemporary conflicts have to be dealt with within the framework supplied by the larger strategic scene. But, whether anyone feels they are beyond change or not, it is wholesome to keep in mind that a list of conflict-control measures, to be comprehensive, must begin by addressing itself to these larger causative factors.

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troops might still have been avoided by a policy measure of neutralization of Iran, which would have required an international agreement. This kind of policy is possible and may be increasingly valuable. In modern times an international agreement in 1955 neutralized Austria. It may turn out to be important to neutralize the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Agreements to forgo spheres of influence for the benefits of lessened conflict may appeal increasingly to the Soviet Union, and the United States should give high priority to seeking agreements for what might be called 'spheres of abstention'.

If nuclear-fuelled power had been available in 1941 the pressure for oil access would have been lessened. The same would have been true later in Iran in the Mossadegh crisis, and in the Suez war of 1956. Technical developments such as alternative energy sources might help to remove major areas of the Middle East from great-power contention. Similarly, as demonstrated later in Europe, long range air-lift capability, had it been available, could have obviated the need to station ground forces on Iranian soil. Perhaps this capacity will lighten the future US load in Asia. At any rate, alternative energy sources and long-range air-lift capability illustrate the conflict-control pay-offs that come from technology.

If local weakness creates – as it did in Iran – a dangerous vacuum tempting others to intervene, the relevant conflict-prevention activities call for strengthening the internal social, political and security fabric of the country. If, nevertheless, outside help is required to restore law and order, etc., troops from relatively disinterested countries are obviously preferable to those with direct interests; the UN Congo operation in 1960–64 rested on this eminently sound principle. For the future, this suggests a most important continuing reason to favour multilateral rather than unilateral military presences when such action is required.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

Accepting the fact of foreign (Soviet) military presence in Iran

during World War II, the next question will be: what actions would have been relevant to avoiding what in fact happened? If one wished, for whatever reason (fear of intensification, pre-occupation elsewhere, etc.), to prevent such a potential conflict situation from exploding into violence, what would have been required?

Apart from the central requirement of a stronger and healthier Iran, relevant counter-pressures would have included, first, a potent countervailing force that by presence and believed intention would have deterred a power such as the Soviet Union from believing that its take-over attempt could be pursued with impunity. In this case, US and British power in the area, backing up clearly expressed Allied opposition, would have fitted the need.

Second, international jurisdiction of the issue could have introduced the whole array of pacific-settlement modalities, many of which were in fact involved later. International (and later UN) cognizance would have spotlighted the Soviet role and bought time by 'stand still' agreements and diplomatic delays. Above all, it could have reinforced existing non-intervention agreements concerning Iran by providing for fact-finding, inspection, border-watching, guarantees, and, conceivably, sanctions. A combination of US and UN pressures might have encouraged Moscow even further to minimize and conceal its role.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

Special problems arise when one considers the implications of a determined conflict-suppression policy after the fighting broke out in Azerbaijan. To have stopped the fighting at that point, given the relative position of the sides at that moment, clearly would have meant victory for the pro-Soviet faction. To have avoided such victory would have meant the necessity of enhancing the pressures for intensification of the conflict or for at least its continuation. Put differently, the factors that the United States would presumably have favoured in the pre-hostilities phase would, once fighting started, all have tended to keep it going and

intensify it, since the anti-Soviet side would then have seen to it that Moscow's puppets did not bring off a quick victory.

For analytical purposes let us assume, however, that an ending of hostilities was favoured *despite* Soviet advantages that would come from this. The following policy measures would by this logic have been involved in the suppression of the conflict: assuring the rebels' clear-cut military superiority on the ground; introducing third-party (Soviet) backing with armed forces on the ground; keeping the country disunited; not taking treaty commitments seriously; reducing the availability of a counter-force in the area. (Clearly, if the result were to be Communist penetration or take-over the United States would be unlikely to favour policy activities aimed at this kind of conflict suppression. An exception might be made if profound danger of super-power intensification were involved.)

It will be noticed that the measures cited are precisely those the United States would favour (and has favoured), *mutatis mutandis*, in a situation where US interest is focused on 'our' winning a conflict or on overturning a hostile régime. The above list reads plausibly if one imagines it for Cuba in 1961 instead of for Iran in 1945. The factors needed to ensure local victory of pro-Soviet factions in Iran were precisely those necessary to the victory of pro-Western factions in Cuba. It is currently absurd to think of taking such actions in any purposeful way in the name of conflict control, but, analytically, they represent the policy activities that might have been needed to fulfil the theoretical requirement of *terminating hostilities quickly*.

Preventing the Resumption of Hostilities

Following the termination of the first hostilities phase of the Iranian conflict, the external and internal situations both began to change, and some of the policy activities that were needed – and lacking – earlier came into play. With the end of World War II, US and British policy began to run explicitly counter to Moscow. And Iran took its case to the United Nations. The

strongest offsets to renewed hostilities in Iran lay in making US contingent threats more explicit and upgrading the specificity of UN actions in terms of more substantive resolutions, a UN presence, the threat of sanctions, etc.

It should be understood that actions which were taken to deter Soviet intrusion during the first Phase IV by raising the stakes and the potential cost to Moscow would also by definition have had the effect of making it a bigger war if it broke out again. Of course, the expectation would be that such a threat would serve as a deterrent to resumption of hostilities. This relationship is a tricky one, but very important to keeping the peace. The threat of fearful consequences is supposed to deter. But if deterrence fails, the results can be worse than if a lesser deterrent had been used in the first place. Moreover, it could be that the Soviets had no intention of resuming hostilities even if the deterrent had been lessened. If the level of future hostilities had been limited in advance by local-arms limitations or reductions, this would not have necessarily promoted the resumption of hostilities.

Can the conflict controller have it both ways – limiting possible renewed hostilities by cutting down arms, while deterring possible resumption of hostilities by raising the stakes (increasing arms to Iran, pressures on the Soviet Union, etc.)? It would seem that trying to inhibit the resumption of hostilities by threatening heightened retaliation cannot easily be accompanied by arms-control measures. The only way to reconcile this anomaly would be to have the deterrent threat centre on strong international machinery, or in any event on some type of collective-security action, thus not being wholly dependent on local-arms levels. This would then be consistent with local and even international arms limitations.

In the sub-phases of Phase IV, when the issue was whether hostilities would resume and if so at what scale, or whether the dispute would be settled, the success of a conflict-inhibiting policy would have perhaps been advanced by further limited and non-vital Iranian concessions to the Soviet Union, along with ways for Moscow to believe it might achieve influence without fighting.

The latter is an extremely dicey game, and many play it badly (although Nasser and Tito at times have done it well). To be too soft invites unexpected responses from a third party (e.g. the United States in Laos in 1960 and 1961) with sudden unpleasant prospects for intensification. Thus, conflict control cannot always mean *any* action designed to avoid conflict, but must take into account the critical limits of policies of appeasement, coalition, concession, and even disarmament, beyond which a backlash is set up leading to potentially worse intensifications.

During the period (Phase IV_1 Sub-Phase D) of the Iranian conflict when Soviet troops had withdrawn just across the borders, more could have been done to secure the Iranian frontiers, including UN observation and patrol activities.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

When the second round of fighting began, it was in part caused by the success of the Iranian government in establishing its writ. (Earlier it had been Tehran's weakness that created conflict out of the Tudeh party's relative strength.) In fact this was not a conflict the United States would have wished to control by freezing the positions of government and rebels in order to inhibit the resumption of hostilities. The danger of future conflict may be far greater if a rebel movement is left untouched than if it is defeated; obvious examples, each illustrating a different side of the point, are Katanga province in the Congo and the Kurds in Iraq.

Once hostilities were resumed in Iran, however, their continuation might have led to serious intensification in the form of reintroduced Soviet troops. They were, in fact, quickly terminated, due to policy measures not applied earlier, such as making Iran stronger, and the abstention from the conflict by the Soviets.

Settling the Dispute

To enhance settlement of a dispute such as this one the key once more is in a strong and cohesive polity for the country in question.

In this case the strengthened Iranian government discouraged further Soviet adventurism. But, as a general rule, it may not always be true that measures directed against dissident groups at home will necessarily minimize the chances of violence. Internal health is one thing. But repressive policies, unless accompanied by total social controls as in Communist countries, lead often to new and more widespread political revolution (cf. 1776, 1789, 1848, not to mention more contemporary instances such as those in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Ghana).

The Bay of Pigs: Lessons for Conflict Control[2]

In many ways the Bay of Pigs was a mirror image of the situation in Iran in 1946. In the background was a wider conflict of which this case was merely one sector or front. The invariant factor of proximity to a super-power was paramount in both cases, and nothing could be done to change it. (Neighbouring great powers and super-powers do not *have* to intervene in the frequently irritating local politics of lesser states, however: India [if we consider it a weaker power] is certainly a case in point, where massive intervention might not have been surprising but has not been attempted, any more than it has been attempted in recent years by China in Outer Mongolia or by the United States in Mexico during its periods of turbulence.)

In the cases of both Iran and the Bay of Pigs the neighbouring super-power fomented internal conflict through subversive guerrilla forces inside, besides training and introducing additional indigenous subversives from without. In both cases justification for intervention was found in historic precedents and frameworks – spheres-of-influence treaties in Iran, the Monroe doctrine in Cuba. In both instances current international law, including the

2. See Chapter 6 for the analysis from which these lessons were drawn.

UN Charter, expressly forbade the policies pursued by the super-powers. And in both instances the super-powers were unsuccessful in their aim of overthrowing the neighbouring régime.

Controlling the Conflict

Prevention, here as elsewhere, would have been the ideal form of conflict control. In this case prevention would have meant never permitting things in Cuba to reach a point where social, political, and economic revolution could be readily capitalized on – and completed – by Communist extremists.

This had to mean, in retrospect, action during the rule of the Batista régime to encourage peaceful internal change in Cuba – and elsewhere in Latin America – toward greater liberalization. In Cuba this would admittedly have meant painful preventive policy activities: economically painful steps involving US sugar policy, socially painful steps involving changing American attitudes toward darker-skinned neighbours, and politically painful steps involving disturbing the smooth and comfortable diplomatic waters of prolonged US coexistence with tyranny and reaction. None of this was really done in Cuba, and the conflict was not prevented.

Later, controlling would in fact have meant: not permitting the US–Castro dispute to become viewed in predominantly military terms by the United States; discouraging ourselves from actually exercising a military option, and, once the invasion began, quickly ending the fighting. Of the three, only the last was done, thanks largely to US mismanagement rather than to anything else.

Keeping the Dispute Non-military

To avoid what in fact happened the United States would have had to keep its general view of the Cuban situation political and defensive rather than military and offensive. Following a con-

tainment policy rather than an intervention policy – as the United States now does toward Cuba – would have satisfied this criterion. This policy is today part of the larger issue as to whether both the US and the Communists will accept continued stalemate or whether they will go over to the offensive. The answer is, generally speaking, up to the Communists. But US response will often determine what *kind* of conflict it is to be.

In this age the undesirably sharp edge of unilateral interventionist policy is often dulled when other powers are brought in, i.e. when a direct head-butting contest is 'multilateralized'. In anything but a direct military-security threat (as existed when Soviet missiles were secretly emplaced in Cuba in 1962) conflict is more likely to be controlled if, as a virtually automatic policy, unilateral quarrels are made multilateral. The Organization of American States and the United Nations are generally thought of as useful only to the extent that they support our side in such quarrels, but their principal value in 1961 might have been, *per contra*, to stay the US hand. If after such multilateral action Castro's propaganda were not then validated by US military intervention, such a policy might have done far more to undermine his régime than what in fact happened. The accompaniment of US abstinence would have had to be similar restraint by Moscow, toward which end the United States ought to have applied direct pressure.

OAS might have played a role that, while short of intervention, sufficiently appeared to be policing the region to obviate unilateral US invasion plans. This might have taken the form of prophylactic action against Castro's external subversion attempts by means of inspection and publicity, backed by believable deterrence plans plus some responsibility for training internal defence forces in the target countries. All of this would have increased the likelihood of adverse reactions to unilateral US intervention, as would have UN fact-finding machinery.

The irony of Cuba, and other places where anti-US régimes govern, is that general rules apply there as well as elsewhere. In Communist countries, to the extent there is internal political,

economic, and social health, opportunities for externally sponsored subversion are minimized, along with temptations to overthrow the government by force. (In fact, Cuba had greater internal cohesion than US intelligence estimated.) Happily, the same rule holds in the far greater number of places where non-Communist nations are struggling, often with US help, for cohesion and strength. But in these places too it will assist in averting conflict if the United States carefully limits its definition of strategic values while displaying less sensitivity to anti-Yankee sentiment.

Wholehearted and rigorous application of universal rules against unilateral intervention would be, in fact, greatly to the benefit of free nations and moreover would be supported by the growing majority of states that cherish their independence from intervention. Strengthening international organizations such as the UN and OAS would tend to reinforce this rule.

It was the US decision to arm Cuban exiles that signalled the implementation of a significant military option; a generally accepted ban on the clandestine training of exile forces for re-invasion of their homeland might have gone a long way toward conflict control. The United States has at various times considered itself disadvantaged if unable to train 'freedom fighters' to liberate Eastern Europe, Nationalist Chinese with the same mission toward the Chinese mainland, or Cuban exiles in Guatemala in 1960–61. In the event, none of these proved useful: the conflicts in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed that the United States was in fact unwilling to risk World War III by fomenting revolution in Eastern Europe; Chiang Kai-shek's forces have been leashed since 1950; and the Bay of Pigs turned out to be a self-defeating adventure, its net result to confirm Communist propaganda and unify Cuban opinion.

A practical conflict-control policy today would be one of US or international discouragement of the practice of subversion through exiles. With the whole experience of Communist-inspired subversion in hand it seems self-evident that the United States – and the cause of conflict control – would benefit from more universal application of rules against this kind of activity. In 1966

and in earlier years the UN General Assembly passed Soviet-sponsored resolutions against intervention, modified later by other resolutions to condemn the very kind of intervention that Communists practice. Rather than being considered purely hypocritical by Moscow and purely rhetorical by the US, these resolutions might be usefully implemented with international machinery. Furthermore, an international human-rights tribunal could hear grievances by individuals and groups that otherwise might have no outlet. A fact-finding agency could add pressure on 'host countries' to permit inspection by challenge and invitation in order to refute charges of preparations to intervene with exile forces. Most important the spotlight of publicity would help keep the potential intervener off balance – as the United States was in the Bay of Pigs, the British and French were in Suez, and the Soviets have been on several occasions in Eastern Europe.

Along these same lines, the handling of refugees and émigrés often has much to do with later conflict patterns. Three prime examples of such refugees are the Germans from the so-called 'lost territories' to the East, the Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan, and the Cubans in Miami. Sound preventive policy calls for encouraging wider dispersal of such groups.

Even though grave and ideologically unbridgeable problems existed between Cuba and the United States at the beginning of the 1960s, some issues – such as that of expropriation – might nevertheless have been fit subjects for international procedures of arbitration, conciliation, good offices, mediation, adjudication, etc. (In the issue of expropriation, US guarantees to private investors against losses due to expropriation might have been appropriate.) It would seem today that only countries enjoying fundamentally good relations tend to employ these procedures. This is absurd, since their value lies in isolating remediable issues from a context of potentially dangerous hostility. Unfortunately it appears weak to do so, which is undoubtedly why Britain and France would not hear of going to the International Court of

Justice in 1956 on the issue of compensation for the nationalization of the Suez Canal – and why the United States did not seriously think in these terms before the Bay of Pigs.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

The absence or failure of conflict-control policies in the first phase often has a cumulative effect, and it had one in this case. As the United States became more firmly committed, events could probably only have been diverted with strong and influential measures by the United Nations in the form of fact-finding, publicity, time-stretching diplomatic delays, channels of communications, good offices, and peaceful-settlement proceedings; by OAS in action also deterring unilateral US action; and by the Soviet Union in the form of effective deterrence. Even at a late stage in the pre-hostilities phase some dramatic change in the situation might have altered the conflict. Guatemala might have refused to serve as a base, particularly if determined efforts had been made for more cohesion in OAS. Great-power agreement about arms transfers could have promised to make the Cuban situation less open-ended and thus blunted the US thrust – instead, MiGs and pilots were to arrive imminently. And the US government would have had to be willing to reverse its covert policy and restrain the exile forces in training.

One vital factor making the conflict difficult to abort, once in motion, was the increasingly close Cuban tie to Moscow. This took a chiefly economic form but included arms assistance. Soviet assistance was less than that to Egypt, but this time it was going to a country ninety miles off the coast of Florida. For the United States, what was tolerable in Egypt became a potential *casus belli* in Cuba. Restrictions on arms transfers would today remove some of the inevitability from this kind of situation, since a foothold acquired by a great power all too frequently signals the beginning of an effort to arm the client state with sophisticated weapons that create new tensions in the client's regional neighbourhood. The Soviet Union has practised this mischievous policy in the

Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Indonesia, and Cuba. The United States, Britain, and France have created lesser local imbalances and instabilities (often in the name of stability) in Latin America and south Asia and have contributed to local arms races in the Middle East and elsewhere. An alternative to a universally agreed régime of restricting arms transfers to those arms needed for internal security[3] would be a US–Soviet–British–French agreement. Of course the same thing can sometimes be accomplished by direct and unlimited pressure to desist, exerted by one power on other. In 1962 the United States applied such pressure on Moscow in Cuba. Perhaps the United States would have been deterred by an all-out threat from Moscow the year before.

Terminating Hostilities

The key policy involved in ending the fighting in Cuba was US restraint in withholding its direct power even when 'its' forces were losing. A policy of victory could have been carried through, undoubtedly with local success (though with incalculable consequences for the US reputation in Latin America and elsewhere). Ironically, what caused the US reversal was the degree of effective internal control in Cuba, which, if realized before, might have discouraged even the attempt made at the Bay of Pigs.

'Peace' is currently preserved by a deeply rooted policy of restraint by both Washington and Moscow. This in turn stems from a now mutual general strategic deterrence. Clearly a fundamental conflict-control policy is to continue at all costs a situation of deterrence, specifically a secure second-strike retaliatory capability under all conditions, unless and until it can be substituted for by a workable and just structure of disarmament and world order. At the same time the relative numbers and sizes of US and Soviet strategic forces could be substantially reduced and

3. *Regional Arms Control Arrangements for developing Areas*, Report for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Cambridge: MIT Center for International Studies; September 1964), pp. ix–27.

still maintain the deterrent situation with both its global and local benefits.

The Greek Insurgency: Lessons for Conflict Control[4]

Controlling the Conflict

Controlling the Greek conflict – like that in Vietnam – would have meant: not allowing a Communist-led movement to dominate wartime resistance; not permitting civil war to break out, and also sealing off the country from external intervention through international-organization mechanisms; and bringing hostilities to an early end, through a combination of firm counter-insurgency measures and political, economic, and social reforms, particularly in the countryside, that would win popular support for moderate non-Communist rule (alternatively, the aim of early termination of hostilities could have been obtained by ensuring a rapid Communist victory – something we would hardly recommend).

Keeping the Dispute Non-military

Like so many other post-war conflicts, the Greek insurgency had its roots in great-power war and Communist organizing skill that enabled the party to take over control of wartime resistance movements. Short of avoiding great-power war, later political-ideological conflict may be averted by preventing Communist takeover of legitimate nationalist and patriotic resistance movements. This in turn implies the need for effective non-Communist organizations that can compete with an ELAS (*or* a Vietminh or Vietcong) for popular support in the 'sea' in which, in Maoist terms, insurgent 'fish' swim.

4. See Chapter 7 for the analysis from which these lessons were drawn.

The difficulties with this prescription – so important to US policy in the post-war era – are both obvious and chronic. The chief difficulty is ideological: the tendency for the non-Communist left to share many Marxist ideas and thus alienate powerful supporters of anti-Communism, such as the United States, and the tendency of the anti-Communist right to represent unpopular forces of wealth, corruption, landlordism, militarism, and, as in wartime Greece, monarchism. Given this common polarization of the political extremes, a strategy for the United States that could be both conflict controlling and 'winning' is recognition and support for popularly based non-Communist elements which work for stability and democratic reform, with eschewal of both blind support for unpopular *status-quo* powers and the romanticizing of what are in effect Communist take-over movements.

In wartime Greece this meant the desirability of active support of non-Communist resistance groups, notably EDES, plus pressure on the Greek government-in-exile to liberalize its composition, submit the question of monarchy to a popular vote, and generally appeal to popular sentiments while providing a democratic alternative. Strategic considerations that led to all-out Allied support for ELAS should have given equally high priority to avoid strengthening of political enemies and the creation of new post-war conflicts by shortsighted 'purely military' wartime policies.

As in so many wartime situations, stores of surplus arms (such as those from the Italian surrender as well as those from retreating Germans later) should be prevented from falling into the hands of potential conflict-makers (such as ELAS in Greece).

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

Impulses toward reform in an atmosphere of suspicion and conflict (such as the Greek King's agreement to a post-war plebiscite on constitutional questions – or elections in Vietnam) can benefit by being implemented in ways that lend them maximum

confidence, i.e. through neutral (UN, etc.) administration or supervision providing guarantees of fairness.

It is essential to convince radical take-over movements of two things: (1) that they will not be permitted to succeed in their ends through violence and (2) that there is a legitimate role they can play in the political process. Experience with Communist coalition governments is an unhappy one, particularly when the Communists remain convinced of the usefulness of violence and also when they are allowed to appear to retain a monopoly on popular issues of economic and social reform. Given this, the third essential ingredient for the success of political moderation is, of course, that described above: (3) support for popular non-Communist elements of genuine reform. These three factors are central to a successful strategy of internal conflict control. Today Vietnam and much of Latin America bespeak their relevance.

The element of deterrence and discouragement of radical-minority take-over requires clearly stated intentions on the part of the deterrer (which the British did not provide at first in Greece), plus the will and strength to carry them out. But that will is, of course, sapped when the action seems entirely repressive and anti-democratic. Thus – and the lesson is still not well learned by the hawks of the world – military power is only useful in counter-insurgency when harnessed to reform and popular consent, except in deceptively short-run terms.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

In the Athens round of fighting, Communist forces might have been more deterred by the threat of US intervention, as well as by diverting their attention to traditional Balkan rivalries such as that between Yugoslavia and Greece over Macedonia. (These, like all deterrents, are two-edged swords; as in the later full-scale insurgency a greatly expanded US presence might have tended to intensify hostilities, and an outbreak of inter-state hostilities over Macedonia would have been no improvement.)

Acceleration of insurgent guerrilla action might be avoided by

discouraging diplomatic recognition of the insurgents and urging free elections under international supervision.

In Greece, as in many other contemporary cases, conflict control in the sense of violence-minimizing might have been achieved either by moderating hostilities – which might have allowed them to drag on – or by intensifying them with a view to a rapid end to the fighting. This trade-off represented one of the central dilemmas of Vietnam and has no easy answer. The crucial variables are probably the perceived danger of intensification versus the pressures of public opinion – both able to act in either direction.

Preventing the Resumption of Hostilities

Strong measures are required in an age of competitive intervention to keep internal wars from spreading across national frontiers. The provision of sanctuary and guerrilla training in Greece's northern neighbours of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria was countered by some international cognizance, investigation, fact-finding, and reporting. This international spotlight function was of great value in Greece (and in Korea) and might have played a deterrent role in Vietnam if the value of international-organization assistance had been recognized earlier, notably by the United States. The role of US and allied power in backing such multilateral action should include pressure on potential external mischief-makers not to intervene, backed by meaningful threats from the responsible powers.

Following the first round of fighting, further hostilities might have been inhibited in Greece by joint or impartial supervision, inspection, and control of the agreement by which ELAS was to disband, for ELAS in fact violated both the letter and spirit of the agreement by sending its hard-core cadres to the northern countries with a substantial number of arms.

As Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill so clearly recognized, a policy of reconciliation, even-handed justice, and incorporation of dissenters into legitimate modes of dissent is the only sound one to follow after victory in a bitter war, particularly

a war between brothers. Conflict-control strategy at Versailles in 1919 might have avoided a conflict-breeding punitive treaty. The Greek government of 1945, like other right-wing governments, tended to drive non-Communist leftists back into the Communist fold.

The economic distress that Greece was experiencing in late 1945 resembled that existing in such other conflict-prone situations as that of Germany in the early 1930s. Given the political-strategic-ideological position of Greece in 1945 (as of Korea in 1953, and of, say, Brazil or Indonesia in the late 1960s), conflict control indicated economic and financial assistance on a substantial scale. (In the contemporary cases perhaps multilateral means would be politically preferable.)

Vigorous internal-security operations to preserve law and order, particularly in villages and hamlets, are essential to conflict control; foreign military assistance is frequently needed to this end. Tactics designed to split Communist opposition and isolate the irreconcilable radicals are advisable, but these are made effective only if popular consent can be won through accommodations of legitimate political demands – or opposition suppressed with totalitarian measures. Moreover, repression should only follow efforts to encourage all political elements to employ the political process to pursue their programme.

There is no necessary reason why bilateral military assistance should preclude an international presence. Before major insurgency developed in Greece – as during the whole 1946–9 period – preventive international peace-keeping capability should have been introduced, going beyond fact-finding and, ideally, replacing British and later US forces with an international force interposed between adversaries and along the border.

One lesson of both Greece and Vietnam is that splits within the Communist world diminish the capacity of Communist movements to take over on the basis of unified external support. At the same time, the Sino–Soviet competition can mean rivalry to champion the indigenous Communists in various part of the world. This particular point remains moot.

The Indonesian War of Independence: Lessons for Conflict Control[5]

Controlling the Conflict

Controlling the Indonesian war of independence – i.e. avoiding or minimizing violence in the archipelago – in simple-minded terms would have meant preventing World War II, which provided the pre-conditions for it, or avoiding the even earlier Dutch colonialism and the subsequent independence impulse. This is obviously unrealistic, but it illustrates how fundamental were the roots of this conflict. In more realistic terms controlling the conflict meant: first, discouraging the Dutch from believing they could in fact take over again after having been evicted by the Japanese; second, enabling the Indonesians to win their independence quickly once fighting broke out or, alternatively, enabling the Dutch to carry out a quick and successful police action – in any event, stopping the fighting once it started; and, finally, keeping the parties from fighting again through diplomatic and military means of pressure. At all stages genuinely controlling this particular conflict meant making clear to all sides, but particularly to the Dutch, the eventual grounds for settling the dispute, namely independence for the former Netherlands East Indies.

Keeping the Dispute Non-military

The key element in the Indonesian war lay in colonialism and its obverse – anti-colonialism. In our vocabulary a dispute was inevitable. But the transition from dispute to conflict might have been avoided if the approaching end of European colonialism had been more visible in 1945 than it was. With adequate foresight, conflict-preventitive policy measures might have afforded constructive outlets for Dutch status-seeking impulses, finding surrogates for the Netherlands' dying empire. In the late 1960s

5. See Chapter 8 for the analysis from which these lessons were drawn.

a widespread understanding exists about the inevitability of decolonization. But there is still a need for economic and spiritual alternatives to the colonialist and imperialist impulse. Ironically, in the years ahead the chief would-be imperialists may be found outside the white Western world. One had already had glimpses of an imperialist urge, however impotent, in contemporary China, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Ghana, and the UAR. Remedial policy prescriptions might take such forms as: first, deterrence and the courage to stop expansionism; second, the encouragement of regional associations, common-market schemes, and co-operation in economic and social development, in a kind of neo-William Jamesian substitute for neo-empire. Unbridled nationalism is still – as it was – the prime enemy. As for such 'imperialism' as is found in some investment and trade policies of developed countries, answers may be found in enlightened governmental aid and trade philosophies, plus support for more rational mechanisms to resolve fundamental problems of foreign investment, commodity marketing, and balance of payments. Seemingly remote from conflict-control, these are in fact central to it.

The most operational conflict-control lesson to be derived from the Indonesian war turns on the problem of serious misconceptions that may lead parties to blunder into conflict. In the Indonesian case the need was for reliable information about the situation to be conveyed to both parties. Given the dispute, a third-party presence able to undertake this sort of fact-finding could have been of great value, above all preventively if brought in before fighting broke out.

Part of any post-war planning ought to deal with the matter of collecting arms suddenly found to be in surplus. The presence and availability of arms in large quantities may have made the difference in turning the Indonesian dispute into a militarily flavoured conflict situation. In this case Japanese arms were available in quantity to the Indonesian nationalists. (Note also that the Chinese Communists took over Japanese arms left in Manchuria in 1945, with epochal results.) And the other side of the coin was the use by returning Dutch colonial masters of Allied-

supplied military *matériel* originally intended for use against the Japanese. The history of military-assistance programmes has often been one of undesirable use of arms by metropolitan countries against their colonies and by neighbours against each other. The United States should continually re-examine its military assistance programme in the light of what use has, in fact, been made of the arms supplied.

Above all else, machinery for peaceful change should have played a crucial role in this case. One still important form of peaceful change involves the relatively bloodless and equitable alteration of the legal and political status of territories.[6] In the post-war years the former Italian colonies, some French, British, Australian, and New Zealand colonies, Trieste, West New Guinea, and Austria represent the only major examples of peaceful change. The Palestine experience was a mixed one; and there has been no real effort to deal with Kashmir equitably. It might be helpful, as suggested by a number of observers, for an equity tribunal to deal in a semi-juridical fashion – yet within the context of the UN political machinery – with thorny territorial issues.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

Here, as in other cases, internal cohesion and stability on the part of governmental authorities were pre-conditions for asserting sufficient control over a local situation to prevent the actual outbreak of hostilities in a tense period. Historically, it would only have postponed inevitable conflict if the Dutch had been adequately strong; the realistic conflict-controlling need was for a strong *Indonesian* authority. But, whether Dutch or Indonesian, such an authority *was* necessary if the conflict were to be kept isolated and dissident groups disarmed. This point has been since underscored by the widely varying experiences of newly

6. Lincoln P. Bloomfield: *Evolution or Revolution? The United Nations and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1957).

independent governments; the Congo in 1960 was an extreme example of insufficiency on the part of such a government.

History is full of situations in which a legitimate authority seeks to apply or restore its writ in a territory and encounters serious opposition. Consequences arise out of efforts by the authority to suppress such opposition or out of efforts by outsiders to help either the government or the rebels. Examples are: 1945 – Iran, Indonesia; 1950–54 – the Nationalist Chinese in Burma; 1960 – the Bay of Pigs; and 1965 – the Dominican Republic. The best policy instrument to keep such an explosive situation from producing open hostilities takes the form of preventive interposition by neutral or third-party forces between the parties. This has, in fact, never been done preventively but only after some bloodshed and the threat of major military action. Next best would be pre-hostilities fact-finding on the spot; it is sobering to consider what political and even strategic value a more viable international presence of this sort in Vietnam, reporting to the entire world community, might have had during the early years of infiltration from the north. The essential element for this sort of pacificatory strategy is of course neutrality between the parties. In the Indonesian situation the mediatory instruments and agents introduced into the scene were not always perceived as completely neutral. (A parallel of this in more recent times is found in the behaviour of the members of the then Casablanca bloc of African states who put troops in the UN Congo operation but then acted disruptively and non-neutrally.)

Once fighting is terminated, to prevent it from breaking out again the cease-fire that has been achieved must be made firm, with guarantees that it will not be easily breached. Diplomatic recognition as a form of legitimization and stabilization of the *de facto* situation can be a useful means toward this end, particularly if accompanied with time-stretching diplomatic devices. A buffer force similar to the 1956–67 UN Emergency Force in Egypt, put on the ground to monitor a cease-fire, could have been very helpful in Indonesia, along with continuous pressures to negotiate. *Per contra*, unsupervised truces can be positive sources

of tension by creating incidents that can lead to resumed hostilities. One of the most serious problems of the times is the stubborn refusal of the Communists in Laos, Vietnam, and Korea to accept adequate truce supervision on their territories. The same thing can be said of Israel.

During a pause in long-standing conflict situations (such as in Kashmir on two occasions and in the Middle East on three) the parties often use the time to replenish their military stocks in order to arm for the next round. There is room in such a pause for redressing military imbalances, either through arming and training of the weaker side, or through mutual arms-control agreements. The effect of arming the weaker side can be either conflict controlling or not, depending on such factors as the rate of arming, the possibility of surprise attack, or the availability of 'break-through' weapons.

This represents a complex problem. For deterrence purposes arms balances are desirable. If hostilities *do* break out in balanced situations, however, they may be prolonged to the extent that neither side can win a quick victory. Another defect of the parity policy is that if it does not rest on agreement among suppliers it can lead to the introduction of major sophisticated weapons systems. Such systems will raise the level of violence and risk of intensification if deterrence fails. In addition to keeping the local balance at low levels, external guarantees with sanctions are needed to reinsure deterrence in seeing that the arms are not in fact used. The ideal would be a general agreement keeping arms levels substantially low. As long as this is not possible, one might consider imposing quarantines against the importation of destabilizing arms into the general area of a given conflict when it is acute in order to insulate it from possible exacerbation. (Paragraph 3 of the Suez cease-fire resolution of 1956[7] aimed at precisely this.) In this general connexion, the very notion of mutual deterrence means that information about the arms balance is in many ways as important as the arms themselves, perhaps more important. This is another major reason why the United Nations should be

7. UN General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-1).

required to publish information on world-wide military establishments and inventories, arms transfers, and arms trade.[8]

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

It was only after the fighting broke out again in Indonesia, in July 1947, that UN pressure began to become positively strong, vigorously backed by the United States. Two very important instruments for both moderating and eventually terminating the conflict were adequate machinery on the ground and influential great-power involvement carrying the implied threat of meaningful sanction. It hardly seems necessary to reiterate the need to strengthen the United Nations' capacity to back up its peace-keeping capabilities with peaceful-change mechanisms, emphasis on arbitration measures regarding alleged violations, and the threat of sanctions. These were by no means perfect in 1947, for a third round of fighting was yet to break out. They seem if anything less perfect today.

The pressures for terminating the fighting might have been reinforced with sterner economic measures on the part of external powers in a position so to influence matters.

The Indonesian second round particularly suggested the desirability of having available specialized truce-supervision machinery for situations of guerrilla warfare. This problem has never been thoroughly analysed, but Vietnam could be a crucial customer for this sort of capability, as might also parts of the Arab–Israeli confrontation. This special problem surely belongs on the agenda of needed operational research in the realm of peace-keeping.

The involvement of US citizens in the peace-making machinery that was available during the Indonesian fighting implied the involvement of the prestige of the United States and its implicit commitment to control of the conflict. Moscow was similarly involved in late 1965 in the Kashmir conflict. This involvement can only be healthy, since international-organization machinery

8. As recommended in *Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas*, pp. ix–28.

itself is meaningful only with substantial great-power support. The argument is not for the presence of super-power military units in multilateral peace-keeping exercises (although changing US–Soviet relations may make that contingency less undesirable), but for the lending of their prestige to peace-making efforts through their service as guarantors and influential brokers.

It should not escape notice that if the super-power stand-off tends to allow lesser conflicts to flourish, a brooding Cold War or other global-level threat can have the reverse effect of suppressing local conflict. Ironically, it can be speculated that an even more aggressive Soviet foreign policy in December 1948 might have stayed the Dutch hand from the second round in Indonesia by requiring it to focus on Europe. Similarly, it might have intensified the desire of the Allies to see early control of a dangerous situation where the great powers might potentially become entangled. The interaction between super-power relations and local conflicts represents one of the major sets of trade-offs in conflict control. But while the last argument is a serious one, an optimum conflict-control policy would call for super-power *co-operation* above all other policy considerations. Not only would this bring maximum pressure for settlement on local parties, control the flow of arms to both sides, and ensure the mobilization of UN machinery; but also, above all, it would remove that which makes failure in conflict control so potentially disastrous – the possibility of intensification to the great-power nuclear arena.

Conflict in the Middle East: Lessons for Conflict Control[9]

Controlling the Conflict

The Suez–Sinai war of 1956 represented a convergence of two otherwise distinct conflicts – the protracted Arab–Israeli cold war

9. See Chapter 9 for the analysis from which these lessons were drawn.

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and the British–French quarrel with Nasser. To control the first would have meant, realistically, to seal off a highly inflammable and volatile substance and keep it from bursting into flame, or, alternatively, to break a deadly ten-year cycle of wars. To control the second would have meant lessening the strategic importance of the Suez Canal, arbitrating the canal issue after its seizure, maintaining sufficient rationality in London and Paris to preclude a punitive-war policy and deterring their action up to the moment it took place.

THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT

Preventing the Resumption of Hostilities

It goes without saying that movement toward the settlement of the underlying dispute would have been the best means of preventing resumed hostilities. In theory this would have involved action on fundamental substantive issues such as borders, resettlement of refugees, and their compensation. Toward this end one could, again theoretically, envisage unified pressure by the United Nations, the great powers, and other suppliers of external economic and military assistance. Even given the intractability of the conflict, perhaps if the Soviets had sufficiently shared Western anxiety to the point of co-operating by not introducing destabilizing arms and not trying to frustrate UN diplomacy, this might have inhibited the renewed outbreak of hostilities in 1956 or at least limited their potential scale and scope.

Given the profound, deep-seated basis for the Arab–Israeli quarrel it is unknown if even unified great-power pressure would have forced the Arabs toward settlement, i.e. acceptance of Israel's continued existence. It is not even certain that such pressure could have succeeded in forcing one of the basic pre-conditions for such Arab reversal, i.e. Israeli agreement to repatriation and/or substantial compensation of Arab refugees. Nevertheless, some action might have been open to outsiders to make the resumption of hostilities less likely. Intense pressures on Israel

might have resulted, even at this late stage, in readmission of at least a symbolic number of Arab refugees and compensation of others, particularly if international financial help were available. The pressure of international help on the Arab states might have brought about a start on resettlement of refugees, although this is more doubtful.

The threat of a unified boycott on the part of the Suez Canal users might have moved Egypt from its refusal to permit Israel's shipping through the canal. The Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran might have been countered with the threat of military action by the maritime powers to enforce their right of free access to international waterways, and by airways users to force open a closed international air space.

Retention of British troops in the Suez Canal area might have served as a deterrent to aggression as well as a source of international intelligence about warlike preparations. If, for political reasons, British forces had had to leave the region, one possible surrogate for them might have been an expanded international presence to fill the vacuum. As for the existing UN truce supervision in the area, the United Nations was not as effective as it ought to have been in identifying, verifying, and condemning the *fedayin* raids or in following through on condemnation of Israel's Gaza incursions in reprisal. As a preventitive of this kind of activity the 1956 UNEF border watch was one war too late, so to speak. The clearly indicated preventive measure, both with respect to the raids and to the subsequent Israeli attack across the Sinai, would have been joint or third-party border patrols backed by strong international support and sanctions.

In this connexion there was really no substitute (nor is there today) for sealing the border. Greater pressure ought to have been put on Israel to permit the United Nations within its boundaries. The United Nations should have physically sealed the border with barbed wire, ditches, etc. on all the land boundaries of Israel. The moats of the Middle Ages were effective, as would have been the 'McNamara electronic barrier' in Vietnam, if it had ever been really implemented.

Propaganda warfare by Radio Cairo ought to have been severely condemned as violating a variety of UN resolutions about incitement to war. This should have been accompanied by efforts to increase the flow of factual information within the area, preferably by UN news broadcasts. This is also a good argument for considering a substantial strengthening of all UN information facilities, preferably with its own communications satellite facilities, in order to reach a maximum world-wide audience and to counter the sort of inflammatory propaganda in which Radio Cairo and others specialized.

The Soviet arms deal and the US attempt to create an anti-Soviet alliance in the 'northern tier' of Middle Eastern states (the former being a response to the latter) were also contributing background factors. Perhaps the chances are better today for a Soviet policy of restraint; but China may move in as a destabilizing factor as soon as it is able to. We place priority, however, on agreements among suppliers to restrict the sale of arms to states engaged in conflict. Perhaps more weight would attach to seeking such agreements if they were seen as one of the truly crucial problems of our times for which a high price should be paid, if need be, and high risk run to enforce.[10] If none of these measures was possible the 1950 tripartite guarantee of borders needed to be enforced impartially and effectively.

The governments on both sides of the Arab–Israeli conflict contributed to the acceleration of the slide toward renewed hostilities. Whatever private assurances both adversaries gave to the United States and other parties, the public posture of both was increasingly belligerent and intransigent. Perhaps manipulation of and involvement in the domestic affairs of both governments could have affected the personalities that eventually led both sides over the brink.

Practically all the above measures were relevant *after* the 1956 fighting and throughout the period leading up to the third round of hostilities in June of 1967. Perhaps the most depressing feature

10. Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, 'Arms Control and the Developing Countries', *World Politics*, October 1965.

of this lugubrious – and bloody – cycle is that the prescription for conflict control for the latest period seems to be the same as before.

In retrospect the 1967 hostilities suggest, however, some additional measures that might have been used for preventing the resumption of hostilities. Perhaps the most crucial of these continue to lie within the range of US–Soviet diplomacy, above all the kind of price the former is willing to pay to persuade Moscow to abandon its conflict-breeding policies of influence and incursion into an area that would be best neutralized. But to keep the Cold War out of the Middle East requires an American willingness to abandon its own policy of obvious preference for Israel's side in all regional quarrels; US impartiality among the Arab factions, notably an end to the traditional, oil-based policy of favouring the monarchies and sheikhdoms at the expense of the more nationalistic or republicanized Arab states, is necessary. This requires a better American ability to distinguish genuine nationalism, however radical, from Communism, an ability notably lacking when the so-called Eisenhower doctrine was formulated in early 1957.

A conflict-prevention-oriented US policy would at the same time connect up far more coherently than in the recent past its commitments and its capabilities, plus its willingness to act. A credible American willingness to intervene without delay, preferably through UN frameworks but if necessarily unilaterally, in the event of overt Arab armed aggression, might have deterred both Nasser from precipitating the crisis by evicting UNEF and closing the Strait of Tiran, and Israel from launching a blitz attack on the basis of still-ambiguous evidence.

The UN performance in the Middle East during the 1956–67 period was distinctly mixed, and decreasing attention was paid to settlement possibilities – although the UNEF presence was worth its weight in gold while it lasted. A better conflict-control strategy would have demanded extending UNEF to the Jordanian and Syrian borders as the price for entertaining the chronic complaints of both sides. It would have made a much greater and more public issue of mobilizing UNTSO plus whatever *ad hoc*

shifting sands of the Yemen desert. The 1967 war followed the recent partial repatriation to Egypt of those 40,000 or so men. Other distractions might be invented by those interested in keeping expansionist or irredentist powers from being able to carry out their threatening rhetoric.

However impractical such advice may seem, politically, at a given moment, it would have assisted conflict control if Israel had been moving toward a secular state in which the Arabs already in residence there could have envisioned full integration and if Arab leaders discovered other bases for pan-Arab unity than implacable hatred of Israel.

A special kind of conflict-control measure comes from the capacity to make rational, soundly informed judgements about the costs of attaining national goals with existing capabilities. It might have altered Nasser's plans if he had had professional assistance in appraising the relative balance of forces in the Middle East. Similarly, better UAR intelligence might have discredited the Soviet-sponsored reports of Israelis massing along the Syrian frontier.

A UN Secretary-General willing to act courageously and independently – as Hammarskjöld on occasion did in the face of possible criticism – might have temporized when Nasser demanded the immediate withdrawal of UNEF, even though some of his UN troops were defecting, in order to buy at least twenty-four hours in which international diplomatic pressures could have been brought to bear before the situation became irretrievable.

Terminating Resumed Hostilities

According to all our findings it would have contributed to less intense hostilities if previously the military balance in the Middle East had been maintained at the lowest possible level, and if destabilizing weapons had been kept out of the area. At the same time the quickest road to termination would have been an overwhelming advantage on one side, which may suggest the desirability of such weapons in the inventory of one side. The difficulty

with this prescription is precisely that it makes hostilities more likely, because the disadvantaged side feels it must act before the other is ready to use its weapons efficiently. Great-power arms produced the worst of both worlds.

In the same spirit, the possibility of great-power involvement which our research – and intuition – proclaims to be generally a conflict-intensifying factor, can also act as a deterrent to prolonged local warfare and as a positive inducement to termination.

General conditions favouring early termination or, in any event, moderation throughout hostilities include the absence of irrationally nihilistic goals and the presence of pressures on the parties, particularly by the UN, to keep their goals limited. In this connexion Jordan's commitment to join in battle if the UAR were involved was unrealistic, and it warranted being discouraged.

The misreading of one another's intentions, not to say capabilities, was more acute in this case than in many others, perhaps because of the mischievous role of Moscow as *tertius gaudens*. It might help to find devices that can be set up in a hurry for quick communications to clarify intentions preferably before hostilities, but in any event as soon as they start. If Moscow and Washington can communicate for this purpose, so can other adversaries. Here perhaps a do-it-yourself 'hot line' can be made available when needed by a neutral embassy, news service, etc.

THE BRITISH–FRENCH–EGYPTIAN CONFLICT

Keeping the Dispute Non-military

The basic strategic aims involved in the Suez–Sinai war of 1956 could have been changed by developing strategic substitutes more appropriate to a post-imperial and post-colonial era. The need for alternative energy sources for oil might have called forth more aggressive development of nuclear energy. There might have been further efforts to develop: long-range air-lift capabilities, sea-based and land-based long-range missile alternatives to foreign

land bases; relocation of canal routes; and international régimes for vital waterways. These are policy measures that still have relevance to some of the strategic needs and political possibilities of the present.

Basic Western political strategy in the Middle East was, in retrospect, faulty – both the strategy of Britain in Egypt and France *vis-à-vis* Algeria (for which France came to blame Nasser and thus acquire a strong desire to overthrow him). This all gave to Soviet policy ready ways in which to exploit the situation. The combination of a traditional pattern of cultivating friendly relations among aristocratic feudal rulers and the attempt to tie them publicly to anti-Communist Western treaties seems guaranteed to excite negative popular passions in an age of resurgent nationalism. A preferred strategy would be the recognition of a sense of regional identity and independence and a policy that favours popularly supported régimes.

A major component of such a policy is to encourage constructive internal – and regional – development goals, while helping to strengthen the internal political, social, and economic fabric of a country to enable it to resist external blandishments and penetration attempts. In this connexion, the effects of Secretary Dulles's cut-off aid to Egypt for the Aswan High Dam – which in turn was a reaction to Nasser's blackmail attempts – seems a powerful argument for multilateralizing significant aspects of external economic assistance. Such a programme might even diminish the lure of a local demagogue by depriving him of identifiable 'foreign devils'.

Post-war US policy in such regions as the Middle East has tended to accept rules of the game that take as given the existence of non-popular régimes. The vicious conflict-cycle often moves from there to a supportive policy involving the offering of arms to stave off threats to unpopular local rule. The unhappy experiences of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union (and perhaps even China one day) rationally suggest the value of a serious agreement among all external influences to abstain from securing special privileges or exacerbating local

quarrels – a reforming Open Door policy, backed by penalties, that would equalize the non-intervention of external states. It is difficult to think of a general approach that is more likely to be favoured by the people who live in the countries concerned.

Preventing the Outbreak of Hostilities

The only thing more dangerous than forgetting the lessons of history is to misremember them. To Anthony Eden and Christian Pineau, Nasser was Hitler reincarnate – just as to some today Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh are Hitler's contemporary facsimiles. With his political brilliance the danger of appeasing Nasser was not to be minimized. In retrospect, however, a greater evil was created by a Bourbon mentality blinded to the genuine forces of change that Nasser represented despite his charisma and demagogy. Given all this, the opposition to Eden, Pineau, and Ben Gurion should have been strongly – if clandestinely – encouraged with the aim of either removing them from office or discrediting their militaristic policies.

Although the United States tried to act as a peace-maker, arbitrator, and inventor of time-stretching devices, US diplomacy in fact contributed to the outbreak of the hostilities. For if all the other parties were made myopic by various cultural and character defects of their own, they themselves came to believe that the US secretary of state was in fact misleading them and moving the situation from one ambiguity to another – to the point where US credibility and, consequently, influence had virtually vanished. The results of the Dulles style would seem to suggest that some rather different qualities – chiefly candour in making explicit one's aims as well as the limits to one's intentions – might have helped to prevent catastrophic diplomatic miscalculations. Given candour in a case such as Suez the US refusal to countenance a forceful solution could have been believed and thus have served as the deterrent it was intended to be.

A strong case can be made that, if Secretary Dulles had been less certain of his personal diplomatic style, some possible avenues

to peaceful settlement might have opened up. For example, at one stage during the summer of 1956 the UAR gave indications that portions of the contested issues might be open to adjudication, perhaps by the International Court of Justice. Dulles chose to ignore the signal, as well as other possibilities that might have involved multilateralizing the essentially Western front against Nasser. US diplomacy – as well as world peace – was thus deprived of the help of important existing diplomatic agencies and tools of action. In retrospect Britain and France went through the pre-invasion UN exercise of October 1956 purely *pro forma*; but the United States even then could have done more to reinforce the efforts of the UN secretary-general. In retrospect, good offices, negotiations, compromise, and international guarantees of any resulting agreement would have been an infinitely preferable road to the one followed.

The capacity of powers to make mischief for others is normally a function of the physical leverage they possess. Nasser straddled a vital Western artery that under international law represented in Western terms a 'servitude' (*mot juste* for the Egyptian sentiments). Britain's ability to launch a fundamentally irrational assault was improved because it still had an imperial base in Cyprus. With full recognition that in some cases such bases are needed for self-defence or for protection of friends or allies, in principle the sooner overseas colonies are abandoned and foreign bases eliminated, the sooner some classic stimuli to conflict will have been lessened.

Typically, the Soviet intervention threats in Suez became thoroughly vocal and explicit only after the first really dangerous stage of the crisis had passed. Ironically, it might have been a helpful deterrent if Moscow had made its threats both early and credible.

Moderating/Terminating Hostilities

The British–French ultimatum, ostensibly aimed at halting hostilities, in effect broadened the war. More pointed deterrent threats

by the great powers and the United Nations might have been useful, particularly if a UN force had been sent in promptly.

In retrospect, however likely renewed Israeli–Egyptian warfare may have been, its intensity was clearly increased by both the fact and the threat of growing stocks of arms supplies in the region – most particularly by Soviet-supplied aircraft in the hands of the UAR. A balancing policy (such as the United States had been following) would have sought to increase Israel's anti-aircraft defences. But a more fundamental conflict-controlling policy would have pursued high-priority agreements for restraint among suppliers to the Middle East.

US–Soviet convergence of interests continues to emerge as the prime conflict-control policy to be sought. Lacking that, it is then likely that the super-powers will act independently, and the US will need to make its own pressures felt before the conflict is worsened by such Soviet conflict-control moves as the threat of invasion in the Suez case, however hollow that threat. It was probably US pressure more than any other factor that turned the tide in this case, particularly US leverage at the moment of the run on the pound (generally acknowledged as having been the crucial turning point of the Suez conflict).

The second most potent agency for conflict control is the availability of UN machinery to give form and unity to pressures from states that it control conflict and also actually to create such conflict-control apparatus. Certainly the ability to create UNEF and to perform logistic miracles in fielding it provided both a pressure and a cover for a cease-fire and eventual withdrawal. Nothing could argue more eloquently for better stand-by peace-keeping capabilities or, at a minimum, for better developed contingency plans for rapid recruitment and deployment of the peace-keeping force.

Settling the Dispute

Terminating the Suez–Sinai hostilities and removing British and French troops both ended the British–French–Egyptian conflict

and settled the dispute over the canal. The measures to end the Arab–Israeli conflict – which end is certainly not in sight yet – are discussed in earlier sections.

With hindsight one can re-examine recent cases of local conflict and see multiple opportunities to prevent, contain, and terminate violence – opportunities that were clouded at the time by imperfect information and the need for speed. We readily acknowledge that looking back on past events equips one with perfect knowledge of the consequences of an act of omission – something the harassed policy-maker at the time can never hope to achieve.

But it is equally true that those in a position to exert a controlling influence in the direction of conflict control refrained from doing so, in some cases deliberately. They may, in fact, have been indifferent or even have directly or indirectly encouraged a conflict-promoting rather than a conflict-controlling course. From all the evidence it seems clear that the single most crucial element in controlling local conflicts is the way in which great powers such as the United States view their interests, and the will and imagination with which they pursue them.

Part Three

11

United States Interests

Does the United States have a general interest in eliminating or controlling conflicts in the developing regions of the world? The answer might be thought self-evident. But US interests can be interpreted in two strikingly different ways.

Perhaps the most common belief is that the United States, as an extraordinarily rich and strong power with a natural concern for international stability, ought to favour any reasonable means to stop conflict wherever it takes place despite whatever might be hoped to be gained by violence. The *status quo* probably suits this country as well as or better than any other nation in the world. In material and perhaps in political terms as well the United States has more to lose and less to gain from chaos, instability, and unpredictability than any other nation. By this reasoning it is clearly more consonant with US interests to attain US objectives by peaceful rather than by violent means. Logically, then, it is desirable that the numbers and effectiveness of non-violent means of achieving national objectives be increased and strengthened. The United States should thus be in the forefront in advocating policies aimed at stabilizing local situations and minimizing outbreaks of violence.

Other observers, however, seeking to define a general US attitude toward local conflict, arrive at a different conclusion. They do not rate US interest in minimizing violence as paramount or exclusive. In their view, based on over two decades of Cold War, the overriding US interest in the world derives from its role as a committed competitor. In the years after World War II when the Communist bloc appeared united, US interest lay in beating back

the onslaught of a globally based conspiracy. As the Communist world became visibly fractured, and competition among its fragments began to grow in the developing areas, US interest became defined as gaining victory over Communism, however fragmented, in that new arena; US interest in a particular conflict situation (or dispute threatening to become a conflict) was often to prevent a Communist take-over, to preserve an alliance system, or to sustain a reputation for reliable assistance to beleaguered friends. Therefore, in its starkest and most extreme form, the notion of a Pax Americana, far from being a conflict-control strategy in the sense of giving first priority to minimizing violence, has represented a militant forward strategy of intervention with a goal of political and military victory.

The nature of – and sources for – conflicting US interests can be seen more clearly by examining the US approach to some contemporary situations of local conflict. Few of the following statements were applicable before 1941, all have been generally true since that time, and most of them seem likely to continue to be valid; some are consistent one with the other, others represent deep-seated inner tensions within the US outlook that explain much of the confusion and malaise attendant on particular policy undertakings such as Vietnam.

(1) The lessons of the 1930s, indelibly imprinted in the minds of this generation of US policy-makers, call above all for discouraging armed aggression by nipping it in the bud.

(2) A generalized preference exists for an orderly international society in which differences are compromised by pacific means. But there is no effective world order able to enforce such a process. The fact that the United Nations cannot – and perhaps should not – act as a world government compounds American frustration.

(3) Recognition of the extreme dangers of resorting to nuclear weaponry encourages a strongly held desire to minimize violence and avoid conflict intensification that would involve the great powers.

(4) The sense of being in a continuing historic conflict with

various forms of Communism carries with it a willingness to employ unilateral force or to view some situations as irreconcilable – or some combination of both – when the United States believes that a major Communist advance would otherwise result.

(5) A profound conviction runs through all American history that the real revolutionary force in the world is the idea of human freedom and social justice. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it:

> What we are pursuing . . . is not a static concept. For, unlike the Communists, we really believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it.[1]

(6) Equally in the American tradition is a traditional antipathy to dictatorial or tyrannical régimes, although this antipathy is not always acted upon.

(7) A persistent – though not necessarily dominant – national tradition insists that once US forces are committed there is no substitute for military victory.

(8) A deep-seated desire for some form of isolation lingers, both as a residue of historic tradition and as a reaction to a growing sense of over-commitment abroad, fortified by the urgency of unsolved domestic problems.

The ways in which these ingredients interact to shape policy is not purely fortuitous. The bewildering rip-tides of contemporary US policy arise largely from the clash between traditional American political and moral sentiments and the realities of exercising power and asserting responsibility.

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Some significant patterns of national behaviour can be discerned in the recent record of US policy toward involvement in local conflicts. The most striking are those in which US military power has been substantially involved, directly or indirectly.

Of more than fifty local conflicts in the developing regions since 1945, US military power was directly or indirectly present in

1. Dean Rusk in a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, as cited in the *Department of State Bulletin*, 7 March 1966, p. 352.

twelve: the Greek insurgency of the late 1940s, which was abetted by three Communist neighbours to the north; the Chinese civil war that resulted in Mao's take-over in 1949; the Korean war of 1950–53; the US-sponsored overthrow of the left-wing Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954; Communist China's efforts to seize control of the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the middle 1950s; the Lebanon crisis of 1958, in which both the US Marines and the UN peace-keepers landed; the Congo collapse directly after independence in 1960, in which the United States backed up the United Nations and sent military missions several times to assist the Congolese government, evacuate whites, etc.; trouble and intervention in the Dominican Republic twice – in 1960, unrest under the dictator Trujillo in 1965, US intervention when Washington believed that internal crises seemed to be opening the door to power to local Communists; the Laotian civil war in 1960–62; the American-planned and -supplied assault landings at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961, when Castro's new government seemed to drift toward the Soviet orbit; and Vietnam.

When – as in some of these twelve local conflicts – US military forces have been *directly* and *openly* involved, special elements have certainly applied which grew out of the explicit commitment of US prestige, power, and public opinion. And especially in those cases there has been recurrent tension between the pressures for victory and those that recognized limited war as part of a continuing power struggle in this age. The problem was summed up long ago by Alexis de Tocqueville when he wrote: 'There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult – to begin a war and to end it.'

Clearly, the more numerous local-conflict situations have been those in which US military forces were *not* significantly involved, directly or indirectly. With regard to these the United States has acted in the main as a suppressor of local conflict rather than as a fomentor or participant. As a rule it has disapproved, discouraged, disfavoured, and sought to stop such conflicts, in general supporting what might be called a conflict-suppression

policy. The characteristic view was stated by President Johnson when he said:

Here in the United States we do not like violence. . . . We regard it as a manifestation of failure. . . . Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of failure. And so also in foreign policy. There, too, violence is one face of failure.[2]

In all cases, on the record the crucial variable factor inhibiting US willingness to manipulate rather than suppress both internal and inter-state conflicts has been and still is a perceived danger of great-power intensification. This is so both where the United States is relatively indifferent as to the outcome and where it is committed to victory for one side or the other. The point becomes clearer when one examines US policy toward the two broad types of conflict, inter-state and internal.[3]

The United States and Inter-State Conflicts

US interests toward local inter-state wars usually converge with international norms in favouring *conflict control*. The United States has generally supported preventive diplomatic efforts. Examples are: the 1947 and 1965 fighting between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; the Palestine wars, including the Suez conflict of 1956 and the 1967 outbreak; and the confrontation in the 1960s between Sukarno's Indonesia and Malaysia, despite the involvement of our British ally on the latter side. Day-to-day US diplomacy has often shown real concern, when US interests did not seem directly at stake, to settle disputes before they become serious, to suppress existing conflicts to the greatest extent possible, and to exercise maximum influence in terminating hostilities where actual violence has broken out.

2. President Johnson in a speech at Denver, Colorado, 26 August 1966, as cited in *The New York Times*, 27 August 1966.

3. A schematic representation of the propositions that follow may be found in Appendix D.

The United States frequently – far more often than its critics give it credit for – has itself pursued a central role in activities aimed at tranquillizing situations in the developing regions before they burst into unwanted violence. The role of US good offices in subduing the 1967 Cyprus flare-up and its role as mediator in the dispute between Britain and Guatemala over the ultimate disposition of the territory of Belize (British Honduras) are two examples out of many.

Typical of this thread in American policy was the doctrine of 'renunciation of the use of force' which the Eisenhower administration pursued with respect to other people's quarrels, such as that in Suez. Another relevant policy doctrine that persists to this day is one of discouraging any change in political boundaries through the use of violence, which in turn is an accompaniment of a still more generalized policy of opposing the use of military force to achieve political objectives.

In this spirit, the United States has consistently spoken in favour of arrangements of international law and order aimed at implementing and making general this conflict-control preference. It has vigorously supported the formulation of rules that condemn conflict-provoking and conflict-producing policies. It has pronounced in favour of prohibitions on the violent crossing of political boundaries. It has invariably supported UN resolutions condemning intervention – making certain that they equally condemned 'indirect aggression', such as subversion, terrorism, and the like.

The US approach is different where it feels that crucial interests are at stake; at least until recently the litmus-paper test has been the fear of major Soviet or Chinese advantage. In a few recent instances of inter-state wars one of the parties was a Communist state. US policy in that type of situation has been generally conditioned by the assumption that an in-place cease-fire will probably result in an unacceptable political and psychological, if not military, victory for Communism. Instances in the post-war years were the Soviet-sponsored uprising in Azerbaijan in northern Iran in 1946 and, for a long time, Vietnam – but not Korea.

The next key, however, tells how far the United States is prepared to go to implement its general policy preference. If there appears a genuine danger of direct confrontation between US and Soviet military power, both super-powers tend to place the avoidance of such intensification above all else. There are those who believe the US might not have pressed its British and French allies so exigently to desist in their attempt to overthrow Nasser in 1956 had it not been for fear that Moscow's threat to intervene might be real. In the October–November 1956 Hungarian revolution, viewed in part as a conflict between Hungary and the Soviet Union, United States unwillingness to intervene because it feared to risk a direct clash with the Soviets outweighed earlier conflict-producing impulses that went under the label of 'rollback' or 'liberalization'. This reality again conditioned US policy toward the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Thus, where there has been a serious perceived danger of possible nuclear intensification – as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia – the United States has opted for termination, UN condemnation, and non-intervention. In Quemoy–Matsu, as another example, the United States officially spoke, during the 1955 bombardment, of a negotiated settlement, even hinting at a possible turnover of the offshore islands if fighting were once terminated. (That there was no follow-up is beside the point.) While the United States was unwilling to be frightened off when the Vietcong appeared about to win a *de facto* victory in Vietnam in 1965, despite the bombing and increase in troop strength it generally fought a limited action, seeking with increasing seriousness ways to terminate the fighting.

Where no serious intensification danger was perceived a hard US line has usually persisted; e.g. Iran in 1946. But, if there is no danger of intensification, it does not of course necessarily follow that the US will intervene, any more than that danger of intensification will automatically preclude intervention if the United States feels sufficiently compelled to protect or promote its interests. What *can* be said is that, if there is no fear of intensification in situations where the United States regards important interests to be at stake, US intervention has been more likely.

There is some evidence that the 1970s may see much greater reluctance on the part of the United States to intervene *militarily* than has been true in the past – a trend that places a premium on the development of effective non-military conflict-control options.

If efforts to avoid hostilities fail, US policy choices have seemed to be guided by asking whether there will be a direct, major, and measurable Soviet or Chinese gain from suppression of the fighting. If there is no such direct Communist advantage US policy activity tends to work toward the earliest possible cease-fire, using the United Nations or regional organizations to help bring this about. Examples from recent history are the Indian–Pakistani warfare in Kashmir, the several outbreaks of Arab–Israeli warfare in the Middle East, a little-noticed conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Egyptian–Saudi Arabian tug-of-war over Yemen in the late 1960s.

In cases where the stakes seemed relatively low the United States has been more concerned with getting the fighting stopped than in dealing with the situations that generated it. It has usually hoped that procedures for peaceful settlement of disputes would then take over. But cease-fires are rarely made dependent on such solutions. Cases in recent history include the US effort in 1957 (but not in 1967) to get Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula after winning it and to get India and Pakistan to stop fighting in 1965. In both cases promises were implied of future justice for the claims involved; but, in fact, far less effort was invested in the pacific settlement of disputes than in the termination of hostilities.

The United States and Internal Conflicts

In the case of most internal wars US interests have been invariably derived from strategic concerns – regional security, US–Soviet–Chinese relations, modernization, etc. Rather than usually

being subordinate to conflict-control policy, American interests have tended to depend on pragmatic assessments of the probability of success, the accessibility of the area, and the felt need for US intervention. If Communist take-over does not appear to be a prime issue in internal conflicts the United States is not likely to perceive a primary US interest as to which faction wins, and favours ending the conflict. The Nigerian civil war is a case in point.

Even in the internal category a perhaps surprising American preference for stability and peace can be demonstrated. Before the outbreak of hostilities this takes the form of policy activities generally included under the heading of assistance and modernization programmes, combined with an increasing attention to preventive social policies that might be called 'counter-pre-insurgency'; the strategy of economic assistance to developing countries has always rested on a belief in evolutionary progress toward ultimate political stability and peaceful orientation. That the United States does not always or consistently act on its insights is not due to a lack of desire to stabilize (and ultimately free itself of responsibility for) the areas in question. It is rather due to a built-in confusion of competing objectives in a pluralistic society – and thus in the government. The United States has in the main vigorously espoused economic- and political-development measures to ward off Communism's appeal and, if necessary, measures aimed at countering Communist take-over attempts. It has consequently supported UN resolutions condemning intervention.

But the United States has also considered that it has a strong interest in the outcome of political changes in some parts of the world, particularly in neighbouring areas such as the Caribbean and Central America, an interest that could take precedence over conflict control. The United States is inevitably going to favour evolutionary change in much of the Communist world – Eastern Europe, Cuba, Communist Asia. And its commitment to the dynamic process of modernization throughout the under-developed regions is by definition a generator of new potential conflicts.

More pointed still, there were clearly internal situations with which the United States was unwilling to live, even at the cost of fomenting conflict. Obvious illustrations are Arbenz's Guatemala in 1954, Castro's Cuba in 1961, and Tshombe's Katanga by 1963. Other cases where a US conflict-generating impulse may have existed, although without overt action to support the impulse, were the Chinese Communists' crushing of the Tibetan revolt in 1959 and the situation in Trujillo's Dominican Republic in 1961.

After the outbreak of hostilities the United States characteristically recalculates the extent of its vital interests, if any, in the outcome. If no such vital interest is perceived – usually meaning in our times no perceived direct or primary Communist involvement – the US posture is one of non-intervention, the encouragement of pacification efforts, and a hope for reconciliation of contending factions. The United States may have views on the subject; but no significant commitment of blood or treasure to the outcome is to be looked for. Cases in point are numerous: Iraq's attempt in 1961 to take over Kuwait; the warfare in Cyprus, both in a colonial struggle against Britain in the mid 1950s and between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the mid 1960s; the 1950–54 Burmese–Taiwan dispute over Nationalist Chinese troops in Northern Burma; the insurgent movements in Costa Rica in 1947; the Mau Mau in Kenya; India from 1945 to 1948; and – one is required to add – Batista's Cuba and Trujillo's Dominican Republic, whatever distaste the US may have felt for (non-Communist) dictatorships.

If, on the other hand, the US feels it has a primary interest in which side wins, the US preference for victory for its side typically overrides contrary desires for cease-fire, reconciliation, coalition governments, etc. The US then seriously considers intervening with varying amounts of money, military hardware, and, in extreme situations, uniformed US forces. In every one of the following cases the issue, real or fancied, was Communist take-over: the Greek insurgency; the Venezuelan insurgency of the late 1950s and early 1960s; Laos; the Dominican Republic in 1965; the Bay

of Pigs; Guatemala; the Communist terrorist and guerrilla operations in Malaya over a ten-year period; the Congo in 1960; Colombia in 1960; Lebanon in 1958; the Burmese civil war after World War II; the insurgency movement of the Hukbalahaps (Huks) in the Philipines in the 1950s; and, of course, Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s.

In internal wars a primary key to American commitment is the degree of risk that might be involved in extending the fight in scope, scale, or time, rather than suppressing it. Dissatisfaction with the Eastern European *status quo* in the late 1940s and early 1950s led the United States to encourage expectations that many believe helped to foment the following major uprisings in our epoch: the June 1953 East German uprising; the Poznan riots in Poland in 1956; and, above all, the Hungarian revolution of 1956. (In a sense the Communists themselves fomented the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968.) But the strategic risks in Hungary in 1956, in Laos in 1961–2, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (though not in the Bay of Pigs) were evidently seen as sufficient to discourage an activist American policy. In the first case the risks suggested a policy of strategic abstention along with rhetorical condemnation through the United Nations. In the second case, after several futile efforts to influence the situation in our favour, they led in 1962 to a policy of cease-fire and attempted reconciliation through the device of coalition government. The US pursued a hands-off policy in Czechoslovakia.

When US interests seem basically involved in insurgency situations, and where *no* serious danger of intensification is perceived, the United States has not given priority to terminating hostilities or to a reconciliation policy. Post-war examples are the insurgencies in Venezuela, Colombia, Malaya, and the Philippines, and, above all, situations in which the United States has physically intervened: Guatemala in 1954; Cuba in 1961; and the Dominican Republic in 1965. In the Bay of Pigs there was no serious concern over possible Soviet intervention if the United States should succeed in overthrowing Castro and establishing a more congenial régime. The situation in Korea in 1950–53, like Vietnam, involved

a mixture of calculations producing a policy of massive US intervention although later a readiness grew to terminate on compromise grounds out of fear of the possible consequences.

The desiderata for US policy naturally vary with the circumstances and call for quite different postures on the part of the United States in the face of varying conflict threats. The posture chosen probably represents the consensus in policy-making circles. But that consensus can change. In some instances there may even be a succession of different postures over time, as perceptions of the situation and, consequently, definitions of US interests change.

When it was feared, for example, that pro-Nasser Arab radicals were seeking to seize power in Lebanon in 1958 the United Nations first ran a conflict-control operation with a UN observer force. Then the United States ran a conflict-manipulation operation with the landing of 8,000 US soldiers and 6,000 marines. US interests and perceptions had changed in the interval. A similar sort of change occurred in the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, when it later became desirable to introduce compromise-inducing OAS peace forces and UN representation. In other conflicts, such as Laos and Vietnam, the violent phases were entered into gradually after starting out as political disputes. The post-Batista Cuban situation followed this pattern to some degree. After Castro ousted the Batista dictatorship the US posture toward Cuba was at first a disinclination to foment conflict, followed by a waiting period during which the United States watched the revolution turn sour. The United States ultimately adopted a conflict-fomenting policy.

Since World War II real or suspected Communist involvement has been the principal constant in US policy toward local conflict. In the early post-war years there was ample reason for the United States to interpret local Communist take-over attempts as part of a unified world-wide conflict that was by definition unlimited. From the time of precipitate US demobilization in 1945–6 and Moscow's simultaneous reversion to a hard line, the Communists have been the primary *agents provocateurs* when it came to deliberate and wilful initiation of conflict, and at root the role the

United States has played has been a reactive one. But this defensive, responsive US strategy has sometimes been to foment a *counter-conflict*.

To give an obvious example, the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 by Cuban exiles recruited, trained, and armed by the United States represented a US-fomented conflict in reaction to a Communist régime in the western hemisphere. The lengths to which the United States was prepared to go to respond forcibly to perceived challenges were illustrated again in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The other uses of US force in recent years were in reaction to Communist initiatives. Both the Korean and Vietnam wars involved US power in response to attempted Communist take-overs. (This phenomenon has had a reciprocal aspect. Communist China probably would not tolerate a systemic reverse in North Korea or North Vietnam, nor, as the Soviet repressions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia demonstrated, will the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.)

In a curious and troublesome historical irony, it has been increasingly true that the Soviet Union interprets US policy toward local conflict precisely in compliance with Marxist expectations, reinforced by a number of instances when the United States behaved accordingly. As reported by one of the ablest American Sovietologists, on the basis of one hundred conversations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1966,

> Our improvisations are seen as fitting into a pattern of deliberate militancy reflecting a determination to intervene with force in any local situation where political trends are adverse to our interests.[4]

In part this image of the US as 'unilateral interventionist gendarme' is a creation of Communist propaganda. But in part the fact is that the United States has sometimes over-reacted militarily to a politically ambiguous threat, as in Lebanon in 1958 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965. In part, also, these actions are the lot of any self-appointed gendarme, the consequence of which has been acute ambiguities in US policy.

4. Marshall Shulman, Washington *Post*, 27 November 1966.

The varying attitudes of the United States toward specific conflict situations are obviously functions of its sense of involvement and commitment. One dilemma facing the United States – and the Soviet Union and perhaps also Communist China – is that what might be called their 'impartial' (i.e., conflict-controlling) interests often compete with their 'partial' (i.e., conflict-fomenting or conflict-manipulating) interests. A scale of partiality exists marked by the degree to which threat is perceived. The avoidance of bloodshed in conflict situations has been not infrequently overridden by other considerations. The most egregious instances are cases of internal insurrections in which a *status quo* that was at least tolerable to the United States was threatened. In recent internal conflicts involving Bolivia, Panama, Colombia, and the Congo, Washington was willing in the end to give the *status quo* some measure of support ranging from tear gas to organization of a quasi-military force.

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In other cases it can be demonstrated that since World War II a generalized US preference has existed for conflict prevention, suppression, and termination. This has been true of virtually all colonial conflicts, most inter-state local wars, and some internal conflicts – where Communism was not the prime issue. For most of these cases the clear US preference was for minimum unilateral involvement consistent with its vital interests and international responsibilities (reinforced by C. L. Sulzberger's Fourth Cardinal Rule of Diplomacy).[5]

The difficulty arises in the instances where the given conflict *is* fomented, or abetted, by one or another Communist state. There may be no longer any international Communist conspiracy – and, by contrast with Peking, Hanoi, and Havana, Moscow may seem positively conservative in its foreign policy – but in other ways the Soviet Union appears to be increasingly adjusting its tactics and configuring its military forces for more effective manipulation and exploitation for Soviet benefit of local conflicts, par-

5. 'Never get between a dog and a lamppost.' *The New York Times*, 27 May 1957.

ticularly those in the Middle East.[6] Whether this trend was or was not provoked by the great recent increases in US limited war and interventionist capabilities, Moscow can by no means be written off yet as a potential arsonist. As for the more adventurous Communist régimes, their dynamism and attempted export of messianism are too familiar to require documenting.

But to the extent that US policy toward local conflicts *in general* tends only to be defined in terms of a Communist threat, it may no longer always be soundly based. It is striking that out of fifty-four local-conflict situations since World War II involving actual or potential application of force, forty-three were not primarily US–Soviet or US–Chinese confrontations. Contrary to common belief, by no means all insurgencies have been Communist-inspired. Of the overwhelming majority of them that have taken place in the developing areas, Communist elements were prominent in no more than 50 per cent.

The contrary assumption, even when partially disproven continued to be fostered by political rhetoric, as well as by the fact that US military strategy until recently was geared primarily to great-power confrontation. But we have discovered that, alongside their conflict-fomenting rhetoric and action, Communists also conform to realities of power, of timing, and, in the case of the Soviet Union, of the drain of messianic energy that comes with growing *embourgeoisement*. The Soviet Union practices a form of conflict control authentically stated in former Chairman Khrushchev's speech on 6 January 1961 sanctifying 'wars of national liberation' but discouraging general – *and* limited – wars because of the danger of escalation. And, even for the former, Russian 'policy now is watch, help, but no deep involvement'.[7]

6. Witness, for example, Soviet Union construction in 1967–8 of its first aircraft carrier; the substantial Soviet naval power, including amphibious landing craft, operating in the Mediterranean for the first time in 1967; the display of helicopter assault forces in a Moscow air show in the summer of 1967; and the Soviet emergency air lift to supply the embattled Yemeni Republican forces in November and December 1967.

7. Statement by Soviet agent (and British defector) Harold 'Kim' Philby, interviewed in Moscow by *The New York Times*, 19 December 1967.

Controlling a conflict that is defined by Communists as a 'war of liberation' (or 'people's war', in Peking phraseology) frequently turns out to mean, both to Communists and to those who counter their efforts, the manipulation of a fight in order to 'win' without running unacceptable risk. For the period ahead, assuming the two Communist giants remain estranged, a much sharper distinction may well be made in US eyes between Soviet and Chinese involvement. If the Soviet Union has hovered, like Gertrude Stein's St Theresa, between the indoors of *status quo* and the outdoors of revolution, Communist China has given the impression of acting on the revolutionary's belief that it can only gain from stirring up the established order of things, though it is not usually willing to run high risks. And Mao Tse-tung has demonstrated the use of what are in effect conflict-control doctrines and tactics as instruments of what might be called 'safe victory'. For at least as long as they are deterred by overwhelming strategic power in Western hands, both Peking and Moscow, their various belligerent utterances aside, may in general continue to behave as Bismarck was reputed to have done when asked if he wanted war: 'Certainly not,' he replied, 'what I want is victory.'

12

Toward a Strategy of Conflict Control

What have we learned from the analysis of conflict that can contribute to a purposeful strategy of conflict control? And what, from analysis of US interests, that can lead to sound policy prescriptions?

First, some features of conflict clearly suggest patterns. Some of these patterns simply confirm the intuition of the experienced observer. For example, on the record, internal struggles have tended to be harder to control than inter-state conflicts. Considerable great-power partiality has usually been a feature of those conflicts that have proven hard to control. The more intense that partiality has been, the more the conflicts have resisted prevention, moderation, or termination of hostilities. Furthermore, the geo-political setting has related significantly to controllability, for difficult terrain and weather conditions, neighbouring states that incite or support one side or the other, and political instability in a region have all correlated negatively with control. And finally, high commitments of will and resources by adversaries have tended to go with hostilities that are hard to bring to an end.

It may not be quite so obvious, however, that, both in terms of causes and also in terms of the kinds of policy activity that might minimize violence, the distinction between inter-state and internal conflict tends to become blurred, especially in regard to the involvement of third parties. And surely it is thought-provoking that the number and variety of plausibly available violence-minimizing measures is greatest in the pre-conflict phase, progressively declining as the conflict develops to the point of hostilities. The incidence of conflict-controlling policy activity that

has been actually pursued is in inverse proportion to the chances of influencing events. Surely a crowning – and tragic – irony of modern diplomacy, quantitatively confirmed by the study of recent conflicts, is this paradox we reported earlier: only as realistic policy options dwindle does policy activity increase, often coming too late to act as a preventive and invariably trailing off again when fighting stops.

Elements of a Strategy

In regard to specific policy measures aimed at preventing, containing, or terminating inter-state and internal local conflict with a minimum of violence or danger of escalation, what does analysis suggest?

(1) A policy aimed at avoiding conflict must *stimulate and encourage economic, social, and political reforms* in the developing countries. For conflicts in the developing regions there is no question that internal reform is a central element in a conflict-control strategy. The absence of reform invariably creates a role for extremists, frequently Communist. The cause-effect relationship here has perhaps been clearest where the issue was primarily colonial; it does not take a Sophocles to describe in advance the nature of the tragedy that could eventually ensue in the southern part of Africa unless the white man's ways are mended, in both his colonial and racial policies.

(2) The logic of conflict control also suggests a prescription of *strong, cohesive, and effective local government.* (The same nostrum applies in many local inter-state conflicts.)

(3) Conflict prevention in the shape of *genuine reform must come early, preferably before disputes become military-type conflicts*, if dynamic instabilities are not to be set in motion that later suppression – or reform – will not abate.

(4) Perhaps one of the most compelling needs in the prevention of internal conflicts is the one that encounters the greatest diplomatic sensitivity: it is highly desirable to *observe and comprehend a rebellion before it starts* or at least as close to its inception

as possible. In the US *The Negro Family: A Case for National Action* (1965) by the then-Assistant Secretary of Labour, Daniel P. Moynihan, should have served as a foundation of national policy. And the encouragement of sophisticated social-science research early in Vietnam – a well-done 'Camelot' project, as it were – might have furnished better early warning and perhaps supplied better foundations to policies and commitments subsequently undertaken.

(5) A conflict-control policy will by definition seek to make military conflict less violent, destructive, or unmanageable. It is repeatedly shown that *unneeded national armaments are a source of potential danger to the peace*, a disturbing influence in the political and social life of a nation, and an unproductive burden on its economy. Some armaments are essential for paramount public purposes – for security and peace, for defence against subversion, and for internal stability. But to the extent that these purposes can be achieved either without arms, with fewer or less destructive arms, or with controlled arms, it seems to us to be clearly in the interests both of the country concerned and of the United States to reduce or limit them.

The supply of arms and military technology to developing countries has come under increasingly critical Congressional scrutiny. Perhaps Soviet policy makers have been equally concerned after the dismal performance of their Middle Eastern clients in 1967. Some arms-control measures might well be developed that could profitably be applied in various phases of local conflict.

Specific measures could take the form of: controlling the availability of arms, ammunition, spare parts, and supplies so as to set practical limits to a local war's duration – whether or not through formal disarmament agreements; discouraging competitive arming by substituting external agencies of security, national or multilateral; enforcing controls by arms suppliers; embargoing arms in the course of a given conflict; etc. The ideal here would be either to eliminate arms, or in any event not to use them (perhaps employing instead the so-called Brazilian method, whereby one side merely displays its dispositions and deployments, where-

upon the adversary surrenders, the régime resigns, or whatever). One thing that *can* be done is to revive the most useful practice of the League of Nations in widely publicizing statistics and other facts about the arms trade. Communications have improved considerably since the inter-war period; there might be few better sanctions than continuous publicity about arms races in places where they do not belong.

(6) Analysis of cases has repeatedly suggested instances when *more preventive conflict-controlling measures might have been taken through the United Nations and perhaps other international-organization machinery.* Vietnam of the early to mid 1950s is a good example. In reality, however, such multilateral processes are typically mobilized only in later, more acute stages of conflict, where the range of possible actions has become gravely restricted. Perhaps this is why the United Nations and regional organizations seem to be strained beyond measure, asked as they perpetually are to do what no one else can or will, usually after reason has fled.

(7) and (8) The tendency to work desperately for *early cease-fires in outbreaks of inter-state hostilities*, regardless of the asserted justice of the claims, has contributed strongly to short-term conflict containment in the years since World War II. Peace-keeping activities remain a vital conflict-control tool. But a related policy measure that is rarely if ever undertaken successfully is what can be called '*peace-making*', *i.e. bringing the underlying dispute to a successful peaceful resolution.*

The record here is very spotty. Until Israel invaded and held Arab territory in 1967 there was no serious follow-up either on the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, which was the 1956 issue, nor on the question of Israel's boundaries, which became the 1967 issue; the same thing is true of the promised plebiscite in Kashmir. US policy emphasis has tended to rest on the aspect of control focused on cease-fire. It has given little real attention to peaceful change. This is due in part to the difficulties of peaceful change; in part it is reflective of the degree of interest the United States has in the outcome of the issues at stake in the given conflict. The United States often takes a relativistic and

pragmatic approach to the detailed justice of the causes involved. With regard to other people's quarrels, US diplomacy has tended to conform to Charles Thayer's definition of diplomacy as mediating 'not between right and wrong but between conflicting interests'.[1]

But, as pointed out elsewhere,[2] short-term cease-fire diplomacy represents only half of the policy of 'cease-fire *and* peaceful change' frequently enunciated by the late Adlai E. Stevenson. If, according to a rational theory of conflict control, hostilities should be suppressed only in accompaniment with relief to legitimate interests at stake, even greater urgency attaches to development of better, workable, peaceful-change procedures.

(9) A conflict-control strategy may even contain arguments of US-sponsored *intensification of a given conflict* under certain circumstances. If the United States could have been certain that it would not run an intolerably high risk of bringing China or the Soviet Union more directly into the Vietnam war, it might at least be arguable that the conflict could have been ended sooner by intensifying pressures on North Vietnam. An analogous situation existed in Korea in the early 1950s. (The same fear of uncontrolled intensification moderates recurrent temptations to prove to the Arabs once and for all that their ambition to drive Israel into the sea is unrealistic, or to let Pakistan demonstrate to India the necessity of self-determination for Kashmir. It remains an open question whether the interests of world peace would be advanced, considering the intensification potential in each case.)

But in general a strategy of conflict control *emphasizes political rather than military intervention.* It focuses on *prevention rather than suppression of conflict in the developing countries.* It calls for *more purposeful policies in the political, economic, and social realms* in order to lay the foundations of social and economic health, physical security, and political consensus. It also calls for *caring less about certain pieces of global real estate*; this in turn requires

1. Charles Thayer: *Diplomat* (New York: Harper; 1959), p. 252.

2. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, 'Peacekeeping and Peacemaking', *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966.

the *mobilizing of technology to create substitutes for bases and footholds* so that they matter less both strategically and economically.

(10) and (11) Something can be learned from instances of potential local conflict in which there was no great-power partiality and therefore 'nothing happened'; as examples, the civil strife in Belgium or the Romanian–Hungarian dispute over Transylvania. On conflict-minimizing grounds a *purposeful policy of abstention or even collaboration with one's partial adversaries* might serve both national and common interests. Perhaps the United States, whatever its deeper sentiments may be, would serve its own interests by sometimes even feigning impartiality. Even better than this would be *agreements between the super powers on 'spheres of abstention'*. And even if that is not forthcoming, it will still be wise for the United States to ask of each incipient local conflict: do we care?; should we care?; and – even if the Russians care do we have to care?

(12) The other side of the coin is that a US *conflict-control strategy will be interested in prevention and suppression even if Communist take-over is not involved.* In other ways it will act as often as possible in the name of minimizing violence instead of supporting ideology. But such a policy will be sterile and unavailing unless in the end something deeper, earlier, and more basic than most of the current prescriptions for meeting insurgencies is found. Policy toward the developing countries can find new validity in William James's prescription that

> what we now need to discover in the social realm is the moral equivalent of war: something heroic that will speak to men as universally as war does . . .[3]

Put in a more contemporary idiom, ways need to be found, particularly where there is hostility and alienation, of channelling the militant enthusiasms of the younger generation toward what Konrad Lorenz, in his search for substitutes for aggressive behaviour, defines as 'genuine causes that are worth serving in the modern

3. William James: *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: Longmans, Green; 1923), p. 367.

world'.[4] Reform, justice, modernization, education, health, and political freedoms all represent causes that Western democracy can genuinely espouse better than can any other system of values.

Dilemmas of Conflict Control

No one – neither scholar nor diplomat – is entitled to pretend that the problem of local-conflict control is simple or straightforward. Far from it; it is complex and riddled with vexing dilemmas on almost every hand. Virtually each prescription in the preceding section contains complicating features requiring reflection – although not as an excuse for inaction.

A special dilemma arises from confusion over the nature of revolution and the position of the United States in a revolutionary world. As pointed out earlier, a theoretical argument can always be made that the United States, as the chief beneficiary of the established political, economic, and social orders in the world, has a kind of natural mission to use its power and resources wherever conflict emerges for the express purpose of shoring up that particular segment of the *status quo*. But this would always put the United States on the side of existing systems, always against revolution – scarcely a viable, never mind intelligent, policy.

The same ideological principle would also choose for the United States the side in an inter-state conflict that was more likely to favour stability. The Moors and Turks successfully operated a conflict-suppression policy that encouraged stability for centuries. In this century many astute men have argued that, in the short term, conflict control may be made considerably easier if colonial or white or élite control is firmly retained. Undeniably, the reform of decolonization can accelerate the process of change and may temporarily increase instability and possibly violence.

But in terms of durable, longer-range stability, the shortcomings of a policy of repression or tyranny are surely obvious. For

4. Konrad Lorenz: *On Aggression* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World; 1966), 282.

one thing, it may not always be true that measures directed against dissident groups will minimize the chance of violence. Repressive policies, unless accompanied by total social controls as in dictatorships, more often lead to new and more widespread political revolution (cf. those of 1776, 1789, and 1848, not to mention such contemporary instances as Cuba under Batista, the Dominican Republic under Trujillo, Indonesia under Sukarno, and Ghana under Nkrumah). Suppression has been a generally unsuccessful policy from the Holy Alliance through the era's Indian, Cypriot, Indonesian, Indo-Chinese, and Algerian rebellions. Longer-term conflict-control goals are better served by political democracy and civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and dissent than by short-term conflict suppression (unless the fear of intensification dominates super-power policy, as it did in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968).

Perplexing dilemmas also inhere in the attempt to minimize local conflicts by withholding, or balancing, or otherwise manipulating the supply of arms to the parties. The arms-control approach falls foul of two perplexing uncertainties. Some, including the present authors,[5] have urged measures tending to reduce regional armaments to the level needed for internal-security purposes only, with assistance toward the latter end. There are formidable problems of policy definition and execution in this formulation, but, if successful, it would ensure that whatever hostilities did break out would be conducted at a low level. There may be serious negative effects, however. A strong capability for internal policing may, by suppressing legitimate dissent, help to keep in power a tyrannical régime. Common experience indicates that, like colonial suppression, this policy tends to generate wider and more bitter later violence. And a capability for only internal security may help to make more likely external great-power interventions in the face of a later large-scale threat.

The other uncertainty concerns the balance to be established between local adversaries in inter-state disputes. If the local situa-

5. Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, 'Arms Control and the Developing Countries', *World Politics*, October 1965.

tion appears to be in military imbalance the side that believes itself stronger may be tempted to strike; if it does so, and if its assessment has been accurate, it is then likely that it will quickly overcome the victim (and violence will be ended). US Middle Eastern policy has supplied arms to avoid such local imbalances. Rationally, the sides are supposed to be mutually deterred from starting anything. But if hostilities nevertheless ensue they might well be more destructive and dangerous, and speedy termination might be much harder to achieve. On a global scale this is of course the central dilemma of super-power mutual-deterrence policy. In the developing regions the same questions would be magnified manifold in the event that nuclear weapons were to proliferate.

The United Nations and other international-organization machinery obviously have a central role to play in conflict prevention, given sufficient will on the part of their members. The ability of the UN to cope is dependent on that will. More precisely, whether the UN can play a major role in control of local conflict is a function of the policy of the super-powers, the United States no less than the Soviet Union. Regional organizations such as OAS, OAU, and NATO reflect the partial interests of their most influential members and thus find it hard to deal with disparity within their regions. International organizations generally have proved unable to cope with the new format of internal conflict – subversion, terror, insurgency, and a whole catalogue of conflict types that continue to baffle the international community. The reason is in part the legal and constitutional rules under which the international system presently operates. But it is also because of the insistence of one or both of the two super-powers that they have an interest at stake. The UN Congo operation was a notable exception in which the UN responded to an internal collapse in the face of great-power competition. But the UN inaction in the face of Vietnam demonstrated that the problem remains fundamentally unsolved.[6]

6. Lincoln P. Bloomfield: *The UN and Vietnam* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1968), particularly Chapter I.

We are thus led inescapably to question the very international system as presently organized. International law and organization are still shaped by classic notions of nation-states, sovereign equality, and legally impregnable barriers to intervention unless and until uniformed soldiers of one state cross the national boundaries of another. In regard to the old-fashioned type of inter-state conflict, the international system is geared to provide a framework for intervention in the name of both law and order. At the other extreme (particularly until the racial conflicts of southern Africa were rechristened 'international' in the 1960s by a growing UN majority), the system generally prohibited intervention in civil wars (themselves now rechristened 'insurgencies'). That the latter type of conflict appears to be more uncontrollable than the inter-state conflict probably reflects the weaknesses of the international system as much as it does any uniquely intractable quality of wars of brother against brother.

With regard to peaceful change, the dilemma is equally obvious. It is reasonable to ask whether a policy of suppression of violence should be expected to deal with anything beyond the short-run silencing of guns. After all, conflict control can be achieved temporarily by a policy of colonial suppression (as in Palestine in 1946 or Kenya and Cyprus in the 1950s) or by military victory in which one side or the other is defeated (as in Hungary in 1956). It was with this contradiction in mind that John Foster Dulles insisted on adding the words 'and justice' to Article 2, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter; 'All Members should settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not in danger.'[7] It is evident that a vexing dilemma exists in balancing the urgency of stopping potential escalation against a fair settlement.

7. John Foster Dulles considered this defect the prime tragedy leading to World War II; others have identified it as the gravest gap in modern international machinery. Dulles: *War, Peace and Change* (New York: Harpers; 1939), pp. 81–5. See also Lincoln P. Bloomfield: *Evolution or Revolution – The UN and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1957).

But the most vexing dilemma of all is how to measure the suppression of violence, as a governing principle of US foreign policy, against other overarching principles and goals. Would simple conflict *avoidance* have been a reasonable alternative to the post-war response made by the United States and others to take-over attempts by violence and terror in Greece, in Korea, and in Vietnam? Non-violence is not the only value to be cherished. The issue for the United States must never be posed in terms of suppressing violence at the expense of freedom. At root this dilemma is moral and ethical in nature and carries with it inherent limits to the pursuit of any strategy that is overweighted in favour of a single value.

John Stuart Mill made clear a century ago the painful dilemma that above all others drives the United States perpetually to consider unilateral intervention, however unplanned or unwanted. He wrote:

> The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free States. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right.[8]

At the same time, one of the most intriguing facts about local conflicts is the rather low batting average of the super-powers in directly intervening with the aim of scoring a clear-cut win. In many ways the US-sponsored attack on Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was a mirror image of the Soviet attempt to subvert and take over Iran in 1945–6. Behind both was a wider political conflict of which the case in point was merely one sector or front. In both cases one of the super-powers was a close neighbour. In both cases the neighbouring super-power fomented internal conflict through subversive guerrilla forces inside, in addition to training and introducing additional indigenous subversives from without. In both

8. John Stuart Mill, 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention', in *Dissertations and Discussions* (London: Longmans, Greene, Reader, and Dyer; 1867), pp. 176–7; originally published in *Fraser's Magazine*, December 1859.

cases justification for intervention was found in historic precedents and frameworks (spheres-of-influence treaties in Iran and the Monroe doctrine in Cuba). In both instances current international law, including the UN Charter, expressly forbade the policies the super-powers pursued. And in both instances the super-powers were unsuccessful in their aim of overthrowing the neighbouring régime.

Even in less dramatic instances of US–Soviet or US–Chinese proxy struggles for control or influence or for countering the influence of the other, it is by no means clear that unopposed attempts to 'penetrate' bring much reward in this day of sensitive nationalist emotions. Is the Soviet Union really better off with a resentful, trouble-making ally in Cuba that costs $1 million a day to support, with little to show in return, ideological or economic? Would it have advanced either US interests or the prospects for regional peace if the United States had reacted massively in opposition to Chinese Communist attempts to penetrate certain African countries in the early 1960s, attempts that almost uniformly backfired?[9] Here, too, the key is *selective* intervention – and equally deliberate selective non-intervention. Here, too, the strategic framework for policy should give equal weight to opposing clear-cut acts of aggression and to supporting conflict-control activity.

The Way Ahead

It is not easy to find a posture for the United States toward local conflict that will be either always consistent or always successful. The former may be undesirable and the latter impossible. US foreign policy takes its cues not only from what it wants of the world but also from the complex nature of the international scene and of the forces and pressures that play across it. This in turn

9. As Soviet agent Harold Philby put it (regarding deep Soviet involvement in Africa, in particular Ghana), it was 'millions of rubles down the drain'. Interview with *The New York Times*, 19 December 1967.

gives rise to conflicting interpretations of events and to the setting of frequently incompatible goals and priorities.

Having suggested a broad range of potential control measures ('Elements of a Strategy', p. 280) the question remains as to whether the United States ought or ought not to sponsor some or all of them. Some might, if they are taken, disadvantage the United States in the pursuit of its particular objectives as seen at the time. Other measures will, if taken, clearly support the nation's general interest in stability and peace. Still others may appear to be disadvantageous, but actually may have the effect of sparing the United States from committing what looks in retrospect like a blunder.

The changing international scene is bound to affect the policy calculations the United States will be making on this issue in the period ahead. The nature and intensity of US interests in local conflicts has been defined so far largely by the extent of the entanglement of those conflicts in the Cold War. If both the Communist and the Western worlds continue to grow more pluralistic, and if new political issues, new centres of military power and political activity, and new patterns of conflict and alignment arise to complicate or even subordinate Cold War issues, US policies and strategies of intervention and conflict control will have to become much more selective and diversified.

But even in today's ambiguous world the options open to the United States are not necessarily mutually antagonistic. A selective strategy of conflict control would not necessarily compete or clash at all points with other legitimate American strategies. Moreover, there is nothing innate or eternally valid about the particular way the United States has played its world role in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

Historically there have been two ways for the US to play that role. One flourished in the 1920s and 1930s and took the form of a pretence that the United States had *no* role to play. Generally, it followed Mark Twain's precept that 'to do good is noble. To tell others to do good is also noble and a lot less trouble.' Disregarding any analogies to Vietnam, it remains everlastingly true

that Hitler and Imperial Japan in the 1930s were thus encouraged to believe that no significant obstacles lay in their paths of conquest.

The second way, shaped by the shock of emergence from isolation, was for the US to project its power to deter aggression, oppose injustice, support friends, and police disorder. But this active mode of national behaviour has within it two further options: one is for the United States to project its power with partiality (taking sides in local disputes and conflicts in the developing areas), on the assumption that US interests are vitally involved in virtually all substantive outcomes; the other would be to project US power as a form of influence aimed above all at the goal of preventing, moderating, and terminating local conflict, always with regard for justice, but with lessened partiality. Both are forms of intervention. Indeed, a strategy of conflict control is far from isolationist, or passive. As we have tried to show, it may at times call for intervention with economic, social, political, diplomatic, perhaps military, tools even on occasions when no Communist elements are involved and the United States is thus not directly challenged or threatened. At other times, the prescription may be for a strategy of withdrawal or abstention as much as for one of participation, depending on the effect a given act by an external power is likely to have on the probable course of the conflict. In short, it calls for selective intervention or nonintervention in accordance with conflict-control criteria, and above all it emphasizes political rather than military intervention The latter requirement is urgently underscored by the reactions to the Vietnam war.

*

The United States is not alone in the world. Even if it were to adopt a conflict-control strategy as a guiding principle, as long as other great powers chose to challenge and threaten, there might still be occasions when this country would feel itself obliged to resort to unilateral military intervention in local-conflict situations.


The most crucial element in local-conflict control for the future

is thus the degree to which not only the United States but also the Soviet Union and China view their vital interests as seriously involved; equally important is the degree to which they can view a given conflict impartially rather than favour one side. Perhaps the most important task of diplomacy in the years ahead will be to minimize the former and strengthen the latter. American policy can contribute to this high purpose by constantly re-examining the premisses of its own actions.


In the end, policy will still operate in the grey areas, unable – for sound reasons – to occupy either the black or white. Freedom and justice will remain the highest values of political ethics. But they may sometimes become confused with power and prestige. Both world peace and the deepest American values can be served by a strategy of conflict control that vigorously seeks to support freedom and justice in ways that purposefully minimize violence.

APPENDICES

Appendix A The Structure of Local Conflict




Phase of Conflict	Threshold of Transition Between Phases	Description of Phase or Transition
Ph. I		Dispute, not perceived in military terms by either party
	I–II	Introduction of military option by one or both parties
Ph. II		Conflict, perceived in military terms by one or both parties
	II–III	Outbreak of hostilities
Ph. III		Hostilities
	III–IV	Termination of hostilities
Ph. IV		Post-hostilities, but conflict still perceived in potentially military terms by at least one party
	IV–V	End of conflict
Ph. V		Dispute, not perceived in military terms by either party
	S	Settlement of dispute




Crucial Factors Bearing on Transition
Toward Conflict Control (Away from Violence)
Away from Conflict Control (Toward Violence)
• Tending to keep dispute non-military
• Tending toward settlement
• Tending to introduce military option
• Tending away from settlement
(Factors operating during Phase I have combined to push the dispute across the threshold to Phase II, making it a conflict.)
• Inhibiting the outbreak of hostilities
• Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities
• Tending toward settlement
• Promoting the outbreak of hostilities
• Expanding the scale/scope of potential hostilities
• Tending away from settlement
(Factors operating during Phase II have combined to push the conflict across the threshold to Phase III, generating hostilities.)
• Moderating hostilities
• Terminating hostilities
• Tending toward settlement
• Intensifying hostilities
• Continuing hostilities
• Tending away from settlement
(Factors operating during Phase III have combined to push the conflict across the threshold to Phase IV, terminating actual fighting.)
• Inhibiting the resumption of hostilities
• Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities
• Tending toward settlement
• Promoting the resumption of hostilities
• Expanding the scale/scope of potential hostilities
• Tending away from settlement
(Factors operating during previous phases have combined to remove the military option of both adversaries, but the underlying dispute remains.)
• Tending to keep dispute non-military
• Tending toward settlement
• Tending to introduce military option
• Tending away from settlement
(Factors operating during previous phases—or factors unrelated to the conflict itself—have combined to bring the underlying dispute to settlement.)
Pre-Dispute
DISPUTE
CONFLICT
PRE-HOSTILITIES
HOSTILITIES
POST-HOSTILITIES
Dispute Settled

Appendix B The Structure of Local-conflict Control



Phase of Conflict	Threshold of Transition Between Phases	Description of Phase or Transition
Ph. I		Dispute, not perceived in military terms by either party
	I–II	Introduction of military option by one or both parties
Ph. II		Conflict, perceived in military terms by one or both parties
	II–III	Outbreak of hostilities
Ph. III		Hostilities
	III–IV	Termination of hostilities
Ph. IV		Post-hostilities, but conflict still perceived in potentially military terms by at least one party
	IV–V	End of conflict
Ph. V		Dispute, not perceived in military terms by either party
	S	Settlement of dispute



Crucial Factors Bearing on Transition: Toward Conflict Control (Away from Violence)	Crucial Factors Bearing on Transition: Away from Conflict Control (Toward Violence)	Conflict-Control Policy Objectives
• Tending to keep dispute non-military • Tending toward settlement	• Tending to introduce military option • Tending away from settlement	• Keeping dispute non-military • Settling the dispute
(Factors operating during Phase I have combined to push the dispute across the threshold to Phase II, making it a conflict.)		
• Inhibiting the outbreak of hostilities • Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities • Tending toward settlement	• Promoting the outbreak of hostilities • Expanding the scale/scope of potential hostilities • Tending away from settlement	• Preventing the outbreak of hostilities • Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities • Settling the dispute
(Factors operating during Phase II have combined to push the conflict across the threshold to Phase III, generating hostilities.)		
• Moderating hostilities • Terminating hostilities • Tending toward settlement	• Intensifying hostilities • Continuing hostilities • Tending away from settlement	• Moderating hostilities • Terminating hostilities • Settling the dispute
(Factors operating during Phase III have combined to push the conflict across the threshold to Phase IV, terminating actual fighting.)		
• Inhibiting the resumption of hostilities • Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities • Tending toward settlement	• Promoting the resumption of hostilities • Expanding the scale/scope of potential hostilities • Tending away from settlement	• Preventing the resumption of hostilities • Restricting the scale/scope of potential hostilities • Settling the dispute
(Factors operating during the previous phases have combined to remove the military option of both adversaries, but the underlying dispute remains.)		
• Tending to keep dispute non-military • Tending toward settlement	• Tending to introduce military option • Tending away from settlement	• Keeping dispute non-military • Settling the dispute
(Factors operating during previous phases — or factors unrelated to the conflict itself — have combined to bring the underlying dispute to settlement.)		

Appendix C The Fifty-four Local Conflicts

Conventional Inter-state	Unconventional Inter-state	Internal with Significant External Involvement	Primarily Internal	Colonial
○ Aden–Yemen, 1954–9	◇ Indonesia–Malaysia, 1963–5	□ Bay of Pigs, 1960–61	◇ Chinese civil war, 1945–9	△ Algeria, 1954–62
△ Algeria–Morocco, 1962–3	◇ Vietnam, 1959–		□ Colombia, 1960–	△ Angola, 1961–
○ Arabs–Israel, 1967			△ Congo, 1960–64	○ Cyprus, 1952–9
□ Honduras–Nicaragua, 1957		◇ Burma–Nationalist China, 1950–54	□ Costa Rica, 1947	△ French Cameroun, 1955–60
◇ India–China, 1954–62		◇ Burmese Civil War, 1948–54	□ Cuba, 1958–9	△ French Morocco, 1952–6
◇ Kashmir, 1947–9		△ Congo (Katanga), 1961–4	□ Dominican Republic, 1961–2	◇ Goa, 1961–2
◇ Kashmir, 1965		□ Costa Rica, 1955	◇ India, 1945–8	◇ Indo-China, 1945–54
◇ Korea, 1950–53		○ Cyprus, 1963–	○ Iraq (Kurds), 1959–63	◇ Indonesia, 1945–9

○ Kuwait–Iraq 1961 △ Morocco–Spanish Morocco. 1957–8 ○ Palestine, 1945–8 ◇ Quemoy–Matsu, 1954–8 △ Somalia–Ethiopia–Kenya, 1960–64 ○ Soviet–Iran, 1941–7 ○ Suez, 1956		□ Dominican Republic, 1965 Greece, 1944–9 □ Guatemala, 1954 ◇ Laos, 1959–61 ◇ Malaya, 1948–60 △ Nigeria, 1967 ◇ Tibet, 1955–9 □ Venezuela, 1960–63 ○ Yemen, 1962–	○ Lebanon, 1958 ◇ Philippines, 1948–54	△ Kenya, 1952–8 △ Madagascar, 1947 ○ Muscat-Oman, 1956–8 ◇ West Irian, 1962–3

Key: △ Africa ◇ Asia □ Latin America ○ Middle East

Appendix D Model of US Policy Preference and Activities toward Local Conflicts outside Europe

INTER-STATE CONFLICTS

General preference for conflict: prevention, suppression, *termination*

U S considers status quo intolerable

Preventive efforts: diplomatic, military, arms control

OUTBREAK

SETTLEMENT

No direct Soviet or Chinese advantage from conflict suppression

Direct Soviet or Chinese advantage from conflict suppression

Preventive efforts: political, economic, social

SETTLEMENT


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
U S considers *status quo* intolerable

Primary US interest in who wins

No strong US interest in who wins

INTERNAL CONFLICTS




ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL, U S POLICY:
BUT IF,
THEN U S POLICY:
No direct Soviet or Chinese advantage from conflict suppression
Suppression; termination; use of international organization
Direct Soviet or Chinese advantage from conflict suppression
U S disfavours suppression or intervention
Serious danger of great-power intensification
Terminate
Go to international organization
No serious danger of great-power intensification
Terminate only on favourable terms
Primary U S interest in who wins
Possible U S intervention
Serious danger of great-power intensification; or inaccessibility; or low probability of success
Terminate
No serious danger of great-power intensification; or accessibility; or high probability of success
Terminate only on favourable terms
No strong U S interest in who wins
No U S intervention
Ph. IV: Conflict
Post-Hostilities

Index